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



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
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BRIEF OUTLINE

OF THE

STUDY OF THEOLOGY,

DRAWN UP TO SERVE AS THE

Basis of Introductory Lectures.

BY THE LATE

DR. FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER.

TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED

REMINISCENCES OF SCHLEIERMACHER,

BY

DR. FRIEDRICH LÜCKE.

Translated from the German by

WILLIAM FARRER, LL.B.

EDINBURGH:

T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.


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TO THE REVEREND

JOHN PYE SMITH, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.,

ETC., ETC.,

FIFTY YEARS TUTOR IN THE PROTESTANT DISSIDENT
COLLEGE AT HOMERTON.

Ἡδὺς ἐκείνος ὁ φίλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἡμετέρας

NEILUS, *Episc. et Mart.*

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR,

It is not without some hesitation and inward debate, that I have come to the resolution of dignifying my present labour by connecting it, in this manner, with your honoured name.

Not that I have any fear of being called to account by *yourself*, for the assumption of such a liberty. Having been one of the first to sanction the undertaking, you will not repudiate the result of its fulfilment.

But there are many who delight to hold you in honour, and who, without misgiving, may be called Nathanaels in piety, simplicity, and zeal—possibly, also, in the want of a large intellectual sympathy with regard to the various modes in which the *elements* of Religion, material and formal, are capable of being apprehended—to whom

every truly German theologian is little better than a Nazarene. My fear is, lest some individuals of this class should interpret my sincere and uncaptious homage into an attempt to identify you with the details of doctrine and sentiment contained or implied in the following pages. Certainly, if such an attempt were made, it could be fruitful of evil to none save its author. *You* could not suffer: the Church and the World know you too well.

Considerate readers, however, will, I trust, bear in mind that a Translator, by the mere act of translation, does not even profess his *own* adherence to the system of his author. If it were so, a man might easily come to be esteemed the luckless champion of half-a-dozen different and hostile creeds. Much less, then, is the imputation of such an adherence implied in a mere Dedication.

There *are* reasons, moreover, for connecting your name with that of Schleiermacher: especially in an age which groans over the want of Union in the Church, and yet, in too many instances, *hugs* that mental littleness which renders Union impossible; an age, therefore, which cannot *afford* that any real analogy or identity between the services attempted or accomplished by men of God in different countries and under different circumstances, should be overlooked or ignored. The invidiousness, not to say the impertinence, of a formal *comparison* between yourself and the great German, I would wholly avoid. I should be very unworthy, too, to write myself your Pupil, if I were ignorant or forgetful of the existence of

an important *difference*, in principle as well as in detail, between your system and his. Yet if (though under different circumstances and in spheres of different extent) to combat alike, for love of the same Kingly Prophet and Priest of Humanity, against that bondage of the letter, which leaves no room for a free, symmetrical developement of the higher life in man, but condemns even the renewed mind to a state of hopeless pupillage,—against that inflated fanaticism, which dreams that it can dispense with learning, and looks for the fire-baptism of Pentecost and the success of the Apostolic preachers *without* their previous training under the Prince of all Instructors,—and last, not least, against that haughty, Gorgon-eyed, soul-freezing Rationalism, which tends to confound Eternal Reason with the lean results of Human Reasoning, Faith with logical Understanding, and Religion with Morality,—if the participation in this grand conflict of principle (πρὸς τὰ πνευματικά τῆς ποικίλης ἐν τοῖς ἐκκλησιαστικῇς) may form a bond of union between Christian Teachers of different countries and of different Church-Communities: then, doubtless, in that world in which *all* truth-loving spirits come to understand one another, there will be no lack of sympathy between yourself and him.

“Yet a little while” is this mutual understanding delayed! The *day* of conflict and toil—in its burden and heat, at least—is almost ended. A brief interval of venerable repose—(may it yet be long enough for the accomplishment of some parting service to the Church, in which ages unborn shall rejoice!)—of repose consecrated

by the respect, the sympathy, the prayers, of all who know how to appreciate the refinement of the gentleman, the learning of the scholar, the fidelity of the friend, the simplicity and integrity of the man of God—and then—"the night cometh"! A night, not shadowy, phantasmal, drear, like that through which the noblest Preceptor of Heathenism had to grope his uncertain way; but clear, calm, cloudless, illumined by the presence of the Perfected through Suffering, and fading into the pale dawn of Light Eternal!

In grateful acknowledgment of a relation which, although formally at an end, will, I trust, continue in some sense to have a virtual existence until, in one or both of us, the "mortal shall have put on immortality," I beg permission to lay this humble offering, though of foreign growth, upon the altar of your jubilee rejoicing; and once again to subscribe myself,

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR,

With the greatest respect,

Your obliged and affectionate Pupil,

WILLIAM FARRER.

LONDON, April 1850.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE purpose of this work is not, directly, to add another English verdict to those which have already been uttered among us respecting the character and merits (or demerits, as some would be ready to suggest) of Schleiermacher; but rather to furnish a small contribution, at least, towards the means by which the English Theologian may be enabled to form an independent judgment with regard to the matter. Truly it is but a *small* contribution which we here present; yet few, we think, will venture to deny that our selection is about the best that could be made by way of a beginning.* If we had wished to exhibit the rhetorical and poetic element of Schleiermacher's genius, or to illustrate the genetic developement of his system, we should certainly have commenced with his "Discourses on Religion." In so doing, however, we should have fallen into the old

* It must not be forgotten, however, that a specimen of Schleiermacher's criticism appeared in England as early as the year 1825, in a translation of his "Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke,"—attributed to that eminently learned prelate, the present Bishop of St. David's, (then the Rev. Connop Thirlwall.)

blunder of showing but a brick or two as a specimen of the entire edifice; or at all events, of inviting men to judge of the size and splendour of the temple from a sight of its mere approaches. Most readers, of the class for whom this book is intended, will, we think, prefer a *bird's-eye view of the plan and frame-work of the whole structure*. And this is what we have sought to furnish here.

In so far as an introduction was necessary, it has been thought that this want would be best supplied in a translation of the "Reminiscences of Schleiermacher," which were published in the "Studien und Kritiken," very soon after his death, by his friend and disciple, Dr. Lücke. To the warm feeling and lively interest embodied in them by reason of the circumstances under which they were composed, they unite a sober judgment respecting the theological position, merits, and influence of Schleiermacher,—a judgment which the Translator cannot help regarding as correct in the main, though his own stand-point as an English Congregationalist would prevent him from accepting all the views of the German Presbyterian Professor. Most firmly does he believe, most heartily does he rejoice in, the testimony of Dr. Lücke, that Schleiermacher had no intention of founding a *school*, in the ordinary sense of that term. It is the misfortune of the world, and pre-eminently the misfortune of the Church, that when God sends a great man upon the earth, he is too often forthwith regarded by the majority of those who have, in some sort, a receptivity for his communications, not as a *force*. to

stimulate all powers of life in man, both human and Divine, to fresh activity and incessant progress, but rather as a kind of *incarnate law* or *final norm*, to mark for them, everlastingly, (so far as this world is concerned), the limits of the true and the attainable. Yet it can hardly be said that this has been the case with regard to Schleiermacher, at least in his own country. The worthiest and most reverent of his disciples whom it has been the happiness of the writer to know, are men who, so to speak, have *got beyond* Schleiermacher; but men who, at the same time, are ever free to confess that, under the blessing of the Only Wise, it was Schleiermacher himself *who helped them to do so*. It may be quite true, as one of our reviews, (a Hercules for strength from its very cradle), has lately affirmed, in an article, the ability of which it would be simply absurd to question, and almost superfluous to praise,—that “to revive his (Schleiermacher’s) creed at this time of day, in any considerable school of Germany, would be as easy as to restore the Continental system;” albeit the writer has evidently allowed himself to state the case *quite strongly enough*, as men are wont to do when writing in earnest. According to our thinking, however, there is *one* thing which would be *less easy still*; and that is, to *annihilate the influence* which Schleiermacher has exerted, and is yet exerting, upon the character, the contents, and the developement of theology in Germany, and the consequent necessity for a certain degree of acquaintance with his system, on the part of every theologian who desires both historically and spiri-

tually to *understand* the Christianity of the nineteenth century, in its various forms of manifestation.*

There are three principal objects to be kept in view in a translation of this kind: *strict fidelity* to the author's meaning, so far as it is ascertained; a *general adherence* to his *terminology*; and a *resistance*, as effectual as may be, to the *barbarizing* influence which the practice of translation is apt to exert upon the style of the translator. The first and the last of these particulars are of the very essence of a translation, properly so called. The importance of the second of them will be seen at once by a reference to the fact that a great, original thinker, in any department of human science, rarely fails to introduce old and familiar terms into the midst of new associations and uses, as well as to frame new words for the expression of his own conceptions or classifications. All the three points just named have been regarded in the present instance; with what success the reader will determine. The Translator feels constrained to own, that in regard to the last of them his success has not always been proportioned to his wishes. Naturally inclined to the construction of long, intricate, and cumbrous periods, he has had to deal with materials calculated rather to aggravate this tendency than to correct it. A glance at Dr. Lücke's article will suffice to show the truth of this assertion in so far as he is con-

* The "Tabular Sketch" which follows this Preface makes no pretension to absolute completeness; but it is believed to be correct as far as it goes, and may serve to elucidate some passages in the "Reminiscences" which might otherwise be obscure.

earned; and the extremely terse, compressed, and elliptical style and structure adopted in the present work of Schleiermacher's, being contrary to the general and natural character of his style as exemplified in his other productions, contributes to augment the difficulty of a close and yet tolerably flowing translation into English, — a difficulty which, in German works of this class, is always sufficiently formidable. The Translator confidently believes, however, that those readers who are best qualified to judge, will be precisely the readiest to make all reasonable allowance for defects which could hardly be avoided; and if the simple commendation of a conscientious and not wholly unsuccessful effort to retain and convey the meaning of the original be accorded to him, he is content to leave all minor blemishes to that indulgent consideration which is seldom refused to a first appearance in the more settled and permanent world of literature.*

It was at one time the intention of the Translator to prefix to the work a brief account of the *progress* which has been made, in Germany, in the preliminary discipline called Theological Encyclopædia, since the second edition of Schleiermacher's book appeared; especially by the Theologians of what is called, with sufficient propriety, the Middle School—who, without sacrificing any part of the real gain to Theology involved in the labours

* Some of the more important *subintelligenda* which have been supplied, are enclosed within brackets,—especially those about which there might be a difference of opinion: but it would have been impossible,—and if possible, useless,—to have adopted this course universally.

of Schleiermacher, have succeeded in giving to the *Scriptural norm* of Christian Faith and Life a position more in accordance, not only with its own just claims, but also with the real exigencies of the devout consciousness, than that which seems to have been assigned to it in his system. But upon further consideration, the Translator was led to think that this purpose might be more suitably carried out elsewhere; and conceiving that if the adage about a *great book* is worth anything at all, it must apply with tenfold emphasis in the case of a large *introduction* to a *small* one, he was withheld from extending the present Preface, by the salutary fear that, if he did so, the reader might possibly hold himself excused from looking into it at all.

For the very extensive use which has been made of capitals and italics in the larger part of this volume, the Translator is exclusively responsible. His object has been to assist the reader in what Jean Paul calls the *summary apprehension* of the successive paragraphs; a kind of aid which the increasing productivity of the press and the pen is likely to leave us small room for despising.

It only remains to be stated, that if the present work should meet with due encouragement, it may probably be followed by the appearance of translations from other writings of the same author.

LONDON, April 1850.

TABULAR SKETCH

OF THE

CHIEF FACTS AND DATES IN THE LIFE OF SCHLEIERMACHER.

1768. Nov. 21, FRIEDRICH DANIEL ERNST SCHLEIERMACHER born at Breslau, in Silesia.

Went to the school of the United Brethren at Niesky, in Upper Lusatia; and subsequently to the Theological Seminary of the same community at Gnadau, in Saxony.

1787. Left the Moravian Communion. Studied at the University of Halle, under Nösselt, Knapp, Eberhard, and Wolf.

Became Tutor in the family of Count Dohna-Schlobitten, of Finkenstein in Prussia.

Removed to Berlin, to the Seminary for Masters of Classical Schools (in the capacity of Assistant-Teacher).

1794. His ordination. Assistant-Minister at Landsberg on the Warthe, in Brandenburg.

1806-1802. Preacher at the Charité (the principal Hospital) in Berlin. Assisted the elder Sack (afterwards Bishop Sack) in translating "Blair's Sermons." Issued a translation of Fawcett's "Sermons," (Berlin, 1798). Took part with the brothers Schlegel in the "Athenæum." Published his "Discourses on Religion," (Berlin, 1799); "Monologues," (Berlin, 1800); "Letters of a Preacher residing out of Berlin," (an *occasional* production—Berlin, 1800); and a first collection of "Sermons," (Berlin, 1801). He also agreed to join Friedrich Schlegel in translating Plato, but afterwards undertook the work alone.

1802. Court-Chaplain (Minister of the Court-Church) at Stolpe, in Pomerania.

1803. "First Lines of a Criticism of the Doctrine of Morals, as hitherto treated," (Berlin).

1804. "Two Non-Prejudicative Opinions," &c., (Berlin). First volume of Plato. Declined a call to the University of Würzburg. Appointed University Preacher, and Professor Extraordinary of Theology and Philosophy at Halle.
1806. "Christmas, a Dialogue," (Halle).
1807. (Halle attached to the Kingdom of Westphalia). Returned to Berlin, and lectured there. "Critical Letter on the so-called First Epistle of Paul to Timothy," (Berlin, 1807). "Occasional Thoughts on Universities, in the German sense," (Berlin, 1808).
1809. Minister of Trinity Church, Berlin. His marriage.
1810. Professor in the New University of Berlin. Attached to the Ministry of the Interior for the Department of Public Instruction.
1811. Member of the Academy of Sciences. "Brief Outline of the Study of Theology."
1814. Secretary of the Philosophical Class in the Academy. Release from his connexion with the Ministry of the Interior.
1817. "Critical Essay on the Gospel of Luke." President of the Berlin Synod.
- 1817-18. Controversy with Von Ammon.
- 1821-22. "Connected Exhibition of the Christian Faith, according to the Principles of the Evangelical Church."
1828. Establishment of the "Studien und Kritiken"—a genuine product of his spirit, though not directed by him.
1834. Feb. 12. Died at Berlin. His remains are interred in the cemetery of his parish, at some little distance from the city on its southern side. A simple monument, with a bust in white marble, of exquisite workmanship (by Rauch), has been erected over his grave.


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REMINISCENCES
OF
SCHLEIERMACHER.

BY
DR. FRIEDRICH LÜCKE.



REMINISCENCES

OF

SCHLEIERMACHER.

OFTEN, within the present lustrum, has it been our painful lot to behold some of the most distinguished men of our nation depart from amongst us; precisely those to whom, in different departments of the intellectual life, the present generation is indebted for its peculiar character and progress.

Barthold Niebuhr, the great explorer of history, opens this series of illustrious dead; at the commencement of a season of commotion, in which more general calamity might possibly occasion the particular loss of this great man to be felt less at the moment, though the sorrow to which the event gave rise could not be wholly suppressed. Goethe, Hegel, and others, have followed him. Now, Schleiermacher, too, is no longer among us. Thus are the great personalities, the stars, the luminaries of our age, one after another, taken away from us. This is a circumstance which happens in accordance with the everlasting order of nature. Still, it is not on that account any the less painful. He who loves the heights and the mountains, descends unwillingly into the level plain. And yet this alternation of mountain and plain, of heights and levels, is, in the

spiritual world also, order and law. The history of humanity pursues its course between concentration and origination in distinguished individuals, and gradual diffusion and developement in the mass. Thus has it been ordained, even from the beginning, by Divine wisdom and love. No one ought to complain of this arrangement; least of all he who has been taught by the Gospel to discern even in death the law of life, and in the evanescent kingdom of nature the everlasting kingdom of Divine grace.

Schleiermacher, at a recent Festival of the Dead,* while instructing and consoling a Christian assembly with regard to the loss of distinguished men, by a reference to the arrangements of the Divine kingdom, uttered these memorable words: "This, too, is God's arrangement,—that there exists among the children of men a great, yea, often a very great difference, as well in relation to the intellectual gifts with which God has furnished them, as to the position which he has assigned them, and to those external conditions of efficiency by which one man seems to be favoured more than another. This difference exists, and we dare not deny it; so that when we look at human affairs in a general point of view, we cannot say that one human life is of the same value as another. And this Divine arrangement—where could it have been more clearly manifested,—what could have been a stronger expression of it, than the difference which obtained between the Redeemer and all other

* The Festival of the Dead (Todtenfest, Gedächtniss-Feier der Verstorbenen) is an annual holiday of the Lutheran Church, from which it has passed over into, or been retained by, the United Evangelical Church of Prussia. It is a simple *commemoration* of the departed, with a view to the edification of the living; and seems to have been instituted, in accordance with that *conservative* principle by which the Lutheran system is so extensively characterized, in place of the Romanist festival of All Souls.—Tr.

children of men? That was the highest point to which this diversity amongst men was to rise: that in the midst of the sinful race of men the Word was to become flesh,—that the express image of God was to walk amongst them. In comparison with this difference, every other may well disappear; and yet he who was thus distinguished, was scarcely permitted to attain the bloom of manhood, but was then to be taken away hence again. And what did he send in his room? By what means was the work which he had begun, to be now further carried on? He sent the Spirit of Truth: he poured out upon his disciples this Spirit, who took of that which was his, and made it clear to them,—who distributed gifts, and, according to his good pleasure, left not himself without witness, in a greater or smaller degree, in one and another. And thus it is, too, in all human affairs. Oh! when we call up before our minds, as a whole and in detail, the chequered web of our social affairs, consisting as it does of manifold complications, truly, how much seems often to rest on *one* beloved head! How often is the experience repeated, that upon the determination of a single individual, upon the *fact* of its coming to maturity or the contrary, a large part of the immediately ensuing course of human affairs depends,—war and peace, order or destruction, prosperity or ruin! Thus does it happen with regard to the civic concerns of men. The case is the same, too, if we have regard to the cultivation of their mental powers; in which, also, it often happens that one man outshines *all* others by a great example, and levels paths which were before blocked up: but it is necessary that he should be protected in his activity for a certain time, if the newly-opened field is not to be buried again under rubbish, and nothing to remain but what existed before

him. Let us not forget, however, that on the one hand the Redeemer was the culminating point, the highest summit of this Divine arrangement; but that he was also, on the other hand, the being through whom the prophecy was to receive its accomplishment,—that every valley should be filled up, and every height be made plain. And the more the community of man is developed,—the more widely the points of friendly contact, which as a common bond of union embrace all, extend,—the greater the influences which diffuse themselves from every part over the whole—so much the smaller does the influence of individual men become. Most of all is this intended to be the case, most of all is it actually the case, in the Church of the Lord, with regard to all that belongs to the concerns of salvation. It is true that even here, we see how, immediately in the room of the Saviour, the Spirit, poured out by him, moulded as its especial instruments only his apostles and some *few* individuals besides; and subsequently, too, we see that even the Church of Christ, from time to time, fell into such outward entanglements or such inward obscurations, that it became necessary for the Spirit of God to impart to individuals an especial energy, to kindle up an especially clear light in *one*, or in a *few* souls, in order that thus there might proceed from certain particular points a new life, which should continue to diffuse itself, should pervade the darkness, and, in the name of the Lord, awaken those who were dead to a new and fresh life again. But this is what constitutes our true confidence in the kingdom of God and its continuance,—that there are continually *fewer and fewer* of these disturbances, and that for this reason the necessity that individuals should be prominent in the kingdom of the Lord, also becomes more rare. If the

Spirit of God is continually to advance in the accomplishment of his work in the human race, his influence must be exercised upon men more and more on every hand [all-sidedly], his presence and operation must be capable of being perceived in every human life; and in the same measure must the disparity diminish amongst those who have found salvation in the name of the Lord, and are now seeking to diffuse that salvation more widely throughout the world. *Therefore, as often as we derive from the life and activity of any individual, the feeling that he is, in a greater or smaller degree, an especial instrument of God and of his Spirit, it is very possible that when the period of his activity comes to an end, a feeling of anxiety may arise in our hearts; but this anxiety is not the product of faith. Faith ought to know that the Lord, when he recalls one, also calls and appoints another; and he will never be at a loss for instruments to accomplish that which, in his Son and through him, is already accomplished everlastingly, and in the progress of time shall be ever more and more accomplished, through the increasingly equable co-operation of human energies, enlightened and directed by God."*

Thus has the Christian sage, by his truly prophetic interpretation of the arrangements of the Divine kingdom, consoled us by anticipation, as it were, for our loss of him, and taken away from our remembrance and contemplation of him that sting, which, apart from the influence of Christian faith and hope, would have been all the more painful, in proportion to the greatness of the loss which we suffer through his death.

Schleiermacher belongs to that class of highly-gifted men who, in every direction in which their outward and inward calling leads them, diffuse light and life, create, arrange, and rule. His was one of the kingly, domin-

ant natures. He was active in the most various departments and directions; he was distinguished and pre-eminent in them all. He was a learned theologian and a preacher of the word of God, a philosopher and philologist: he is known to the mass of the public as a talented writer upon the most important affairs of the day; and as a man of business, too, he was, in his own circle, beloved and highly esteemed.

It is not my purpose to set forth the great gifts and merits of Schleiermacher, completely and in every aspect. This is the business of an exact biography, for the production of which there will be no lack either of ability or inclination, among those who constituted the more familiar circle of his latter years. I confine myself to that department in which Schleiermacher was, from the very first, at home: that to which, as to inward and outward vocation, he especially belonged: the department of Theology and the Church. In this department, he marks an *epoch* as few else have done. Dr. Neander, just after he had received intelligence of the death of his beloved instructor and colleague, accompanied the announcement of it to his hearers with these words: 'The man is departed, from whom will be dated, for the future, a new epoch in theology.' There will not be wanting those who, from ignorance, or petty jealousy, or party spirit, will deny this affirmation. But I anticipate, without anxiety, that the more his efficient activity shall unfold itself in its entire extent and connexion, posterity, with adequate knowledge, and without envy or partiality, will confirm the verdict pronounced in the first moment of sorrow. It will, it must declare him to be the man with whom a new tendency, in Theology and in the Church, had its energetic commencement.

In general, Schleiermacher marks the *transition* of German Protestant Theology from the more *negative-critical dispersing and destroying*, tendency to that *reconstructive, positive reformation* with which we are now occupied. This reformation includes two elements; a regression and a progress. By the regression involved, I mean the renewed reception of positive Christianity into the whole depth and capacity of the devout mind; the restoration of severe, connected Christian thinking, and the reanimation of the idea of ecclesiastical fellowship. These are the unalterable elements of every healthy Christian life. Our Protestant Theology and Church are built upon them. They can never become *lost* in the Church of the Lord. But they were, for a time, more or less obscured, scattered, and deprived of strength, among ourselves. The problem of the present is, to animate, to collect, to strengthen them anew. This, however, is not possible, apart from the living progress of that science, which, advancingly with the progress of time, separates all that is purely human, all that is accidental and inessential, all that is imposed and arbitrary from the original Word of God, and, amidst the letter and the form, makes the living spirit free and active; but which, at the same time, just by means of the spirit thus made free, preserves and animates the original form, and while opening up the understanding of the Word of God in its height and depth, on the other hand closes the path of contradiction and doubt for ever. The mode of procedure of this science will be chiefly critical. *All* criticism is not advancing and reformatory. We have become acquainted with a criticism which, being destitute of Christian spirit or contents, thought to understand and judge the fulness of the Gospel by means of emptiness, faith by unbelief, truth by imaginations and sudden

fancies. In this process there was nothing salutary, but, on the contrary, retrogression and corruption. The most painful experiences have convinced us, that the *true* criticism proceeds only from the fulness and concentration of Christian life and thought; that only by diving, humbly and believingly, to the depths of the Divine Word, does Christian science acquire the *strength* and the *right* to understand the truth of the Gospel, and in accordance with this truth to judge and condemn all error, and everything that is unchristian in its character.

Schleiermacher's youth falls within the period in which the criticism that was first set in motion by Semler with regard to Christian history, and by Kant with regard to philosophy, commenced its salutary conflict with the earlier orthodoxy, which had now become soulless and insipid. It was the same period in which, after long repose, all the elements of civil, literary, and ecclesiastical life were vehemently shaken as by a thunder-storm, and the old forms, ordinances, and customs went to pieces in our father-land too. Schleiermacher, although educated in a community which, from its entire character, was most of all removed from these revolutionary agitations, and closed against them, could not withdraw himself from a participation in them; the less so, since he belonged by nature to those independent and impelling spirits who produce agitation even if they find none, and whose vital element is that of free inquiry, investigation, and dubitation. In the Dedication of his "Discourses on Religion" to the friend of his youth, Gustav Brinkmann of Stockholm, who was educated along with himself amongst the United Brethren, he reminds the latter of that season "in which the mode of thinking of both young men was developed in a mutual fellowship, and in which, having broken away by the force of personal

courage from a like yoke, and frankly seeking the truth, unbribed by any regard to mere authority, they began to call forth within themselves that harmony with the universe which their inward feeling prophetically placed before them as their appropriate aim, and which life ought to express ever more and more perfectly in every direction." But amidst all the impulsive energy of his liberty-loving, critical genius, which even in the midst of that confined and quiet community drew him into the agitations of the time, and which afterwards, when he had returned to the great fellowship of the Protestant Church and the University, constrained him to a lively and thorough participation in all the excited movements of the age, especially in all its scientific investigations, inquiries, and doubtings,—he yet continued to be inwardly and inseparably bound to the equally mighty energy of that devout disposition with which God had endowed him, and to which the community already referred to had itself given the first powerful excitement, as well as its definite direction towards that which is the everlasting *contents* [q. d. sum and substance] of life, and which is found in the Saviour, and in fellowship with him. I have never been able to read without heartfelt emotion, what Schleiermacher says in his "Discourses on Religion," in grateful remembrance of the religious education which he had received amongst the United Brethren. "Piety," he says, "was the maternal womb in whose sacred obscurity my young life was nourished, and prepared for the world which was as yet closed to it; in this element my spirit breathed, before it had as yet found its particular department in science and in the experience of life; this was my aid, when I began to sift the faith of my ancestors, and to purify my thoughts and feelings from the rubbish of former

ages; this remained to me, when even the God and the immortality of my childhood disappeared from before the doubting eye;* it led me undesignedly into active life; it showed me how I ought to hold myself sacred, with my talents and defects, in my undivided existence, and through it alone have I learned friendship and love."

Thus were Schleiermacher's nature and life impelled and governed by two equally powerful forces. In the case of an intellect so thoroughly healthy, there could be no talk of sacrificing the one to the other; but only of maintaining, protecting, and perfecting each, within its rightful province. Schleiermacher apprehended very early the great problem of uniting, without confusion, without mutual injury or hindrance, free scientific investigation with that piety which is governed by the Word of God and of Christ, in such a manner, that the contradiction and the hostility in which they had become involved by the movements of the age should increasingly disappear. The solution of this problem was, most strictly, the work of his whole life. He sought it in the difficult way of *separation*, pursuing both elements in their *particularity*, as far as to their highest and deepest points of *unity*. He separated theology and philosophy, faith and speculation, Church and State, with all that dialectical acuteness with which he was gifted; but, while he assigned to each of the two contrasted objects its peculiar sphere, in which, undisturbed by the other, it was, of itself, to unfold and to perfect itself, he held fast, with equal clearness and cordiality, the great assumption of the believing soul,—that as in the innermost

* Any one who, being without any personal experience in such matters, might possibly misunderstand this passage, stands corrected by the observation relating to it, in the explanatory Notes [appended by Schleiermacher to the third edition of the work here referred to].

root of the spirit's life the two are one, so also must perfect unity and reconciliation spring as a necessary result from every healthy developement of the diverse. But, seeing that he regarded this unity and reconciliation neither as consisting in a speculative formula of faith with which all thinking should *commence*, nor as an easy spoil of which any indolent or frivolous person may make himself master by means of *half* efforts,—but rather as the infinite problem and the last result of a critical *labour* in common on the part of *all*, in every department of life,—it might easily happen that, because he was occupied chiefly in the labour of separating and sundering as his immediate work, the unobservant should think themselves obliged to reckon him amongst the dismantling, disturbing, and disrupting, rather than as belonging to the truly reconciling, constructive, and composing spirit of the age. Any one, however, that considered his mode of thinking and his activity in their comprehensiveness and totality, must soon become aware that he was one of those great men in whose peculiar character is concentrated whatever is noblest and best in their age, and whose particular life-problem is at the same time the common, highest problem of the age; that is, in the present instance, the problem of *reformation*, by means of an equally energetic *negation* and *reconciliation* of certain things which form a synthesis with each other. His merit consists precisely in this,—that he not merely apprehended with perfect clearness the reformational necessities and the reformational elements of the age in the department of Christianity, but also, in a distinguished manner, by his peculiar theological thinking and working, satisfied the one and gave form to the other. In any other vocation than that of the theologian, Schleiermacher would still have become a great and pro-

eminent. The age in which he made choice of his particular calling, was the same in which Spalding found it necessary to convince people as to the *utility* of the office of the preacher. The State held out to his view more brilliant paths than the Church; and any other science might easily have appeared to his mind of greater promise than theology, in which, at that time more than at any other, want of refinement, tedious controversy, and a destructive tendency, had the upper hand. But he made choice of the theological, ecclesiastical vocation, because his inmost nature impelled him to it. Theology and the Church were from an early period of life the innermost centre of his activity; his love towards them grew with his years; philosophical and philological studies were with him no mere collateral or amateur occupation, but still his special proficiency in these respects merely served to adorn and to complete his theological and ecclesiastical mastery.

Schleiermacher did not accomplish the reformation of the age, in Theology and in the Church, *alone*. No great man stands alone, without help and fellowship in his age. But Schleiermacher, with true originality, went on in advance; he, by way of eminence, stimulated and directed the process of theological and ecclesiastical re-edification, and first moulded for himself those who were the most distinguished helpers and companions of his work. He founded a school, inasmuch as, especially from his first appearance as a teacher of theology and preacher at Halle, he assembled around him and attached to him, by means of his discourses and writings, a multitude of enthusiastic hearers and admirers, who, roused and animated by him, have wrought and are yet working in his spirit. Probably there are few among those who have become serviceable or auxiliary to the new movement in

Theology and the Church, who do not owe their chief stimulus to the lectures or the writings of Schleiermacher. Indeed, mediately, all the more recent theologians have become his pupils, not excepting those who now follow another and even an opposite tendency. The stimulus put forth by him is at least consciously or unconsciously *implied*, in the case of all. If he has founded a school in *this* sense, he has *not* done so in any *other*. It was his manner, to work rather by stimulating than by prescribing, rather in the way of diffusion and emancipation, than in that of contraction, exclusion, and restraint. He never wished to found that kind of school which, with conscious purpose, makes its appearance as a *party*, secludes itself within a certain fixed *method*,* and excludes every modifying influence from without. For this,—notwithstanding all the strength and keenness of his subjectivity,—his regard for the Church and for science was too high, his intellect too free and too comprehensive. Even as, amidst all the certainty and fulness of that which he had found, he was and continued to the last to be himself a *seeker* (*Zwinger*),—even as he counted free individuality amongst the noblest of life's blessings,—so, in his labours, his chief object was simply this, to form every one to be a *seeker* after truth in earnestness and love,—to make the individuality of each so free and vigorous, that he should be able, amidst every excitement from without, freely to possess the truth after his own fashion. Free, independent disciples were what he sought to attract; slavish repentors and imitators inspired him with disgust. But there are not a few amongst his disciples who, although they were at first stirred up by his agency in favour of the new

* *Mannerism* would hardly have been too strong a rendering of the word here employed.—TB.

movement, have subsequently, to a certain extent, fallen into contradiction and conflict with him. This circumstance has occasioned sorrow to many a friend of Schleiermacher; most of all in those cases in which it was observable with regard to his opponents, that they had either stolen their best weapons from him, or learnt from him how to use them. In *his* spirit, we can find fault with them only when, ungrateful for what they have received, they have set aside the fellowship of *love* with him. With regard to diversity of *tendencies*, and deviations from his *opinions*, no one was of a better courage than Schleiermacher himself.* He was not without sensibility as it respected affectionate recognition and attachment; misunderstanding and unkind separation had power to cause him pain; but he felt a sincere rejoicing in the existence of a multiplicity of relations and tendencies, of oppositions and honourable conflicts. Apart from that which was furnished by the *momentum* of intellectual liberty in general, there was in himself an altogether special natural reason for this phenomenon,

* "It seems to me,"—he says in the Notes to his "Discourses on Religion," p. 345,—“especially in every time of a greater excitement of the religious life, such as has undeniably commenced among us now,—to be in the highest degree necessary for the personal comfort of all those who exercise a perceptible religious influence, whether it be officially, or without any external, and only by virtue of their inward calling, that they should elevate themselves to this more liberal mode of thinking,” (see the beautiful passage concerning mastery and discipleship within the domain of religion, in the Discourses, p. 112), “in order that they may not be surprised, if many of those whose first stimulus has been received from them, nevertheless afterwards find it necessary to take up a considerably different mode of thinking and feeling ere they can arrive at full satisfaction. *Let every one rejoice in that he has excited life*, for by this he approves himself to be an instrument of the Divine Spirit; but let none suppose that it lies within his power to determine the *form* which this life shall assume.”

and I am persuaded that Schleiermacher was acquainted with it. He had, in a peculiar manner, united in himself the various elements of theology, and bound them up into a noble whole. But that which in him, by nature and by industry, was intimately bound up together, was not so in all. Along with the great men who, by reason of their nature and character, stand in the *centre* of things, there exists always upon the circumference and within the circle the multitude of those who, although they are attracted and determined by the centre, ever pursue that one side and tendency only which is most in harmony with themselves, or of which they first became masters, and in doing so, lose all the rest, and, in the end, the centre by which the connexion is formed. Thus it happened with regard to Schleiermacher. Many whom he had, in the first instance, won back in favour of positive Christianity, or to whom he had opened up the profound source of the religious life in the immediate feeling, or to whom he had rendered clear and dear the vigorous connexion, and truth in the Spirit, of the Church's system of doctrine, found themselves so powerfully excited and impelled thereby, that in following out this tendency they overlooked and lost the other (the critical) side of the system,—which he, from the central position in which he had his life, held fast with an equal degree of attachment and energy: nay, in the end, estranged, they came to regard the latter as something hostile. It is a circumstance worthy of remark, and one which furnishes a testimony in favour of the Christian *vitality* of his mode of teaching, that amongst those who attached themselves especially to the *critical* side of his theology, and made a further advance in *that* direction, there was probably not one who did not at the same time hold fast and cherish the *religious* and positive co-

clesiastical momentum which the system contains. But as Schleiermacher, from that living centre in which he had his position, readily perceived the one-sided tendencies of the age, and, when they threatened to obtain the preponderance, held it his duty to combat them, if not immediately, yet mediately, by bringing out with greater force the opposite side of the question,—it might easily come to pass that any one who saw him contending, with decision and zeal, in the direction referred to, might suppose, (especially when the observer was himself attacked by the wonderful Ajax) that he was involved in contradiction and hostility towards the truth which he had himself on other occasions defended. Thus have misunderstandings, silent and uttered enmities and separations, arisen in the midst of those who were in other respects akin to him. On this subject, he himself, in his own way, observed:—"If a one-sided tendency becomes too strongly prominent, it is my—I know not whether I ought to say *misuse* or *abuse* manner,* from a natural fear lest the ship in which we are all sailing should capsize, to go over to the other side with as much force as is possible with my small weight." Even these harmless words of moderation and preserving truth and love have been misunderstood, and cried down as an expression—coming to light at last—of his inward wavering and vacillation; by those who see in the diverse tendencies of the age nothing but corruption, and in the antagonist position against which they are furiously contending, nothing but untruth and apostasy from Christianity. Schleiermacher was far removed from the

* A literal rendering (for which I must beseech the reader's kind indulgence) of the very same words contained in the original. *Unart* signifies properly "bad taste," or "naughty trick;" a meaning which our legitimate English word "coarseness;" will probably suggest in connection with the term employed above.—T.

indulgence of this haughty manner. Great as was the weight he brought to the side on which he directly contended, still he never forgot the source of the true reformatory theology, of that which unites all the elements of Christian life and thought; but, often as he marched forth to conflict in different directions, he always retreated again to this as his proper standpoint, and never forsook the fountain of the living Gospel. He had but two foes against whom, as such, he continually renewed the conflict, even to the last man; the *misinterpretation of the letter*, "which denies the liberty of the Gospel, and the frivolous superficiality which denies its everlasting truth."

Proceeding now to mention in detail the scientific, theological, and the practical, ecclesiastical activity of Schleiermacher,—and here of all to characterize the former as it presents itself in his writings.—“—and its characteristic starting-point to his ‘*Lectures on Religion*,’ addressed to the cultivated class of his hearers,”—a work which has become famous alike through praise and through censure. It appeared for the first time in 1799, then in 1806, and again in 1827; the third time with illustrative and rectifying annotations. The work, to a certain extent, quite belongs to the period in which it had its origin. It bears the stamp of the relationships and of the society in the midst of which it was first written. The period was precisely that in which it was still regarded, by a circle far from small, as a greater mark of intellect and refinement to *oppose religion*, especially positive Christianity;—or, at the best to commend it to the authorities as a means of discipline to be applied to the vulgar,—thus to defend it as the necessary foundation and way of all true culture for humanity. The prevailing schools of theology, who her

* Reden über die Religion, an die Gottesdienende eines jeden Volkes, &c.

orthodox or heterodox, were little suited to dissipate the frivolous prejudices of the age against religion. Ecclesiastical orthodoxy maintained a firm hold upon notions and formulas which, by reason of the real progress of the age, had actually lost their power and vitality in the Church. Heterodoxy,* on the other hand,—in its philosophical, as in its historico-critical form,—was at that time preponderantly occupied in the work of pulling down; it wanted the living idea of religion, the divination, the enthusiasm, which would have enabled it to build up something new and something better; nay, it was to a certain extent occupied with the project of despoiling religion of its principality,—of banishing it from the *centre of life*, into the side and back-buildings of *science*, or of a self-existing *morality*. This suffices to determine, in general, the purpose, contents, and tone of the Discourses. Schleiermacher felt himself constrained to take the field with the two-fold warrior-might of a fresh, youthful enthusiasm in the cause of religion, and a keen, lively dialectic, to discover and to conquer anew, as it were, the domain of religion for the educated classes, to present religion to view in its true, original seat, freed from the misunderstandings and disfigurements perpetrated by foes and friends, and to inflame such as were in any way susceptible, with new love for the object thus presented. It seemed as if this would not have been possible to him, without the possession of an uncommonly brilliant eloquence. This quality, at least, has been admired even by his oppo-

It may be proper to remind the reader, that Schleiermacher (and presumably also his friend and disciple) employs the terms *orthodoxy* and *heterodoxy* in a sense different from that invidious one which is commonly attached to them. With him they correspond in the main to the *conservative*, and the *reformatory*, element or tendency, respectively. See Brief Outline, §§ 203—206.—Tr.

nents, and probably contributed essentially to excite an interest in the subject, even in minds of the more inaccessible class. Friedrich Schlegel said at the time, "They are discourses, the first of their kind that we have in German; full of energy and fire, and yet very artistic, in a style which would not be unworthy of one of the ancients."—The society in which Schleiermacher then lived, was formed by the companionship of those enterprising and perhaps somewhat presumptuous spirits, who published and enforced their decided antagonism to the mental poverty and Philistinism* of the age, by a bold and fearless course of polemics in the "Athenæum." This explains to a certain extent that polemical form, that boldness and daringness of assertion, which made the Discourses as much a scandal to the so-called sober and prudent people, as they were a delight to minds of a more youthful order. But whether repelling or attracting, they were for all in the highest degree stimulating. Undeniably, the manner in which Schleiermacher apprehended and represented the nature of religion in these discourses, was a product of his own personal developement up to that time, and a faithful image of his own individuality. Friedrich Schlegel called it, in this respect, "the most *characteristic* book we have—a book of an infinite subjectivity." A man who had attained to the consciousness of possessing religion within himself, in the profoundest

* Most readers, probably, are aware that the *Philister* (Philistines) are the "Town" of the German seats of learning, in opposition to the Professors and *Burschen*, or Students,—to whom we might apply the familiar epithet "Gown," if they were but provided with the graceful and scholar-like costume to which it refers. *Philistinism* (Philisterei) accordingly, is tantamount to a want of learning, of intellectual expansion and activity, of high enthusiasm; it is the *Materialistic* tendency in its broadest compass and manifestation.—Tr.

depth of his soul, as the supremely sacred domestic heart of his life,—superior to all the speculation of science, and anterior to all action, as being itself the deeper source of both,—such a man *could* not think of it as a product or as an auxiliary supplement of knowledge and action. He assigned to it, as independent sovereign over the entire life, the feeling as its original, essential *act*; feeling, however, regarded [not according to the popular use of the term, but] as constituting the central and bounding point, the inmost root of the soul. In order that he might be able to bring to recognition in such everything that exists amongst men under the character of religion, and, in the spirit of love, to take up into the *idea* of religion even its lowest gradations, he apprehended this idea, subjectively as broadly, and objectively as generally, as it was at all possible for him to do. But since he was himself conscious of possessing religion, in its definiteness and truth, only as a Christian and within the Christian church, it was necessary that he should endeavour to show that religion, universally, has an *actual* and *real* existence, only through the medium of *positive* religion and of *fellowship*. In the Discourses, the influence exerted by his studies of Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte, shows itself unmistakably. These authors, however, merely aided him, in the way of stimulus and of culture, to attain to a proper consciousness of his *own* distinctive peculiarity. Whoever reads the Discourses attentively and without prejudice, will easily perceive that in his mode of thinking with regard to religion, Schleiermacher is neither Jacobian nor Fichtean, neither Platonist nor Spinozist, but completely *himself*; and moreover himself with that soul of his deeply rooted in Christianity. It is precisely on account of these Dis-

courses most of all, that he has been charged with Pantheism; often without reflection, but sometimes deliberately and in earnest. Certainly, here and there, appearances, and even particular expressions, are against him. But it is only the man who leaves out of account the particular stand-point and design of the Discourses in the age in which they first appeared, and mistakenly regards certain of their extreme boundary-points as constituting their centre and substance,—the man who declares *every* more profound and intimate apprehension of the (in the religious soul indissoluble) relation between God and the universe to be Pantheism, and is better pleased with any cold, mechanical theory of the universe which dispenses with the living presence and operation of God therein, than with anything which has the effect of softening down and limiting rigid and one-sided notions,—it is only such a man that can regard Pantheism as expressing the true and permanent character of Schleiermacher's sentiments. At all events, after the explanations which Schleiermacher has given in reference to this matter in the third edition of the work, it is impossible for any one to repeat the accusation, without manifesting stubbornness and violating charity. The Discourses belong, by all means, to one of the *earlier* stages of developement and of progress in the life of Schleiermacher; and it is by a reference to this fact that they must be explained. *After* the composition of his Dogmatics it would no longer have been possible for him to write them,—nor, indeed, would it have been necessary. They are apologies rather for religion in general than for Christianity in particular, delivered, as it were, in the fore-court of theology,—I might almost say in the fore-court of the Heathen; but

still they contain already, distinctly enough, the peculiar bases and essential tendencies of his entire theology; and this explains the fact that when, in the year 1821, Schleiermacher,—who regarded the work as no longer needed by the age, in consequence of the changes which had taken place since it was written,—was notwithstanding obliged to take it in hand for the purpose of preparing a new edition, and came to compare this youthful labour with his *maturer* Christian thinking, he found in it, certainly, much to explain, much to modify and to excuse, in the notes which he then added, but still, essentially, nothing to repent of and nothing to surrender.

Up to the year 1804, he was perhaps known in the proper character of a learned theologian, only within certain limited circles. But from the time of his appearing, in that year, as a public teacher of theology at Halle, he awakened by his lectures, first the attention, and then the most devoted enthusiasm of the susceptible class of young men. I recollect very well how, at that season, some of my elder fellow-students, returning from Halle, spoke with enthusiastic praises of the new light that had arisen for them in the person of Schleiermacher. It was a circumstance involved in the history of his developement and his individuality, that, in addition to Systematic and Practical Theology, the Exegesis and Criticism of the New Testament received an especial share of his attention. His studies in this department were profound and comprehensive; but unquestionably they were directed rather towards the Greek and Christian, than towards the Hebrew and Old Testament side of the matter. He was no stranger to what is called scholarship in the stricter sense of the word; but, as

he once playfully observed in writing to me, it was of no use to look for *Notices** from him. He read carefully such works as were connected in any way with his own department; but upon the principle of selection rather than of collection. And as he had, after the likeness of Plato, a soul which turned towards the Idea, and which possessed at the same time an artistic tendency,—everywhere searching after the living Idea, the connexion of the whole,—but seeking for this Idea, when found, the most appropriate, the most living, the purest Form,—so, even from the beginning, his mode of delineation, in the department of learned theology, was prevailingly artistic, graceful, and free from the constraint and the distraction of mind attendant upon the employment of learned citations. His “Critical Letter concerning the so-called First Epistle of Paul to Timothy,” (1807) is composed in the style just described. It was by this specimen of his theological scholarship that he first made himself known to the learned world of theology; including even that portion of it which had not bestowed any particular attention upon his “Discourses on Religion.” The specimen, however, was the specimen of a master. From the time of Semler onwards, the historical criticism of the Canon had been carried on with a large amount of freedom. Moreover, the critical difficulties presented by the Epistle in question, especially with regard to its historical relations, had been already noted, and Schmidt of Giessen had not been afraid at least to *doubt* its genuineness. But still the “Letter” was something new and unique in its way. It may be regarded as the first transplanting of that ingenious† criticism which

* *E. g.* such as might be expected from a learned and exact bibliographer or antiquarian.—TR.

† In the higher sense of the word; bespeaking *genius*.—TR.

had been employed by such masters as Bentley in the region of classical literature, to the literature of the New Testament. Up to this time, it had been the custom amongst theologians to subject to a sceptical criticism those Scriptures only which, in the ancient Church, had been regarded more or less as Antilegomena. But where, as in the case of the First Epistle to Timothy, the ancient Church gave testimony so unanimously that the book was genuine,—in such a case, even Semler's school did not venture to doubt. In order to remove the historical and exegetical difficulties presented by the Epistle, men chose rather to take refuge in hypotheses, than in suspicion. Schleiermacher, however, ventured upon a thorough-going, divinatorial species of criticism. In this he disdained even the help which the absence of the Pastoral Epistles from the Canon of Marcion might have afforded him. As the suspicion had arisen in his mind in consequence of a connected study of the Pauline Epistles, and of the profoundly penetrating sympathy which he had sought to acquire with the whole character and manner of Paul, so, too, his argument against the genuineness of the Epistle was drawn from internal reasons for doubt; from the un-Pauline character of its thought and style, its want of connexion, the incongruity and indistinctness of its historical relations, and its suspicious resemblance (as of a compilation) to the other two Pastoral Epistles, &c. The criticism is so ingenious, the mode of presentation so lively and clear, so overpowering, that any one who gives himself up with but a certain measure of carelessness to the first impression, almost involuntarily agrees with the author. It is true that when we recollect ourselves, and examine the details more strictly, we perceive the weakness of particular points of the argument, the venturesomeness of

certain particular assertions; we become suspicious of a criticism which deals with the Pauline Epistles as with classical writings, which assumes the existence of a finished and to us perfectly knowable *type* of the Pauline mode of speaking and of epistolizing, and—notwithstanding that our information is so defective—of a perfectly known and complete *circle* of historical relations as applying to the Apostle: but although the younger Planck and others have succeeded in bringing up a good deal in opposition to Schleiermacher's criticism, in defence of the Epistle, and towards the satisfying of men's minds respecting it, still, they have *not* succeeded in clearing away every disquieting suggestion, and the faith of the Church in the genuineness of the Epistle referred to has received a wound which, in spite of all the curative arts that have been applied hitherto, is not yet completely healed. But notwithstanding all the boldness of Schleiermacher's criticism, there was a *measure* in it. When, subsequently, Eichhorn rejected all three of the Pastoral Epistles as spurious, I recollect Schleiermacher told me that this appeared to him to be a going beyond all bounds, and that, in his opinion, any one who rejected the other two Pastoral Epistles gave up, by that act, the justifying reason and the basis for the criticism of the first of them. But whatever we may think as to the justifiableness and the result of Schleiermacher's critique,—a more ingenious, a more distinguished product of New Testament criticism (even so far as the *form* is concerned) we have not to show, anywhere. I have heard classical philologists speak of it as something of which they envied us the possession. The divinator species of criticism, which this Letter has been the chief means of putting in motion among us, has its danger

and least of all is it an occupation to be pursued by everybody. But it is necessary to the completeness of the theological Science of the Canon; and since there is no rational ground for regarding it as less necessary within the domain of theology than in that of classical literature, it must be imputed to Schleiermacher, as a real merit, that he introduced it among us in the manner in which he did. The historical criticism of the Christian Canon continued to form one of Schleiermacher's favourite occupations. Many a critical hint, many a critical inquiry and reply, of a like nature with his essay "On the Testimonies of Papias respecting our first two Gospels,"* may possibly yet lie hidden amongst his exegetical Lectures. As an author, he made a further application of this criticism to the Gospel of Luke, in relation to the difficult problem concerning the manner in which the synoptical Gospels had their origin; in his "Critical Essay on the Writings of Luke" (Part i. 1817). It is well known, how, especially from the time of Lessing downwards, this problem had been almost exhausted by a series of hypotheses; not solved, however, but only rendered more enigmatical. Schleiermacher, concurrently with Dr. Gieseler,† led back the investigation out of those airy regions into which men had been misled by Eichhorn's hypothesis of a single original Gospel, to the sure ground of history and exegesis. His hypothesis—as simple, as it is historically probable—is this: that our Gospels are to be regarded as *collections*, formed independently of one another, of smaller and larger

* In the Studien und Kritiken for 1832, Pt. 4. p. 735 *et seq.*

† Dr. Gieseler's "Historisch-kritischer Versuch über die Entstehung und die Früheren Schicksale der schriftlichen Evangelien" was published at Leipzig in 1818, its author being at that time Director of the Gymnasium at Cleve. The substantial agreement of his theory with that of Schleiermacher is sufficiently intimated in the text.—TR.

evangelical *memorabilia* previously existing. He endeavoured to establish this hypothesis by applying it in the first instance to the Gospel of Luke. By going more deeply into the structure of this Gospel, and by comparing it with the other two, he attempted, in the most ingenious way, to discover in their original form and character the evangelical Memoirs which he supposed to form its basis; and to determine Luke's manner of proceeding in the collocation and arrangement of them. The *apologetical* interests of the sacred Scriptures have but *gained* by this attempt of his; not merely because, as a general principle, they never can do otherwise than gain by the spread of truth, but also because our conviction as to the goodness of Luke's sources of information, and as to the conscientiousness with which he employed them, has been essentially promoted by Schleiermacher's essay. It has been objected against this work, that its suggestions are often more ingenious than probable, especially with regard to the sections and junctions [of the Gospel], and to the original form of its sources. But it was partly in Schleiermacher's manner, and partly in the nature of such a first experiment, that the theory should be carried out in all strictness, even to the extreme. It is one advantage of these acute investigations, that they enable us to discern clearly *how far we may go*. This is always an important gain. Continued criticism, especially the uniform carrying out of Schleiermacher's method in the case of the other two Gospels, will infallibly lead to many modifications, limitations, corrections [of the views entertained by him]. But it is only by proceeding in the manner which he adopted, connecting the comparative study of the Gospels with an investigation as to the individual manner of each Evangelist in particular, that the critical pro-

blem presented by the Gospels will, with the progress of time, be determined more and more to the satisfaction of science and of the Church. But even if it should hereafter be found necessary to strike out other paths,—provided they be but paths of truth, the distinguished merit of Schleiermacher in his essential furtherance of this inquiry must always meet with grateful recognition.*

In consequence of a natural combination of criticism with exegesis, these treatises on the First Epistle to Timothy and on the Gospel of Luke, also contain specimens of Schleiermacher's exegetical method; occurring rather, however, merely *by the way*. Any one who has had the good fortune to hear his courses of exegetical lectures, will be able to give a better account of his exegetical method than I can. My knowledge of it (apart from the occasional specimens just referred to) is derived merely from the perusal of his essay on Col. i. 15—20,† and from the statements of those who have attended his lectures. The idea which I have formed of it to myself is the following. Schleiermacher knew of no other mode of expounding the Sacred Scriptures, than that in which there is a mutual interpenetration between a philological spirit and philological skill, on the one hand, and a living interest in the Canon as embodying the original, normal representation of Christianity, on the other. He declared expressly, in his encyclopædian course,‡ that exegesis, unaccompanied by a true interest on behalf of

* The English translator of the above work [reported to be the present Bishop of St David's, Dr C. Thirlwall] says in his Introduction, very truly, "It deserves to be studied as a specimen of exegetical criticism which has seldom been equalled, and which cannot fail to excite the admiration even of those who do not admit all its conclusions."

† See the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1832, p. 497 *et seq.*

‡ See his "Brief Outline," §§ 147, 148.—Tr.

theology and of Christianity, is just as idle and inadmissible, as it is when unconnected with a philological spirit and with philological skill. In his view, the thing to be aimed at in all interpretation consisted in this,—to apprehend correctly every individual thought along with its relation to the idea of the whole, and thus to *construct* for ourselves, in the way of imitation, the original act of composition. But though his attention was directed above all things to the solution of this chief problem in a really philological manner, he made it little or no part of the business of his exegetical lectures specially to investigate the *grammatical* and *historical elements* of this solution, but more or less taking these for granted, in order to avoid all diversion of attention, or touching upon them only in so far as they were of essential service to the hermeneutical operation, he went directly, in every case, to the construction* and delineation of the *thoughts* and their connexion. He carried out this process of construction with a preponderating regard to the *form* of the thoughts before him. The *ascetic*, *apologetical*, and *systematic developement* of these thoughts, he left for discourses better adapted to the purpose. In this respect, his *sermons* rendered essential service in the way of *completing* his exposition towards the more *real* [*material* as opposed to formal] and popular side of the subject. They are a treasure as it respects the exegetical developement of thought.—His scientific exposition was chiefly marked by a dialectic character, and rested on the assumption of certain

* Here, and in the context, this term is used to signify the process by which we re-construct, as it were, in our own minds, with as much accuracy as possible, a thought, or a system of thoughts, expressed or recorded by another. The many readers who do *not* need this comment will perhaps pardon its insertion, for the sake of the few who do.—Tr.

strict laws of thought and of composition, as applying to his author also. In this department of exposition he attained to distinguished excellence, and was indeed a *master*. †The hermeneutical operation consists of two equally essential movements of the mind,—which seem to exclude each other, but which in reality are inseparable; the *immergent* and the *emergent*, as I am disposed to call them. By the former I understand the entering fully, the sinking of one's self, as it were, into the spirit and the peculiar manner of the author. In order to this, a certain degree of self-renunciation, of self-surrender, is required; such as is to be found in the case of friendship. This is the first, the essential condition of all true understanding; which is all the purer and more objective in its character, the more the expositor, in the act referred to, denies himself and his own individuality and age. This hermeneutical self-denial, however, is not required to be (any more than that self-denial which is in the strictest sense moral) a *giving up* of one's proper self; but only an *expansion* of the latter. If this entering into the [position and spirit of the] author is not at the same time a *voluntary apprehension*, a true taking up into our proper self of that which was foreign to us, a personal, individual *appropriation*, it is fruitless, because it is more or less unconscious or unintelligent. The process of *exposition* is completed only by an individual *appropriation* [of the author's meaning]; the translation, as it were, of that which was foreign, into that which is our own. The highest perfection to which the process of exposition can attain, is, to apprehend the meaning of the author with full *objectivity*, (by a process of penetration, immergence), and to give it forth again with a like degree of *individuality* (emergence and appropriation). So long as there is no

true, pure friendship, no complete establishment of identity, between the author and the expositor, the exposition is more or less in danger from the influences of misapprehension and nonapprehension. No one individual succeeds in the perfect solution of the exegetical problem in this its height and depth. In every expositor, even in him who gives himself up most completely to the influence of the author, there always remains behind an unconquered, uncompensated portion of his own individuality, by which the pure objectivity of the apprehension is interfered with. On the other hand, he who merely goes through the process of self-surrender, without any accompanying, vigorous appropriation, will be more or less deficient in the power of expounding what he has received, and thus bringing about an understanding of it on the part of others. The gifts which exposition requires are not distributed in an equal proportion. Schleiermacher belongs to the class of those who are far more strongly inclined towards a distinctive individuality of apprehension, than to self-surrender; who rather draw over the author to their own position, than allow themselves to be drawn by him. This method, provided it does not wholly neglect the endeavour to enter into the individuality of the author, has both its reasons and its advantages. It is precisely this circumstance,—the complete traversing of the contents of the New Testament Scriptures by a large number of competent *individual* and *original* apprehensions,—which leads to a growing understanding and appropriation of these contents within the Church. In so far, we must admit that Schleiermacher, by reason of the peculiarity and originality of his manner of apprehension, rendered important service to the cause of exegesis also. But this energetic individuality of his, which impressed itself upon every

thing that came within his sphere, had precisely the effect of preventing him from entering into the views of the New Testament writers with that self-surrender, that self-forgetfulness, which is necessary in order that the expositor may give again in its purity, and free from all damage, the unfamiliar meaning, and the unfamiliar form. Amongst the writers of the New Testament, there was none that approached more nearly in character to himself than Paul; of the whole number, he most loved him. For that very reason, he has probably contributed more to the proper understanding of this writer, than to that of any of the rest. Schleiermacher, however—an accident which easily befalls the love of energetic men—imperceptibly changes the Apostle into himself; makes him just as severely dialectic in his mode of thinking, just as artistic in his manner of writing; and seeing himself in Paul, rather than Paul in himself, falls into the consequence (notwithstanding all the acuteness, and the almost magical force, of his exegetical argumentation and style,—as, for example, in the Essay on Col. i. 15–20) of expounding *himself*, rather than the Apostle. Still, we cannot allow ourselves to be at all withheld by this circumstance from estimating his merit in connexion with exegetical theology so much the higher, since even in those cases in which he erred by reason of the over-might of his peculiar genius, he succeeded in awakening a larger amount of scientific life and effort in the pursuits of exegesis, than has resulted from the labours of a hundred others, who, from a want of genius and of individuality, were not even capable of going wrong.

The foundation of the University of Berlin in the year 1810, marks an important epoch in Schleiermacher's theological activity. I do not know what share he

had in the proceedings connected with the actual foundation. His talented work on the Universities is said to have been not without influence in this respect. But one thing I do know,—that Berlin, just like Halle a hundred years earlier, stands for the sign of a new period in theology; and it is not an accident, but a circumstance included in that connection of things which, is of higher ordination, that Schleiermacher is seen, from the very beginning, at the head of the theological faculty in the new University, as Savigny is at the head of the juristic. The spirit of the new University, in the department of theology, was indicated soon after its foundation, by the appearance of Schleiermacher's "Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, drawn up to serve as the basis of Introductory Lectures"* (1811). Only a few sheets, but a whole world of new thoughts! Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology,—as a science, a purely German necessity and production, involved in the very nature of academical studies as pursued in Germany,—had already received considerable furtherance from the labours of Nösselt, Kleucker, and Planck. But Schleiermacher leaves even the nearest of his predecessors far behind him. In his work, Theology appears for the first time as an organic whole, constructed in a wonderful manner and by a master's hand, from its practical *point of origination*,—the necessity for an orderly Guidance of the Christian Church, and the necessary interest of the theologian therein,—to its practical *summit*,—the theory and technology of the ecclesiastical praxis. Taking up, separating, connecting, arranging, with a like degree of recognition, all the essential elements of theology,—the

* Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen entworfen.

religious and the scientific, the practical and the theoretical, the positive and the philosophical,—Schleiermacher rears with artistic genius a magnificent edifice as well founded, as it is complete and inwardly connected. The arrangement is so simple, that every reader finds his way through it without difficulty; every theological talent and interest finds its place, its work; vital connexion pervades the whole system; no one is permitted to be idle; only the indolent and unscientific are excluded, and that [as a matter of course, and] without the utterance of any formal ban. One does not know which to admire most in this work; the noble plan after which the whole is constructed, or the boldness and originality with which it is carried out. The ground-plan lay solely in Schleiermacher's own mind; the then existing form of theology contained merely certain first lines and essential relations, as materials towards its construction, and these, moreover, to a certain extent, were presented in a different order and connexion. Since the idea of theology from which Schleiermacher set out was superior to the then existing reality, it follows that his outline contains a theology of the future rather than of the present. In this sense it is, to a certain extent, a truly *prophetic* work, which upon the supposition of a vital progress in our science and our church, will, as time advances, meet with increasing fulfilment. If I am required to point out what is new in the work, and what we have especially gained by it, I must call attention, first, to the intimate *connexion* of theological science with the idea of the Church, by means of which the positive, practical end, and the moral, religious interest of theology are determined; then, to the *defining* and *placing* of the notion of Philosophical Theology, at the very *portal* of the study of

theology, whereby the old controversy as to the relation of theology to philosophy receives a simple adjustment; further, to the peculiar *combining* of the Exegetical, Church-Historical, and Systematic elements under the common notion of Historical Theology, by which means the injurious separation of these divisions is done away, and, in particular, in the department of Systematic Theology, the perpetually recurring intermixture of Dogmatics with the Philosophy of Religion, and of theological with philosophical Morals, is guarded against; also, to the imposing manner in which Practical Theology is constructed as an *organic whole*, and is taken up into the idea of theology as an *integrant part* of it, nay, as being indeed its crown;* and lastly, in so far as Methodology is concerned, to the thorough and decided *distinction* laid down, between that *general* amount of theological acquirement without which it is impossible for any one to be a theologian, and that *special* proficiency which is required as the condition of the properly academical form of activity.—The Outline has been objected to on account of the epigrammatic brevity by which it is characterized. But it was the very purpose of the work, that it should contain *propositions* merely; which none but masters in the science can understand without further elucidation. And although I could myself wish that the new edition of 1830 had contained a yet larger number of explanatory notes, I must

* I rejoice to find the work so highly estimated,—with especial reference, too, to this point,—in Dr. Nitsch's "Observationes ad theologiam practicam feliciter excolendam" (Bonnæ, 1831, 4to.). I entirely agree with him when he says: "esse (hunc librum) ante omnia a cæteris libris, quibus hoc tempore theologorum literatura vel aucta est vel inundata, plane segregandum, deinde eidem tamquam novum auctorem et antesignanum præficiendum.—E prophético genere si veniam demum, dicat aliquis eam esse methodum, dicat quoque e poetico interiori illo vocis sensu, quo Aristoteli poetici dicuntur."

still confess that, for academical compendia, the form of brief and even enigmatical propositions, appears to me incomparably more suitable than that copiousness of detail which rather stifles than awakens the desire for explanatory lectures. In so far, Schleiermacher's Outline seems to me to be characterized by distinguished excellence with regard to its form also.

I reckoned just now as a part of what we have gained by this work, the peculiar representation which is there given of Systematic Theology (embracing Dogmatics, Morals, and Ecclesiastical Statistics) as the integrant concluding part,—the part relating to the Church's Present,—of Historical Theology in general; which latter, according to Schleiermacher's views, has Exegesis for its commencement, and Church History in the stricter sense for its middle portion. On this point, I shall meet with contradiction from some; perhaps from the majority of persons. I myself, however, am of the number of those who do not unconditionally assent to Schleiermacher's representation of Systematic Theology in the respect referred to. I am of opinion that the scientific interest from which Systematic Theology has its origin, is prevailingly of a different character from the *historical*; even supposing the *critical* interest to be reckoned along with the latter. It [the interest which gives rise to the construction of a Systematic Theology] is precisely the *systematic* interest; and specifically, not that subordinate interest which is directed towards the organic arrangement of a given historical material, but the interest which aims at a scientific exhibition of the principles of Christian faith and conduct in their absolute truth, in such a manner that all doubt and contradiction, and all inward incoherency of Christian thinking with regard to them, disappear. This is altogether

a different thing from the historical interest. But, notwithstanding what has just been said, I must still abide by the assertion, that Schleiermacher, by giving this strong prominence to the positive, historical *momentum* in Systematic Theology, by pointing out the proper object and contents of the latter, in the developed dogmatical and ethical consciousness and system of teaching of the Church, and by repressing subjective caprice and individual speculation, rendered essential services, which, if not now, yet certainly hereafter, will be acknowledged with gratitude. But this leads me to speak of the work in which he has carried out the view of Systematic Theology just adverted to,—his greatest work,—that with which he closed and crowned his theological labours of a literary character among us,—his “Exhibition of the Christian Faith, according to the principles of the Evangelical Church.”* (1st ed. 1821–22; 2nd ed. 1830–31).

Amidst the conflict of opinions and tendencies within the department referred to, it is a difficult thing to convince all, that with this work, a new period, a true reformation in dogmatical literature, has its beginning. I do not know anything which one could place by the side of it, in regard to historical importance, except, perhaps, in its day, the “*Institutio Religionis Christianæ*” of John Calvin. Even its opponents have been obliged to bear testimony, by the liveliness of their opposition and the energy of their attacks, to its stirring and searching power. A time will come, when new epoch-marking developements in Dogmatics will convert the development of our time, involved in Schleiermacher’s work, into a thing of the *past*; but, so long as there is life in our

* Darstellung des christlichen Glaubens nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche.

science, the time will *never* come, when men shall cease to reckon the work itself as constituting one of those commanding, and as it were prophetic heights, from which new prospects of the goal, and new paths to it, are obtained and defined.

People have generally admired the dialectic skill which is apparent in Schleiermacher's Dogmatics: many, without knowing properly what it is they admire; and some, rather equivocally, with a secret dislike and a convenient fear, by which they consider themselves exonerated from the trouble and labour of studying the book thoroughly. But it is a great thing in a science, and always delightfully conducive to its progress, when a distinguished genius brings it nearer to the *idea* of strict science,—procures recognition and supremacy in it for method and order, for notional precision and strictness of connexion. Schleiermacher accomplished this service for Dogmatics in the degree in which he did, and his merits in this respect are so much the more highly commendable, by reason of the fact that his dialectic skill thoroughly overcame and practically refuted the earlier popularism and the merely outward logical method, together with the faint-hearted tendency to despair of securing a scientific form at all,—attained its object in a manner which was lively, free, and, in short, anything but scholastically dry. But this is neither the only merit, nor the greatest one, of Schleiermacher's work. Its greatest merit is to be sought in its *contents*; in this, namely,—that Schleiermacher, from first to last, gives so decided a prominence to the *positive* character of the Christian system of belief, to its most inward significance and connexion in the life of the Church. Notwithstanding all the peculiarity, acuteness, and honesty of his subjective apprehension, he has thereby contributed to give

force again, in the minds of men and in science, to the objective and eternal truth of the Christian Faith, in an incomparably higher degree than others, who, in their presumed possession of purely objective, absolute notions as God himself possesses them, look down conceitedly upon the subjective Theologian-of-Feeling, (for so they esteem this skilful dialectician), as occupying a lower stage, above which they have risen long ago. Dr. Twisten remarks very justly, that "Schleiermacher, by conducting the science of Dogmatics to the facts of the Christian consciousness, as its basis and its true object, secured faith itself against the assaults of a science which mistakes its own boundaries, as well as restored to the System of Faith its own proper independence." This merit will be thankfully imputed to him even by the latest posterity; and it is quite possible, that if the intoxication of the new *absolute* science should be succeeded by a period of jejune scepticism, the Dogmatics of Schleiermacher will then become the chief armoury from which weapons will be drawn for use against the latter. We may account it a fault in this work, that the *exegetical foundation* has not, in it, the breadth and completeness which might be desired, and that the Christian consciousness is not apprehended with sufficient precision in its *original, canonical* form. But this defect is connected with an excellence which ought to be gratefully recognised; namely, that Schleiermacher regards the essential contents of the System of Faith not as a concluded *letter*, but as a free, *spiritual* stream, diffused through the entire historical life of the Church, and attaining to its complete developement thereby. At the same time, he holds fast its pure *source* in the life and teaching of the Saviour; he will not acknowledge anything which has not flowed there: but

while he is persuaded of the incessant directive and formative agency of the Spirit of Christ in the Church, illustrating Christ's word and Christ's history, he takes for granted, with a magnanimous confidence, that that which is in the Church matter of general *acceptance* and *consciousness* as having a *Christian* character, must also be precisely *the Christian Truth*. Dr. Twesten commends, "as one of the fairest aspects of this masterpiece, the noble tolerance which knows how to place itself as much as possible above opposing views, and without misapprehending their true character, yet to point out how the Christian consciousness may find expression in an equal degree in each of them." I do not merely *quote* these words; I thoroughly *subscribe* to them. The time is already come, in which this noble tolerance that characterizes the Dogmatics of Schleiermacher, is more and more demanded from the Protestant Church, and imposed upon it as a duty, as the true means of sustaining Christian fellowship, in opposition to the increasingly self-willed, disuniting, exclusive, and, in so far, unchristian and destructive antagonisms of the theological schools. The work, however, has, on this very account, been charged with fixing too broadly the limits within which the Christian character shall be held to apply, and with weakening down the characteristic Christian *truth*, while it widens the fellowship of Christian *love*. But the persons who bring the charge, are merely those who are not able to distinguish between tolerance and indifferentism. A man who so decidedly adheres to the characteristic contrast of the Gospel between sin and grace,—who gives so strong a prominence, and the central place in his belief, to the historical, living Christ in his absolute sinlessness and onliness,—who so unreservedly and consistently excludes the

heretical deviations of Ebionitism and Docetism, of Manichæism and Pelagianism,—who so keenly apprehends and carries out the Protestant principle, without denying the elements of truth which are to be found in the Catholic,—as Schleiermacher has done in his *Dogmatics*,—such a man can be regarded as indifferent, only by those who are subjects of the most pitiful intolerance and bondage of the letter. If the Deistic Rationalism of the antecedent schools of theology has ever received a discomfiture, it has been in the *Dogmatics* of Schleiermacher. Many an assault that is now proclaimed as having led to a decisive victory over Rationalism, the latter would have overcome; the deadly wound that has been inflicted upon it by the truly *rational*, but not *rationalistic* *Dogmatics* of Schleiermacher, is something which it will never get over.

It is the fortune, or misfortune, of every great, distinctly individual work, to meet with manifold opposition. *Want* of understanding and *misunderstanding* have, at the least, fully as much to do with this as the desire after *truth*—if not more. It has happened thus, too, in the case of Schleiermacher's *Dogmatics*. With the insight which he possessed into the existing state of the Church and of theology, and with his modest consciousness that the immediate result presented by him was merely *his own apprehension* of the Christian system of faith, and not the system of *Dogmatics* in its *absolute* form, he was prepared to be both misunderstood and assailed. His Letters respecting his “System of Faith,”* in which he endeavoured to dispose of all polemical matter, in order that it might not be in his way when preparing a second edition of the work, show how noble

* In the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1829, Parts 2 & 3. [These Letters are both addressed to Dr. Lücke.—TR.]

was his manner of thinking, with regard to the attacks which he had experienced; how, namely, he looked upon every honest opponent, rather as a coadjutor in the common work, than as an opponent in the proper sense of the word. He endeavoured, in these letters, to remove the misapprehensions to which the work was liable; and, with unprejudiced readers, he has assuredly in a great measure succeeded. But even as, in the first composition of his work, he had been to a certain extent careless of possible misapprehensions, had treated many points without enough either of clearness or of precision, and was, in general, accustomed to expect of his readers (because it was his own habitual practice), that they should understand every individual detail by a reference to the whole of which it formed a part, and his Dogmatics by a reference to the connexion of his entire theological system of thought; so, too, in these letters, —partly from an artistic dread of tedious diffuseness, partly from a kind of magnanimous carelessness,—many points have been treated suggestively rather than fully, and thus a good deal of matter for misunderstanding has been allowed to remain; nay, from his manner of dealing out cuts and thrusts on the right hand and on the left, he has, perhaps, added to that which existed before. This fact has been interpreted to his prejudice, as having resulted from a feeling of haughty contempt. But the imputation is unjust. In scientific matters, he never manifested contempt towards anything, except downright stupidity, and the ill-will exhibited by persons who were of no consequence whatever. Except in such cases, he willingly entered into a consideration of the opinions of others; though it was not easy to get him to do this any *further* or any *longer* than the interest of his own mind in the cause of *truth* allow-

ed. And so these attacks and misunderstandings will yet continue for a time; until his Dogmatics shall have succeeded in penetrating more generally into the spirit of our Church and of our theology, and in converting the truth which the work contains into a matter of common possession.

Schleiermacher was not one of those who, in the field of science, egotistically fancy that every thing begins with *them*. He cheerfully went back to the earlier stages and developements of theology, learned from them, and found in them points of connexion for his own views. This historical interest, on the one hand, furnishes an explanation of the manner in which, in his Dogmatics, he goes back to certain earlier dogmatic definitions laid down by celebrated teachers of the Greek and Latin Churches, and seeks to extract the golden grains which may be found in them. On the other hand, it has given rise to a couple of Essays in the department of Dogma-History, which are characterized by a high degree of thoroughness: one "on the Doctrine of Election," (an investigation of the Augustinian and Calvinistic theory), with which the Berlin Theological Journal for 1819 begins; the other, "On the Contrast between the Sabellian and the Athanasian Representations of the Trinity," with which the volume for 1822 is creditably brought to a close. The distinguished talent of Schleiermacher, cultivated as it had been by characteristic investigations into the history of Grecian philosophy, manifests itself in both these treatises. To the second of them, we are indebted for some new pragmatistical points of view with respect to the earliest history of the doctrine of the Trinity. The former Essay looked like a work out of season, since, from its defence of the logical consistency adhered to by Augustine and Calvin

with regard to the doctrine of election, it was adapted, so far as the multitude were concerned, rather to injure than to aid the Union of the two Evangelical Confessions, which had then but just begun. But when I pointed out this circumstance to him, he declared that it was his intention, precisely with a view to *serve* the interests of the Union, to excite a new discussion with regard to a matter which superficial reflection, indeed, supposed itself to have decided long ago,—but which, if the Union was to develope and perfect itself in a *scientific* point of view also, [and not to subsist merely as an *outward fact*], *must needs*, sooner or later, be brought under examination. That this difficult problem has since then been more closely and thoroughly investigated, and possibly, also, a beginning made towards new dogmatic determinations respecting it, is a circumstance for which we may thank the stirring treatise referred to.

It was not, however, merely as an *author*, that Schleiermacher laboured for the reconstruction and advancement of theology; as an *academical teacher*, also, by means of oral discourse, he opened up new paths, and furnished new points of view. When some portion of his discourses shall have been printed, it will be possible to specify more accurately the amount of gain in this direction. His lectures on the life of Jesus have given occasion to the subsequent delivery of similar courses in other Universities; and Hase's work on the life of Jesus,—an excellent book, notwithstanding all its faults,—derived its origin from the same incitement. Of Schleiermacher's lectures on the topic referred to, I know only thus much,—that distinguished as they are by the peculiar manner in which the subject is treated, they will be found to yield, when published, a mea-

sure of novelty and of stimulus, in reference both to the exposition of the Gospels, and to the dogmatical and ethical contemplation of [the person and history of] Jesus. So with regard to Practical Theology, on which he lectured regularly, and always in an enlivening, delightful manner,—Ecclesiastical Statistics, a discipline of which he was the first to establish a scientific notion at all,—Church-History, and the Historico-Critical Introduction to the New Testament, upon which he discoursed from time to time, and which he enriched with new points of view and new investigations,—and lastly, Christian Morals, upon which, mediately as an author, he exercised a reformatory influence by his

Criticism of the Doctrine of Morals” and his ethical disquisitions contained in the *Memoirs of the Academy of Sciences*,—all these branches of science will, as time advances, be indebted to his lectures for new tendencies and new incitements, as well amongst those who heard his discourses, as amongst those who are merely privileged to read them.

Schleiermacher was in possession of Theology as an organic whole,—not merely for the purpose of satisfying his own individual scientific necessities, or of enhancing the lustre of his genius,—but in its vital relation to the Guidance of the Christian Church; a work to which he felt himself called, both in the pulpit and in the academic chair, as an officer of the church, and a minister of the Word of God. If it is only the mutual interpretation and vivification of the ecclesiastical and the scientific interest that constitutes the true theologian, then was Schleiermacher so much the more

completely entitled to the appellation, in that both these elements were to be found in him, each in a distinguished degree; and withal in so beautiful an equipoise, that he was qualified to serve the Church with equal effectiveness as a practical and as a theoretical theologian. I have always admired and envied him for this,—that God had given to him to be active in both directions of the theological life with an equal degree of eminent proficiency. His scientific activity in the study and in the academic chair, was crowned, every Sunday, by the preaching of the Word of God in the pulpit, and was also variously interwoven, the whole week through, with ecclesiastical duties in his congregation, and with the intellectual instruction of the youthful Christians committed to his charge. For any one else, this would have been too much; one occupation or another would have suffered by reason of all the rest. Not so with Goldschmeider. I have never even heard him complain that his manifold duties were too much for him or that one interfered with another. On the contrary, he seemed to find in the one refreshment and rejuvenation for the discharge of the other. And when I call to mind in addition, that notwithstanding all his multiplied official occupations, and his copious activity as a writer, he was at all times possessed of leisure, good temper, and a lively readiness for the enjoyment of social life in larger and in smaller circles,—that he never brought with him into society the unwieldy gravity of the study or the official position, but was always the cheerful enlivening companion,—I can free myself from the spell of that astonished admiration with which I regard this great man, only by considering how richly the good God had endowed him with gifts above others, and by delighting myself with the contemplation of his virtue.

in turning them all to account, and bringing them all into a proper connexion with one another.

That which was immediately and chiefly prominent in his performance of duties connected with his spiritual office, was his Sunday's sermon; as though, and at the same time a supplement and completion, of his scientific activity. As regards the relation of his sermons to his *Dogmatics*,—the manner in which the two really agree with, supplement, and replace each other,—I may appeal to the excellent essay on that subject by Dr. Bietschke, Professor at the University in Halle,* and am certain that every one who reads it attentively will agree with him in this, that notwithstanding, although he attached great importance to the formal difference between the scientific and the popular mode of communication with regard to the Christian Faith, and everywhere gave effect to the distinction, yet knew as little of any material discrepancy between the two things, that one must needs say, his *Dogmatics* are just as indispensable to a complete scientific understanding of his Sermons, as the study of his Sermons is necessary in order to an ill-ated comprehension of the former work. They are not superficial or malicious persons who, without any foundation for it, have given utterance to the suspicion that the man was a different character, in the pulpit, from what he was in the academic chair and in his scientific writings. The same fervour and love with which, in the pulpit, he held fast to the positive contents of Scripture, and made its vividly personal centre, the Fatherhood, or the only-begotten Son of God, the ever-living Jesus of his sermons appear also plainly enough in his *Dogmatics*, amidst the abstruse of the critical and dialectic understandings; and

* In the Studies and Studies by 1845, Part I. p. 264 et seq.

the freedom and spirituality with which, in his Dogmatics, he everywhere places himself in opposition to the bondage of the letter, to the false allegoric-Gnostic, as well as to the Jewish-Christian manner of connecting the Old and New Testaments, and to the confounding of the essential and the non-essential, are prevalent also in his Sermons,—in which, after the noble style of Luther, he expected of his hearers a toleration for even the *freest* announcement of truth perceived. I have already remarked above, what a rich treasure his sermons are for the purposes of scientific exegesis, especially in relation to the New Testament. But in order that it might be fully perceived how truly Schleiermacher, in the pulpit as in the academic chair, was a man of complete, homogeneous, and symmetrical character one of his younger disciples, Rütenick, has shown, in a very instructive manner, (in the first instance, it is true, only in a popular form,) how his whole System of Christian Morals may be constructed from the materials afforded by his sermons. Of the questionable distinction between *dogmatical* [doctrinal] and *moral* [ethical] sermons, Schleiermacher knew nothing. As, even in a scientific point of view, he admitted but a very *relative* distinction between Dogmatics and Morals, and insisted most decidedly upon the maintenance of the most intimate connexion and mutual relation between the two, so too, in his sermons, he always held fast and exhibited the most vital, reciprocal connexion as existing between Christian thought and action, between faith and love; and I do not know one of his sermons, whether printed or merely listened to, in which one would find a preponderance of the dogmatical or the ethical element, unaccompanied by a most vivid tracing out of each to its junction with the other. A complete statement of the cha-

characteristic peculiarities of Schleiermacher's mode of preaching is not my object here. The talented characteristic sketch by Dr. Sack* is a good beginning towards an apprehension, without exaggeration and without party spirit, of Schleiermacher's great merits, and his distinguished originality, in this department also. My friend designates the homiletical peculiarities of Schleiermacher as being threefold. The first, and the most fruitful of good, appears to him to be the confidence and earnest vitality with which all his contemplation sets out from a fellowship with the person of Christ by means of faith and love, makes this fellowship explanatory of the essential character and destiny of the Church, and draws from it a reliance on the power of the Spirit, which has already passed over into the Church. While he assigns to this characteristic the greatest praise, and the epoch-marking importance which belongs to Schleiermacher's mode of preaching, he finds its second characteristic, (to which he alludes rather in the way of censure), to consist in this, that the worth accorded by Schleiermacher to the Word of God in the Scriptures, is not that of ever newly *originating* his faith, and of giving to it a *Divine determination* with regard to its essential elements, but merely that of *guiding* and *regulating* his *reflection* upon his own believing feeling.† This censure, in my views, is based upon a false apprehension of the idea of faith as entertained by Schleiermacher. Dr. Sack supposes that faith, namely the faith which is peculiarly Christian, was, in Schleiermacher's estimation, *pre-*

* In the Studien und Kritiken for 1831, Part ii. P. 350 et seq. (in a critique upon the sermons of Schleiermacher and Albertini).

† Literally, *faith-feeling*, (Glaubensgefühl); a compound employed with an immediate reference to Schleiermacher's theory respecting the ultimate basis and essential nature of religion.—TR.

ponderably a feeling, unaccompanied by the consciousness of an objective truth. (This I must deny. In his sermons, as also in his Dogmatics, Christian faith it is true, is essentially something subjective, a subjective life in men; but its characteristic, positive, distinct and definite character (Bestimmtheit) to which Schleiermacher gives such decided prominence, is indeed just a product of history, of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ; which, as its essential contents, Christian faith receives at all times in the purest and clearest form from the Scriptures. It is true, it draws from the sacred Scriptures this its contents, not as an outward word, as a doctrine by nature foreign to itself, but as an entire life, in which doctrine and word have their being; and it receives the same in the Christian Church, not as something which is ever newly appearing and originating, but as something which by virtue of the Christian Spirit, is present in the community of the faithful, as something which is already known, only that it is constantly growing in vitality and completeness. Dr. Sack is further of opinion, that with the peculiarity censured by him,—which he terms, by way of reproach, Schleiermacher's idealistic element, but to which we should rather give, in praise, the appellation spiritual-ecclesiastical;—there is connected a third peculiarity manifested by Schleiermacher in his sermons, namely, that he supposes the life and operation of grace to be present in all his hearers not merely as a matter of perfect consciousness, but also in such a stage of advancement, that too little regard is had to the manifold states of defective piety and of incipient faith which nevertheless actually present themselves in our congregations; and I must certainly allow that there is such a connection; nor can I overlook the existence of a certain one-sidedness in this respect. But

on the other hand, I must declare that it has always afforded me special gratification, and has appeared to me exceedingly praiseworthy, when Schleiermacher has mounted the pulpit with this magnificent assumption of his believing and affectionate soul, that he found the Christian congregation, as such, *already founded* and gathered together by the Lord and his Spirit, and that he was not called to the *first planting* of their faith, but rather to the *watering* of that which was already planted, by the unrestrained communication and efflux of his own enthusiasm and knowledge, so deriving their origin and intensity from the word of God. Schleiermacher did not overlook the different stages of knowledge and piety which exist in a congregation: he took good notice of such states as are defective. But, [in preaching], he always assumed as the starting-point, a certain average measure of Christian faith and life as existing in the congregation; leaving the inferior stages to another kind of instruction than that which is afforded by preaching. In an age in which there are so many who deal with Christian congregations as if the work of redemption and regeneration had not yet found a beginning in them at all, either consciously or unconsciously, or as if it had every Sunday to be commenced anew, and by this perverse fashion, weary and exasperate, rather than elevate and gladden.—Schleiermacher's opposite peculiarity is only a matter for praise.—I cheerfully subscribe, on the other hand, to what Dr. Sack says respecting "Schleiermacher's talent of combining the unity and variety of his discourse, in transparency of form, and more than logical clearness of arrangement, so as to form a whole, constructed, as it were, of but one piece." I cannot forbear copying, word for word, the whole of the beautiful passage of my friend's observations which

relates to this point, even with the partial *censure* it contains,—which I, however, can allow to pass only as being rather a representation of the *well-authorised individuality* of Schleiermacher: “This precision of his thoughts,” Dr Sack goes on to say, “and this clearness in their relations, combined with the noble *structure* and the dignity of his language, this idea-abounding and animated fulness of soul, compassed about with ecclesiastical* taste and tact, cause the fervidness of his essential tendencies to appear with a prominence which affords the highest gratification. At the same time, however, it cannot be concealed that the entire structure of the author’s language is rather ecclesiastical and elevated and at the same time antique, than biblical and properly homiletical. This circumstance is connected, again, with his neglect of the Old Testament; which is the inexhaustible source for the homiletical style, so far as the more lively and the more elevated departments of the latter are concerned. One may venture to say that the author has too little of the *oriental*, in apprehension and expression,—nothing of that quality which gives to the style of Herder, (apart from its defects), so powerful a hold upon the reader, especially in his earlier writings; where he [Schleiermacher] attempts the properly rhetorical, the Bible-imitative, he is seldom happy. His strength, to be sure, lies in another department; in that of truth and gentleness, of quiet energy and constancy, —qualities which pervade his words, breathing out, as it were, from their very centre.”

It is known that Schleiermacher was not in the habit of writing his sermons before delivering them. Those

* I should prefer to translate *ad literam*, and to say *churchly*; it would give a more exact and a more appropriate meaning; but the word is hardly English.—Tr.

which are in point are all taken from notes made while he was speaking. When I was in the habit of hearing him, there were always two of his younger friends employed in taking notes at his sermons. Any one who was aware of this, was led to admire the great gifts of the man still more. To a certain extent, the sermon did not first originate in the pulpit, inasmuch as it had been already conceived in his mind several days before, and this preparation had been completely carried out, as it were, up to the moment of his delivering the discourse. But he was writing down, except, but the time of my living with him, on the Saturday evening, the text and subject, and at the same, in addition to this, the several divisions of the latter, mentally collected. Thus he called *making out his bill*.* Thus however he entered the pulpit. Here, there set in, at a precise form, the mode of presentation, and its details were conceived. The sermon had its origin, as a living product of his previous reflection, of the animating impression produced by the spectacle of the assembled congregation and of that mastery of his mind over the order of his thoughts and his language, which was present to him at all times in an equal degree. Any one who knew him, could observe how the artistic structure of Christian discourse arose; how, at first, speaking slowly and quietly, more in the ordinary form of discourse, he collected and arranged his thoughts; then, again, when he had spoken for some time, and had as it were spread out and drawn together the whole new-work of thought, how his speech became more rapid, more excited, and, the nearer he approached to the admonition or encouragement which formed the conclusion, proportionally augmented in sublimity and fluency.

* *German. Zettel machen.* It seems to have been thinking of the items of which his memorandum consisted.—Tr.

Thus did I hear him, Sunday after Sunday, for the space of several years. He was always like himself; and always attractive, by reason of his peculiar mode of treating the text, by novelty and freshness of thought, by a well-ordered method of presentation, and by fluency of speech. I have never heard of his having made a mistake in speaking, or of his having corrected himself. If one's attention was not extraordinarily enchained by the thoughts presented, one often had occasion to admire the manner in which, with his peculiar style, inclined to the construction of intricate periods, he every moment, even in the midst of the most intricate, found the right word, and never lost the clue that guided him safely to the conclusion. It is not every one that has this gift; least of all the gift of speaking before a congregation, in *all* moods and circumstances, upon *all* matters of Christian faith and life, without written preparation, and always with the same degree of fulness, clearness, and beauty. It is often the case that the *contents* suffer under the mastery, and from the extreme readiness of the *language*. This easily gives rise to a monotonous manner; accustomed trains of thought quickly return; and so of all the other vices of this kind which belong to uncalled-for extemporizing. Of all this, there was no trace to be found in Schleiermacher. He had his own manner of expression, peculiar to himself; his own peculiar circle of thought. But the affluence of his mind, and the fulness of Christian life that was in him, did not permit any of the customary vices of extemporizing to obtain in his manner of preaching; but led to the result, that the hearer merely beheld in him with complacency the highest degree of homiletical skill, and was able purely to enjoy the rich fruits it yielded. When I once asked him how he had arrived at this enviable

degree of skill, he answered, that he had, very early, attained to the perception, that the highest thing to be aimed at was, not to *reproduce* the sermon in the presence of the congregation, merely by means of the memory, but to let the words arise, fresh and new, from the energy and fulness of the soul at the very moment; and that in order to become qualified for doing this, he had begun by merely omitting to write the conclusion of the sermon; and thus, proceeding backwards, step by step, (just as one leaves off by degrees a warm garment to which he has become accustomed,) he had at last attained even to that which was most difficult of all,—to refrain from writing down even the introduction.

Any one who heard but a single sermon from Schleiermacher, might entertain the apprehension that he was not intelligible, that he was not popular enough, for the more uneducated in his congregation. But upon a continued and connected hearing, this apprehension completely disappeared. He expected much of his hearers; but still, properly speaking, nothing more than familiarity with the Scriptures,—and attention. And since he knew how to enchain the latter, even in the less educated, by the freshness and spiritual liveliness of his delivery, by his constant connexion of even the profoundest Christian ideas with practical life, with the existing condition of church, family, and fatherland,—an explanation is afforded of the fact, that while his audience at church consisted indeed for the most part of the more educated class, yet people of a meaner condition, and these even from other congregations, were seen to visit his church regularly, and to listen with attention to his discourses. I believe that with the progress of time, this portion of his audience continually increased in numbers; since, just as there was in his

entire theology a vital progress, as also in his mode of preaching, concurrently with the continued experience and enlargement of his inward life, there was a constant advance in the qualities of Christian simplicity and favour, from year to year.

Preaching, certainly, constituted for Schleiermacher the principal scene of his efficiency in the congregation; but, even as he was accustomed to take a unumquodque view of all that belonged to any particular circle of activity, so was he also mindful, and that with a like degree of love and satisfaction, of all that is included in the essential nature of the congregational life. Ever before the necessity for liturgical reforms in connection with Divine worship became more generally a matter of discussion, he endeavoured, in his own congregation to awaken, and to satisfy this liturgical want as well as he was able to do it in his own circle, without a more general reform in the Evangelical Church as a whole. Since he regarded singing and preaching as constituting one living whole, and the hymn-book then introduced was on the summary objective to the ordering of such a whole, he hit upon the expedient of getting particular hymns printed, at least for each morning service, - hymns which he selected, with a reference to their sense and suitability, from the rich treasures of sacred song ancient and modern, belonging to our Church. Thus his congregation became acquainted by degrees with the most beautiful of our hymns, and he himself was practised and qualified for taking a leading part in the preparation of a new hymn-book, which should be adapted to our present state of Christian culture. It is known that he was one of the principal compilers of the New Berlin Hymn Book. The defects of this collection*

* - Under the Berlin Hymn-book. The German name is: *Das Evangelische Gesangbuch*.

testifies to the clearness, precision, and vigour of his mind in this department also.

I have no immediate information in regard to his educational method in the common instruction of the young. I know only this,—that his instruction proper-story to confirmation was very much liked and sought after, especially amongst the higher orders, and that the young persons of both sexes whom he prepared and confirmed, attached themselves to him with an especial degree of assiduity and industry. This would be innumerable, unless in the department of school also, he had possessed a considerable talent for recording and epigrammatically summarizing the words of the young in favour of the liberal. The encouragement of young persons which he thus found for himself, was at the same time as it appeared to me, his principal sphere for the exercise of the pastoral care. He did not withdraw himself from the discharge of this essential part of his duty as a preacher. But it was a characteristic involved in the entire nature of his position, and to some extent also in his personal individuality, that as a pastor, he rather permitted himself to be engaged also by those who had affection and confidence towards him, than was himself in search of them. When he possibly sacrificed of efficiency, in this department of his episcopal office, he compensated, in a high degree, by his constant and active participation in the pastoral concerns of the Church. Schleiermacher regarded the individual congregation as a really organic part of the ecclesiastical whole, inseparably bound together both in truth and in discipline. His reverent activity was directed at every early period towards the advancement and to the *Erhaltung* of the Church. (See his *Werk*, *Book I*, *Chapter III*, Dr. Ritschl of Stettin), 1830.

necessities of the Church's life as a whole. His first publication in connexion with this subject consists of "Two Non-prejudicative Opinions in matters connected with the Interests of the Protestant Church; with a more immediate reference to the Prussian State" (1804). This document was written about the time when he had finished his profoundly thoughtful work on the Criticism of the Doctrine of Morals. It appeared without his name; but it bore the impress of his mind. In the first Opinion, which relates to the separation of the two Protestant Churches, the ecclesiastical life-question of his mind, the Union, already makes its appearance, as clearly and definitely as possible. He points out the mischiefs of the separation hitherto existing: how, in relation to the religious interest, it nourishes superstition on the one hand, and, on the other, indifference towards even the essentials of religion; then, moreover, how it also operates injuriously in relation to general morality and true culture; and again, lastly, how, in relation to the state and the school, it also shows itself as an evil which it is high time to remedy. All this is worked out in a manner distinguished as much by the truthfulness of lively experience, as by genius and wit. But Schleiermacher did not content himself with complaining of the evil; even then, along with the necessity of the Union, he also pointed out the proper manner of its *accomplishment*; he demanded that the *fellowship* of the Churches should be restored, without touching the differences in the system of *doctrine* or the variations in the *ritual*, and insisted that this restoration should be effected without circumscribing the liberty of faith and action of any individual. Even at that time, he called attention to the fact, that in the community of the United

Brethren, this idea of Union was realized in a satisfactory manner. The second Opinion inquires into the means by which the decline of religion may be prevented. Full of the most lively and truthful delineations of the corruptions, unseemlinesses, and incongruities which were to be found as well in the regulation and administration of public worship as in the constitution and condition of the clerical order, it contains at the same time a multitude of reformatory hints and proposals, which, in the revolution that has taken place in the ecclesiastical life since 1814, have in part been realized, in part agitated anew, and subjected to a fuller discussion. I do not know what impression these two Opinions made at the time of their appearance; assuredly but a very preparatory one. They contain already, however,—partly wrought out in detail, partly in the germ,—all those ideas which, ten years later, Schleiermacher began to diffuse after a more energetic and more complete fashion, and to conduct to supremacy.—It was but for a short time that he was permitted to take part in the general government of the Church in one of the higher spiritual offices connected with the State. It was at that season of the regeneration of the Prussian State, when those ministers of powerful intellect, Von Stein and Wilhelm Von Humboldt, were seeking, in every department, to place the most able men at the head of affairs, and when, accordingly, Schleiermacher also could not fail of finding his place. I do not know in what manner, nor to what extent, he exercised an influence at that period in connexion with the reform of the Church. But this I know, that he willingly withdrew from the position, when, subsequently, the troublesome quickness and decision of his mind met with more of simple resistance than of positive effect. After

this he confined himself to doing, according to his ability, partly as a writer, and partly as the freely elected President of the Berlin Synod, in promoting the conduct, upon the right basis and in the right way, of the reform of public worship and the constitution of the Church, (which had been agitated, especially since the year 1818, even in the highest quarters), and, along with this, of the Union. To this period belongs the series of his numerous publications relative to ecclesiastical affairs,—chiefly of a polemical character, and commencing with the celebrated "Letter of Congratulation to the Very Reverend the Members of the Commission appointed by his Majesty the King of Prussia for the purpose of preparing new Liturgical Forms" (1818). The anonymous gossamer of this work did not prevent the instant discovery of the author: so completely does it bear the impress of his mind. Rather a consolation and warning, than a congratulation, and not wanting in a certain degree of irony,—it was nevertheless received by the Commission with much more kindness. One might almost say that none of Schleiermacher's writings attained its end so immediately as this. The Commission, with noble self-denial, entered into the ideas of Schleiermacher; instead of precipitately constructing new liturgical forms, it proposed that a commission should first be given to the Church, by means of which it should be possible to give to the ecclesiastical reforms, as proceeding from within, namely, the character of a collective action of the Church. It pertains to the imperishable renown of the King of Prussia, that he entered into this idea with all the interest of his Christian mind, and all the energy of his kingly will. It is true, the new Liturgy for the Court and Garrison Congregation at Potsdam and the Garrison Church at Berlin, was little

adapted, even by the manner in which it was introduced, to give rise to the hope of a true, comprehensive reform, brought about in a proper way. Schleiermacher, like a watchman on the battlements of the Church, observant of every appearance and movement in the ecclesiastical horizon, did not omit—this time with the avowal of his name—with frankness, yet in a tone of mildness, to subject the new Liturgy to criticism, in his pamphlet “On the New Liturgy for the Court and Garrison Congregation at Potsdam” (1816); and, at the close, to direct attention anew to this point,—“that a well-ordered Synodal Constitution affords the only means of securing for the Church a legitimate co-operation towards the reform of Divine worship,—so that neither the caprice of the individual shall be able wildly to wander at pleasure in the sacred concerns of public worship, nor a fruitful and acknowledged point of union be wanting to the like-minded, who would fain enter into a mutual connexion,—nor the man of experience and of eminence be destitute of that silent, direct influence which it is proper for him to exercise.—When, then, upon the occurrence of the jubilee of the Reformation in 1817, the King, by his praiseworthy example and excellent arrangements, prepared the way for, nay, in very strictness founded, the Union of the two Protestant Churches, and, as early as the spring of 1817, the official notification with regard to the formation of Presbyteries, and the union of the Protestant clergy into District, Provincial, and National Synods, made its appearance as the result,—Schleiermacher’s rejoicing over the incipient success of his fairest and most cherished desires was equalled only by the zeal with which, by counsel and by deed, with love and diligence, he sought to promote and defend the new work. His ideas, in the mean time,

had found entrance and patronage in more extended circles; a number of the clergy, especially the younger part of them, had come forward as fellow-labourers and fellow-counsellors in the sacred enterprise. Schleiermacher, with thankfulness and modesty, cheerfully recognised this fact; devoid of envy, he rejoiced that he was neither the *only* labourer, nor, outwardly, the most important one. In order, however, that by the communication and discussion of his opinions and counsels with respect to certain particulars of the official notification just referred to, he might unite such as were like-minded to a deliberate and unanimous action at the Synods which were shortly to be held, he hastily stepped forth in advance, and wrote, as early as the summer of 1817, his "Observations concerning the Synodal Constitution about to be established for the Protestant Church of the State of Prussia."—When, soon after this, the Berlin Synod assembled, and as a mark of honour elected him to be its President, he fulfilled the duties of this office with such zeal, such aptness, patience, and love, that even those who had, until then, rather feared and mistrusted him, began to bestow upon him their affection and confidence; so that the labours of the Synod evidently prospered under his guidance, through the increasingly lively harmony which prevailed amongst its members. The Union, and the new Constitution of the Church, appeared at that time inseparable,—the one was the necessary auxiliary of the other. Thus, the first sign of life given by the Synod was its "Official Declaration respecting the Celebration of the Lord's Supper, to be held by the Synod on the 30th of October." Schleiermacher was the author of this document. In it, he sets forth the Union, in a brief and popular, a gentle and earnest manner, as a *purely eccle-*

siastical pacification,—*unconnected* with any settlement of *dogmatical* differences, which would be useless, nay, would lead to new divisions,—and *testified* by means of a new and common ritual in the celebration of the Lord's Supper.

Nothing could be more convincing than this simple declaration; and any one who, in the spirit of it, took part in that first united celebration of the Lord's Supper by the entire Protestant Clergy of the metropolis, will recollect how that elevating and sacred service, accompanied as it was by the animating remembrance of the as yet *undivided commencement* of the Reformation,* contributed essentially to give stability and completeness to the conviction of the verity and purity which belong precisely to this kind of union. Contradiction and misinterpretation were hardly to be looked for; at least from theologians, who must needs be acquainted with the history of the previous divisions, and attempts at union. When, therefore,—while every one at Berlin, in vigorous health, and strong generous faith, was resigning himself to the hope that the work thus commenced would go on in gladdening prosperity, Dr Ammon's† Examination of Harms's Theses‡ made its appearance,

* Its commencement, namely, by the publication of Luther's Theses; the special event to which the commemoration of 1817 referred.—TR.

† The well-known *Rational Supra-naturalist*, as he has sometimes been called; author of "*Die Fortbildung des Christenthums zur Weltreligion*," and other works which have excited a good deal of attention. A man of great learning, both classical and modern, and a celebrated preacher; though, when I heard him about four years ago, I thought him sadly cold and dreary. Schleiermacher compared him to an *eel*, which continually slips out of the fingers of any one who attempts to catch it.—TR.

‡ The name of Claus Harms is well known in Germany as that of a very popular and successful preacher, as well as able and fearless defender of the standard Lutheran system of doctrine. Born May 25, 1778, at Fahrstedt, a village in Ditmarsh, (the West part of Holstein), he went to

—a bitter pill for the weaklings in faith of that day,—and found fault with that as morbid which we considered healthy, and dishonoured with all manner of insidious calumnies and ignoble derision the ordinance which had been celebrated with all devoutness,—every one was roused, I know not whether more to indignation or to pity. Upon a closer consideration, however, it seemed impossible, for the sake of the cause involved, to allow the attacks of so influential and renowned a theologian upon that still recent and delicate work, the Union, to go unreprieved. All looked to Schleiermacher as the natural champion of this cause; and he was not the man to let himself be long sought after, where its interests were concerned. His pen was already pointed; he dipped it in the generous indignation which Ammon's production had excited within him; and thus, in February 1818, appeared his "Letter to Mr Principal-Court-Chaplain Ammon, on his Examination of Harms's Theses." Whatever may be our judgment respecting the polemical tone of this composition, it is possible that something more of mildness and good-nature would per-

the village school until he was twelve years old; after which the clergyman of the place taught him the rudiments of Greek and Latin. He was then required to assist his father, who was a miller and farmer; and upon the death of the latter, he managed the property for his mother, until, in 1797, she disposed of it, and thus left him at liberty to follow his own strong impulse towards a more studious life. He went to school at Meldorf, and in 1799 removed to the University of Kiel, where he devoted himself to the study of theology. In 1806, the congregation at Lunden, in North Ditmarsh, elected him as their Diaconus, (Curate or Assistant Minister). Ten years later, he removed to Kiel in the capacity of Archidiaconus, becoming subsequently (1837) Church-Provost and Councillor, and (1842) Superior Councillor of Consistory. His numerous literary labours have all been occasioned or suggested, in a greater or less degree, by his active zeal and experience as a *preacher* and *pastor*. The "Ninety-five Theses" referred to in the text were published in 1817, as a kind of announcement of the Tercentenary Festival of the Reformation, which

haps have won over his opponent, rather than vanquished him; but Schleiermacher's whole character rendered it a thing impossible for him to oppose sweet to bitter; he was fond of a *homœopathic* cure in such cases, and as Ammon had employed wit in his challenge, it was natural that Schleiermacher should serve him with wit in return, and that of a flavour both salt and bitter. I myself, however, who just at that time saw much of Schleiermacher, can bear witness, that although upon other occasions he ascribed to himself, probably in jest, a certain itching for polemics, he was actuated and guided, in the work just referred to, purely by his zeal for the *cause* at issue. If, at the same time, his strokes fell upon the *person*, this was unavoidable; because the matter seemed to turn upon his annihilating the opponent's *personal right of attack*, and making the latter *feel* that this had been done. I do not make this observation for the purpose of wounding the feelings of his antagonist, who is still living, but for the purpose of stating the historical connexion as completely as possible from my own recollections, and of defending my friend

was held that year. It would seem that the author thought to *commemorate* Luther by *imitating* him in his mode of assailing the theological and ecclesiastical abuses of his time. Harms's bold and decided assertion, in these Theses, of the doctrines of Human Depravity and Saving Faith, gave rise to a fierce and widely-extended controversy, in the course of which he felt himself constrained to attempt a more elaborate exposition and defence of the views he had put forth. See his "*Briefe zur nähern Verständigung über meine Thesen*" (Letters, intended to promote a better comprehension of my Theses), 1817, and "*Dass es mit der Vernunftreligion nichts ist*" (That Natural Religion [the Religion of Reason] amounts to nothing), 1819. The strife was maintained on both sides for a considerable time, and then dropped; its *appreciable* results, as is usual in such cases, being but small,—unless we reckon amongst them the honest, healthy celebrity which thence accrued to the author of the first challenge, and which his later years have abundantly justified and confirmed.—Tr.

against false accusations on the part of some who are ignorant of the facts; accusations which I, too, have subsequently heard.

But this was not the last conflict which our valiant combatant in the cause of the Union and Constitution of the Church had to sustain; others, incomparably more severe, were impending. No long time elapsed, before the ecclesiastical horizon was enveloped in an exceedingly ominous gloom. To the statesmen of the old school, the developement of a more liberal constitution and a more important position for the Church, was from the very first a source of great annoyance; the suspicion of a new *hierarchical* preponderance found utterance,—at first in secret, but soon, also, aloud. Mistakes, exaggerations, remissness, and precipitation, on the part of the theologians, gave a semblance of reason to the objection, that the age was neither peaceful enough nor mature enough to allow of the Church's having a constitution of greater vitality [than that to which it had been accustomed]. And as, in the department of political life, especially from the year 1819, something of crime and something of thoughtlessness, revolutionary giddiness and the fantastic tricks of a superficial liberalism, called forth a necessary reaction, and a defensive solicitude and apprehensiveness with regard to every excitement of a free and lively character seemed almost to be but a part of the duty of caution and circumspection, it could not but be that by degrees, in the ecclesiastical department also, preference should be given to the policy of stopping short and standing still, rather than to that of following up the movement which had been begun. This is not the place, nor is it possible for me, to set forth and to pass judgment upon the individual *momenta* of the reaction in ecclesiastical affairs, as they followed upon and in

consequence of one another. Enough, the appearance of the new Prussian Liturgy and Agenda was the commencement and the signal of a new and in part opposite tendency, obstructive at once—at least in its immediate result—to the Union, and also to the Constitution of the Church. Schleiermacher could not, in accordance with the principles of his practical theology, approve either the contents or the form of the new liturgical arrangements. He would have been untrue to his most inward and essential nature if he had agreed to them; and it was a consequence involved in the energetic character of his mind, as well as in the nature of the position he had previously occupied, that he became the leader of the opposition. His pseudonymous publication, “On the Liturgical Right of Evangelical Sovereigns, a Theological Deliberation, by Pacificus Sincerus” (1824), struck at the root of the opposite tendency, and stirred up anew the controversy respecting the principles of law involved in the connexion between Church and State; a controversy which, in the age of indifference, had almost been laid to sleep amongst the theologians, and had merely dragged along a wretched and spiritless existence in the schools of the jurists. The consequence has been, that since that time there has also arisen in this department, amongst theologians and jurists, a more lively intercourse and conflict of diverse tendencies and opinions.—In appearance, the noble hero was vanquished. The opposite tendency has, *practically*, obtained the upper hand. But, that its supremacy is, I might say, merely *interimistic*, and that its theory, half out of fright at the consistent, logical developement of itself in the writings of Augusti and others upon this subject, and half from a consciousness of the power of truth arrayed on the other side, becomes increasingly

modified, relaxes, and concedes, until, perhaps, a point has been found in which the true medium is situated; this is the work of the man who so long and so steadfastly maintained and led the opposition,—until so much had been conceded on the other part, that he thought he could not, without doing violence to the claims of truth and love, delay any longer at least a cessation of hostilities.* I am too little acquainted with the individual *momenta* of the proceedings with regard to the Agenda since the year 1827, in which I left my native country, to be capable of judging as to the inward motives by which Schleiermacher was influenced in his conditional acceptance of the Agenda. But this I know, that in the great concerns of the Church, he never did anything contrary to the dictates of his knowledge and his conscience, and he was just as far removed from the idle arrogance and self-will of an *absolute* opposition, as from the pitifulness of giving up a single particle of the truth, or of his convictions, for the sake of outward peace or gain. He thus failed, it is true, to reach the summit of his desires and strivings for the welfare of the Church;

* Schleiermacher's great object (see Brief Outline, § 287,) was to secure, as far as possible, the perfect combination of *freedom* with *regularity*, in public worship; to *limit* the *subjectivity* of the officiating minister, without reducing either himself or his congregation to the condition of mere *machines*. I was informed by a resident in Berlin, who is not unknown to the theological world of Germany, that Schleiermacher was accustomed *practically* to assert his liberty in this respect, even to the last. The Prussian Liturgy, namely, includes a general intercessory prayer, for the King, Royal Family, Army, and People of all ranks and conditions, which is usually recited after the sermon, though it *may* precede the latter. This form Schleiermacher declined to use; and substituted an *extempore* prayer, in which the same topics were taken up, and pretty much in the same order, as in the printed form. I am not aware that he attempted to vary the *other* parts of the Liturgy, to which, as being derived chiefly, I think, from certain of the ancient Liturgies, he might possibly feel less objection.—Tr.

desires and strivings which proceeded from the most honest conviction. The tragic sorrow which this circumstance occasioned, he never concealed. But, by his example, his writings, and his efficient activity, he conducted the age to a point from which, (provided the Evangelical Church of Germany does not misapprehend its true life and well-being), it will *accomplish*, under more favourable and peaceful circumstances, that of which the might of an unfavourable and tempestuous condition of the world only permitted the noble genius of Schleiermacher to make a *beginning*. No great and clear idea has ever been lost, or remained but an image of fancy and a pious wish; least of all such as, by a reference to the inmost necessities of mankind and to the nature of the case, have been so energetically made a matter of consciousness within the Church, as the ideas to which we here allude have been by Schleiermacher.

In the last years of his life, Schleiermacher saw himself involved in a controversy with two persons with whom he would rather have remained at peace. The approaching celebration of the jubilee of the Augsburg Confession furnished those two distinguished theologians, Von Cölln* and Schulz†, of Breslau, with an occasion for publishing conjointly, and with a reference to certain disquieting signs of the times, a public declaration and preliminary caveat respecting theological liberty of doctrine in the Evangelical Universities, and its limitation by means of symbolical books,—in case the design should

* A divine of the moderate Rationalist school. He died February 17, 1833, in the forty-fifth year of his age. His principal work, a system of "Biblical Theology," was published after his death, with a memoir of the author prefixed, by his friend Schulz.—TR.

† Dr. David Schulz, the accomplished editor of Griesbach's Greek Testament, and author of many important contributions to Exegetical Theology in its various branches.—TR.

be entertained of introducing a new requirement of adherence to the Augsburg Confession.* Declaring the Augsburg Confession to be no longer adapted to represent the unity and community of faith and doctrine in the Evangelical Church, they pointed to a better future, in which, with a larger measure of agreement, and a more general diffusion of correct views, it would be possible and advisable to set up a new and more valid Confession. Schleiermacher, knowing himself to be perfectly agreed with these gentlemen in the maintenance of the Protestant liberty of doctrine against every kind of limitation, addressed a letter† to them, in which, on the one hand, he declared that there was but little ground for apprehending any new impositions of adherence to the symbolical books,—pointing out the perfectly unpractical and useless character of such impositions, and the unlikeliness, for this very reason, of their being resorted to; and, on the other hand, protested even against the *wish* that *new* confessional documents should, at any period whatsoever, take the place of the old. Looking at this letter in connexion with what Schleiermacher had written elsewhere respecting the essential character of the Protestant Symbols, (in the “Almanack of the Reformation” for the year 1819), one might possibly take offence at certain sharp points which, according to his custom, he carelessly left sticking out here and there; but the tone of calmness, pacification, and encouragement was unmistakeably prevalent throughout the whole epistle. The passage, however, which contains the greatest occasion of stumbling, is that in which, in order to show how altogether impracti-

* The title runs,—“Ueber theologische Lehrfreiheit auf den evangelischen Universitäten und deren Beschränkung durch symbolische Bücher,” (Breslau, 1830).—TR.

† In the Studien und Kritiken for 1831, Part i.

cable it is to effect the exclusion or conversion of the Rationalists by means of orthodox formularies of doctrine and liturgies, he directs attention to the fact that it is possible for many a one, perhaps, even notwithstanding the difference of his own views, to accept and to use the prescribed liturgical and other formularies,—in his own sense and meaning, namely—without our being able to say in every case, unconditionally, that this constitutes a want of truth and faith, or a *reservatio mentalis*. It was to be foreseen, that this expression,—although, in its connexion with the whole, it explained itself, as being a benevolent and excusatory, rather than a morally strict judgment with regard to a whole series of cases which are of no infrequent occurrence, especially in the liturgical praxis,—would be subject to manifold misapprehension and misinterpretation. That the “Evangelical Church-Journal” was uncharitable enough to make it a reason for charging him with hypocrisy and laxity, nay with Jesuitism, occasioned him no surprise, and as he himself says, he silently left it to the enjoyment of its gratifying discovery; but that the two gentlemen before referred to also deemed it necessary, in their double reply, to call him to account on this head, was a circumstance which caused him pain. He did not omit to answer for himself, respecting this and respecting other matters, which had been made an occasion of reproach against him, as involving a contradiction between the earlier and the later Schleiermacher; he did so in the Preface to his “Sermons relating to the Commemoration of the Delivery of the Augsburg Confession” (1831). One sees, at the same time, what pain it occasioned him to be laid under this necessity. I will not attempt to roll away all the blame of the misunderstanding from him; but his defence

is sufficient to satisfy any one who knows Schleiermacher to have been just as decided an enemy of all hypocrisy and equivocation, as of the bondage of the letter. I cannot approve all that he has said with regard to the *present* significance of the Symbols, but I share with him the glad anticipation of a condition of the Church, in which the true unity and community of doctrine shall have existence and vitality in the midst of perfect liberty. In respect of the stand-point appropriate to such a discussion, however, I can but concede that he has not, with sufficient circumspection, distinguished between the two cases,—namely, that in which symbolical books and liturgical formularies are already in existence and in use, and that in which such things are *newly* set up for general use,—and judged them according to their difference; and the like with regard to the *momenta* of Reformation and Revolution.

It is impossible for me to speak of Schleiermacher's *theological* character and merits, without having the *entire personality* of the man, amiable and exalted as it was, brought to my recollection. I was taught to know and love his theology and his personality together; in him the one sustained and gave brightness to the other, and my experience has doubtless been the experience of several who have occupied a position of proximity to him,—that the one became intelligible and dear to a man by means of the other. If I further attempt to delineate, from the image which I retain of his personality, some of its principal features, I know well that I want the *skill* to produce a portrait such as would be worthy of him; *not*, however, either the *love* or the

truthfulness faithfully to describe the impression which he has made upon me in an intimate acquaintance of several years' duration.

I saw him for the first time in the spring of 1816. That moment I shall never forget. I had approached him by letter some months before, and had gone to Berlin especially in consequence of the encouragement which he had afforded me, for the purpose of *habilitating* myself in connexion with the Theological Faculty there. As his letter had expressed a friendly sincerity, rather than a cordial warmth, so I found it to be with himself, too, at our first conversational meeting. It was only by degrees that the shy and timid reverence with which I had approached him, gave place to another feeling; nay, it was, at first, only increased by the admiration which the immediate presence of his powerful soul, manifesting itself in his glance and in his speech, excited within me. But just then it was least of all *my* doing, that this timidity and shyness gradually disappeared, and gave place to an increasingly cordial and confidential respect. Any one who mustered courage to *seek* him, was very soon cordially *met* by him; and then, it was not merely the cheerful and jocose kind of social intercourse by which he tempered with gentleness the oppressive might of his genius, but it was just the loving soul, opening itself, simply and naturally, to every one upon whom he had reason for bestowing his confidence. He then no longer merely permitted an approach, but came to meet the individual, in an encouraging and confiding manner, and attracted to himself all that was susceptible and in need of love towards him. I can never think of the affectionate manner in which he drew me closer and closer towards him, bestowed upon me a constantly increasing confidence, encouraged and com-

forted me,—without the most grateful emotion. His love was no effeminate tenderness, accompanied by ever open, caressing speech; but an earnest, compact fire, which not merely passed through the stranger mind with a magnetic softness of attraction, but also convulsed it like an electric shock,—“yet even thus, always possessed for such as abound in vital energy a refreshing charm.”—Any one that did not understand and tolerate him in this guise, might easily feel himself repulsed in the midst of his approach; and thus it has happened with many, who had been accustomed to a more effeminate sort of friendship. But what he says in his Monologues is perfectly true: “I am *sure* of those who are *really* disposed to love *me*,—my interior nature; and firmly does my soul entwine itself about them, nor will it ever forsake them. They have learnt to know me; they behold my spirit; and those who once love it as it is, must love it ever more faithfully and ever more fervently, in proportion as it develops itself and fashions itself more durably in their sight. Of this possession I am as well assured as of my being; nor have I as yet lost any one that ever became dear to me in love.” I am not the only one who is in a position to celebrate his fidelity and persistence in friendship. Those who occupied a still nearer position, and had been longer connected with him, will furnish a yet stronger testimony that he was one of the most faithful of men, and that he understood the noble art of *keeping* a friend, firm and warm, even in the midst of ill-tempers and incongruities.—It is a common saying, that along with a man’s advance in years his ability and inclination to form new friendships are diminished; the bloom of youth, it is said, is the proper season for laying the foundation of friendship; the later, colder, more isolating years of life are the less adapted to the

purpose, inasmuch as persons of the same age become more and more rare. In this respect, too, Schleiermacher continued fresh and young; he never isolated himself. The friends of his youth were but the *stock* of the, in him never-dying, tree of friendship, which even in his latest years put forth new branches. He knew how to set aside even the disparity of years and of intellect, by the youthful freshness and serenity of his affection.

It may sound paradoxical to the ears of strangers, and of those who judge according to appearances, but I speak with perfect truth when I affirm, that over the deepest ground of his heart *love* reigned supreme, from the very first,—and, as time went on, ever more purely and more tenderly; and that even the keenness of his *intellect*, the stinging wit, the bitterness of speech with which he fought and wounded, were never able to overcome the love which was the foundation of his *heart*. I know no one that possessed so noble a tolerance, so expansive a heart, ready lovingly to judge and to bear with the most various gradations and tendencies of intellect. Notwithstanding the decision and finality which characterized his mode of thinking, he possessed a universal capability of finding out and recognizing, without envy or repining, whatever was good in others. When I lived with him in Berlin, *he* was the man who, in spite of all misapprehension, whenever he detected anything like ability, either amongst his ecclesiastical or amongst his academical associates in office, was the readiest of all to yield to it a loving recognition and eulogy. And I remember that on more than one occasion he set younger men right, when they had let fall an arrogant, intolerant judgment respecting others. “Leave me that man in honour” was his saying; “he has ability and merit, in his way

He never had reason to be afraid of any antagonist. Nor was he ever so. He was never in want of opponents; and just as little was he in want of a mind for controversy. If he was merely attacked *personally*, so that the attack did not at the same time affect any important *cause* of which he was the representative, he never defended himself. He rebuked his adversary by his silence. For ordinary learned controversies he had not enough either of time or of egoistic irritability. But when he saw the truth, the welfare of the Church or of the State, placed in jeopardy, and thought the foe of sufficient consequence, he *never* delayed; weakly tolerance was then as far from his thoughts, as a sparing of his time and ease. Usually the first in the field, he attacked the opponent with every force, every art, and every privilege of an honourable warfare. The employment of irony, of biting wit, in controversy, he considered allowable, nay, necessary. He did not understand wherefore he should not make use of the weapons which nature had bestowed upon him, and was of opinion that when the opposite party had come forward in a spirit of self-conceit, there was nothing so effective, for the purpose of enforcing upon him the salutary feeling of his own insignificance, as the lash of a stinging wit. He had a kind of pleasure in wit, an instinctive turn that way. But amidst the enlivening use of this weapon, he strictly and diligently kept in view the cause itself which he had to defend. He practised Polemics as a *moral* duty and art to which he felt himself inwardly called by the nature of his genius and by his love to the cause. If he had once apprehended the *necessity* of a controversy, he flung himself with the whole force of his personality against that of his antagonist. The personal element in his polemical style often served merely by

way of dramatic enlivenment; but it is in a far higher degree the natural expression of his hearty interest in the cause at issue, an interest by which he was penetrated in the most lively manner. His mode of controversy was not *convenient* either to himself or to his antagonist. He made earnest work of it, and drew blood. He knew beforehand that he would draw down upon himself, from this quarter and from that, evil report, hostility, anger, and revenge; he regretted this—but, for the sake of the cause involved, he willingly accepted that which, from the ordinary character of men, was inevitable. His valour was in such cases greater than his prudence. Whatever prudence he may have had, the prudence of the indolent and the cowardly was of a kind which he ever disdained.

Always, and in every age, the number of those who labour, accomplish, and produce, to the same extent as Schleiermacher, will be but small. The natural rapidity and certainty of his mental movements does a great deal in the way of explanation. What he wrote for the press had been previously so well considered and prepared, even with regard to the form, that—since he always possessed at the same time a mastery of language—he never had occasion to strike out any thing. None of his sermons, none of his lectures cost him more than the time which was requisite for a thorough meditation. A small scrap of paper sufficed for his memoranda, even in lectures such as those upon the History of Philosophy. Thus in every labour, by his various proficiency, he saved time and spirits for new intellectual acquisition and new exertion. He was, moreover, very economical with regard to time, and by this means had time for everything that his very comprehensive vocation requi-

red of him. In his latter years, certainly, I have heard him complain that he was no longer able to accomplish all that he wished. But it is precisely the most industrious and creative class of men, by whom this complaint is most emphatically made; and the *material* energy, which is also an essential requisite, does not grow with a man's years. Schleiermacher had, altogether, but a limited capital of physical strength at his command. His bodily constitution was naturally weak and delicate—at least in the years in which I lived with him—and sickly too. But what a mastery he exercised over it, compelling it, even in its sickly states, to be the servant of his mind! Labours and journeys, official activity and social life,—his body must suffice for all and obey the requirements of all. In pedestrian travelling* he always took the lead; in the evening the last to go to rest, in the morning the first to prepare for renewing the journey. I know that he has preached, and delivered lectures, when suffering from spasms of the stomach, and no one has perceived that he was ill. I have often had an opportunity of observing, that when he has been in company till late in the evening, (and it was not easy for such meetings to last *too* long for *him*), the most cheerful and animated of all who were there,—he has lectured or preached next morning, with freshness unimpaired, often as early as six o'clock. This Socratic mastery and might of the spirit over the body was a part of his inmost nature, and secured to him in

* It may be as well just to remind the reader, that frequently, German *professors*, as well as German students, turn the long vacation (or at least a part of it) to account in this particular way, by having recourse to the best of all possible preparations for the fatigues of a University campaign.—Tr.

age that renewed youth, with which he “smilingly saw the light of his eyes departing, and the white hair springing up between the locks of blond,”—with which, even to his latest breath, he maintained so lively a participation both in the earnest labour and in the cheerful enjoyment of life. Of the wonderful account which we have heard lately,* that “whoever has had occasion to observe him within the last three years of his life, will be able to testify that he was the subject of an often irrepressible sadness, a prostration, an inability to contend against sorrow, which was such as to excite compassion,”—of this apocryphal compassionate story I understand nothing. “A domestic calamity,” it is said, “furnished the first inducement to this state of mind; or, to express myself more correctly, the death of his only son tore away the flood-gates which still dammed up the feelings of a broken existence,—broken, he himself, perhaps, knew not how.—From that time there was an affecting joyousness in Schleiermacher’s preaching; the plan of his masterly discourses remained the same, but his tone, his manner, the solution of his dialectic enigmas, had undergone a change. One would not believe it, and yet he might every Sunday convince himself of the fact,—that Schleiermacher never again left the pulpit without shedding tears:” and so the story, devoid of taste or connexion, goes on still further, and becomes at last so senseless as to exhibit to us a man who shut both eye and ear, and with tears entreated his congregation to do nothing but be resigned, and “close their eyes and ears,”—and who, at last, approached with enthusiastic confidence nearer and nearer to the immediate appearance [vision?] of the Redeemer, until he was able to revel in the corporeity, the personality, in the

* Extraordinary Supplement to the Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 77, 1834.

entire actuality of the God-Man, as Thomas saw him after the Resurrection."*—What a piece of nonsense! What an unfamiliar, nay, what an *impossible* Schleiermacher has this marvellous dreamer beheld! The death of his only and hopeful son *did* communicate a most vehement *shock* to his mind. How was it possible that it should be otherwise? But a man who could so lift himself up amidst the first sorrows of his paternal heart,—go to the grave of his ardently beloved son,—and speak with such composure, such strength of faith, as Schleiermacher did,—could not, either then or afterwards, have had the feeling of a broken existence. Schleiermacher possessed by nature a very profound and powerful sensibility, but he had also an equally energetic power of mind to govern it at all times. *Long before* the death of his son, I have seen him leave the pulpit with tears in his eyes. This profoundest stirring up of his religious feeling, however, merely gave to his discoursing the full warmth of conviction; it never hindered him from thinking and speaking clearly and with power. I saw him at two different times after the death of his beloved son, but on both occasions, I found in him the same Christian *σωφροσύνη* with which, in previous years, he had been able to master both bodily and mental pain, and to dictate to his feeling its proper measure.

Schleiermacher has this in common with the greatest and noblest of men, that there is something animating even about his *death*. It was the reflection, nay, the glorification of his life.

* I have been at some pains in rendering the *words* of this remarkable passage; for its *meaning* I am not accountable. The reader who avoids stumbling at it on *this* account, will at least be tempted to question its *æsthetic* propriety.—Tr.

That, when the tidings of his death resounded, not merely in Berlin, but through all Germany, nay, as far as the German name extends, all was consternation and sorrow over the great, irreparable loss,—that friends and pupils, admirers, opponents, strangers, his congregation at Church and at the High School, the entire city in which he had lived, the Court, and the people, vied with one another in giving splendour to his funeral,—this is assuredly no mere outward testimony to the greatness of his name. It is much, and it is beautiful, but this is not what I have in view. I am referring to the *inward* history of his death. I have read the record of the observations, made with the attentiveness of affection, and committed to writing for the benefit of his more intimate friends, by her who in life was nearest to him, and who during his last days did not leave him for a single moment. As much of this as is suitable for a more extended circulation, I am permitted to communicate. “The temper of his mind during the whole course of his illness, was marked by a serene and gentle tranquillity, a punctual compliance with every direction; there was never a sound of complaining or discontent; he was always alike cheerful and patient, although grave, and retired within himself.” “One day, when he awoke from a slumber into which he had been thrown by means of opium, he called his beloved consort to his bed-side, and said, ‘I am, to be sure properly speaking, in a state which fluctuates between consciousness and the absence of consciousness, but inwardly I am spending most delightful moments; I am constrained to be constantly in the midst of the profoundest speculations, which, however, are here identical with the most heartfelt religious experiences.’”

I find in this incident a beautiful crowning of his end

with glory. The man who had struggled his whole life long, to attain to the *higher unity of the religious and the speculative*, but who, with modesty and caution, regarded it not as the *commencement* but as the *ultimate aim* of his thinking,—*receives* it as a reward and signal of departure for the heavenly kingdom, in those moments when the outward man dies, in order that the inward man may rise, free and pure, to the perfect enjoyment of eternal life in God !

The last days and hours of his life were pervaded and irradiated by the presence of religion. Even his dreams were reflexes of his religious life and activity. “ I have had such a beautiful dream,” he said on one occasion, “ and this dream has left with me quite a peculiar and salutary frame of mind. I was in a very large assembly,—there were many persons, familiar and unfamiliar, all looking at me, and wishing to hear from me something of a religious character; it was in the nature of an instruction, and I gave it with so much pleasure !”—Affectionately mindful of children and friends, and, in proportion as he drew nearer to the important moment, more profoundly immersed in love, as the inmost spring of his being, he said, “ To the children I leave the saying of St John, ‘ Love one another ! ’ ” “ And I charge thee,” said he to his consort, “ to salute all my friends, and to tell them how heartily I loved them.”

He had soon become certain of his approaching death; he would have been glad to remain with those who were dear to him; he felt that he had yet much of hardness to endure, before arriving at eternal rest; but he went to meet the last conflict with composure, and with devotedness to the sacred will of the Eternal Love.

“ The last morning, his suffering visibly increased, he complained of a violent sensation of burning, inward-

ly, and the first and last murmur forced its way from his lips,—‘ Alas, Lord, my pain is great !’ In a deeply affecting manner he then said to his family, ‘ Dear children, you should now all of you go from the room, and leave me alone; I would fain spare you the woeful spectacle.’—The perfect lineaments of death presented themselves; his eye appeared to have grown dim,—his death-struggle to have been accomplished. At this moment he laid his two forefingers upon his left eye, as he often did when reflecting deeply, and began to speak: ‘ We have the reconciliation-death of Jesus Christ, his body and his blood.’—While thus engaged, he had raised himself up, his features began to grow animated, his voice became clear and strong, and he said with priestly solemnity, ‘ Are ye one with me in this faith?’ to which his friends replied with a loud ‘ Yea!’ ‘ Then let us celebrate the Lord’s Supper! But there can be no talk of the sacristan. Quick, quick! let no one stumble at matters of form!’ After that which was necessary for the purpose had been fetched, (his friends having waited with him, during the interval, in solemn silence) he began, with increasingly radiant features, and eyes in which there had returned a wonderful, indescribable brightness, nay, a sublime glow of affection, with which he looked upon those around him,—to utter a few words of prayer and of introduction to the sacred service. After this, addressing in full and aloud, to each individual, and last of all to himself, the words of the institution, he first gave the bread and the wine to the others who were present, then partook of them himself, and said, ‘ Upon these words of Scripture I abide; they are the foundation of my faith.’ After he had pronounced the benediction, his eye first turned once more towards his consort with an expression of perfect

love, and then he looked at each individual with affecting and fervent cordiality, uttering these words,—‘Thus are we, and abide, in *this* love and fellowship. *one!*’ He laid himself back upon the pillow. The radiance still rested upon his features. After some minutes he said, ‘Now I can hold out here no longer;’ and again, ‘Give me another position.’ He was laid upon his side; he breathed a few times; life came to a stand. The children had entered the room in the mean time, and surrounded the bed, kneeling. His eye gradually closed.”

In the anguish of sorrow, and in the feeling of spiritual elevation, I have nothing to add further, save the words of Scripture, “Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord!” and, in recollection of the saying with which I once dedicated a book to him, “Be mindful of your teachers, who have spoken to you the word of God; whose end contemplate, and be followers of their faith!”

BRIEF OUTLINE
OF
THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY,

DRAWN UP TO SERVE AS THE BASIS OF INTRODUCTORY LECTURES.

BY THE LATE
DR. FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

It has always appeared to me a matter of no ordinary difficulty, to deliver academical discourses under the guidance of a hand-book constructed by another; for every deviation in *opinion* seems to require at the same time a deviation from that *order of arrangement* which has originated from a different point of view. Certainly the plan alluded to becomes the more easy, in proportion as the peculiar views of individuals with regard to details are subordinated to a common view with regard to the whole; that is, in proportion as *that* has existence, which is commonly called a *School*. But how little this is the case in Theology at the present time, every one knows. For the very same reason, therefore, which makes it a matter of necessity,—if a guiding-clue is to be employed at all, (a practice which is at all events useful, in many respects)—that I should construct one for myself,—it is not competent for me to put forth the claim that other instructors should make use of mine. If I should therefore appear to be going a step too far, in introducing to the public at large, by means of the press, a work which is intended merely for the present and future hearers of my lectures, I comfort myself with the thought, that these few sheets contain the whole of my present views with regard to the study of theology, and that these views, whatever their specific character, may, perhaps, even by their deviation from those which are held by other men, operate in the way of stimulus, and generate something better.

Other teachers are accustomed, in their encyclopædian courses,

to give also a brief abstract of the individual *disciplinæ* themselves which are thus exhibited; to me it appeared more fitting to conform to the example of those who, in such discourses, prefer to fix the student's whole attention upon the *formal* side of the subject in order that the significance of the individual parts, and their connexion, may be the better apprehended.

DR. F. SCHLEIERMACHER.

BERLIN, December 1810.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

AFTER the lapse of nearly twenty years, which have passed away since this little book first appeared, it was perhaps only natural that I should find much to alter in matters of detail; although the theory, and the mode of treatment, viewed upon the whole, have remained altogether the same. What I have altered, in expression and in position, is also, I hope, improved. In like manner, too, it is my desire that the brief notes appended to the main propositions of the work may not fail of their end, which is, to facilitate the progress of the reader.

The numbering of the paragraphs of each section separately, in the first edition, occasioned much prolixity in the citation of them, and a change has therefore been made in this respect.

DR. F. SCHLEIERMACHER.

BERLIN, October 1830.

BRIEF OUTLINE, &c.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. THEOLOGY, in the sense in which the word is constantly taken here, is a *positive science*, the parts of which are connected into a whole, only by their *common relation to a determinate mode of faith*, that is, a determinate form of the God-consciousness; those of *Christian Theology*, therefore, by their relation to *Christianity*.

A positive science, namely, is, in general, a body of scientific elements which have a connectedness of their own,—not as if, by a *necessity* arising out of the very *idea* of science, they formed a constituent part of the scientific organization,—but only in so far as they are requisite in order to the solution of a *practical problem*. If, on the other hand, a *Rational Theology* has, in past times, been exhibited as an *essential part* of the scientific organization: it is true that this *also* has reference to the God of our God-consciousness; yet, being a *speculative science*, it is altogether a different thing from the Theology with which we have to do.

§ 2. A Theology will be formed in connexion with every determinate mode of faith, *in the measure in which the latter is communicated rather by the aid of mental representations** than of *symbolical actions*, and in the

* *Vorstellung*, in its older and more established acceptation, is the *generic term* employed to designate the *contents* of the *intellectual consciousness*; it may also mean the *act* by which these are brought before the mind. It is made to include, as its leading subordinates, *Anschauungen*, (percep-

measure in which, at the same time, it obtains *historical importance and independence*; which Theology, again, may be *different for every different mode of faith*, because it is connected with the individual character of the latter, as it respects both form and contents.

Only in the measure stated; because, in a community of small extent, the necessity for a Theology, properly so called, does not arise; and because, in the case of a preponderance of symbolical actions, the ritual Technology [Technik] which contains the interpretation of the latter, hardly deserves the name of a science.

§ 3. Theology is not the business of *all* who belong to a particular Church, nor *in so far as* they belong to it; but only *when* and *in so far as* they have a share in the *Guidance* of the Church: so that the *contrast* between such persons and the mass [of Church Members], and the *prominent appearance of Theology*, are matters *each of which implies the existence of the other*.

The expression "Guidance of the Church" is here to be taken in the broadest sense, without reference to any one particular form.

§ 4. The more the Church advances in its development, and the more numerous the regions of *language* and of *culture* over which it extends itself, the more *tions*, contemplations, observations, intuitions), in which *prominence* is given to the *antithesis* between the subject (the personal mind itself) and the object; *Begriffe*, (notions, conceptions),—in which the *special* reference is to the *object* represented or conceived of; and *Erkenntnisse*, (cognitions), which imply an *agreement* between the contents or *totality* of the mental image and the real character of the object for which it stands. It corresponds on the whole, therefore, to the word *idea*, in its loose and popular application among ourselves. I have chosen to render it, here and elsewhere, (though not with absolute uniformity), by "mental representation," which gives both the *literal* and the *real* meaning.

Hegel and his school, on the contrary, make the term *specific* instead of *general*; using it to denote the *imperfect* of which *Begriff* is the *complete*.—Tr.

many-partedly does Theology also become organized; for which reason, *Christian Theology* is that which has attained to the *highest* state of cultivation.

For, the more these two things come to pass, the more numerous are the *differences*, both in men's *conceptions* and in their *modes of life*, which Theology has to connect together, and the more various the historical material which it has to investigate.

§ 5. Christian Theology, accordingly, is the *collective embodiment* of those *branches of scientific knowledge* and those *rules of art*, without the possession and application of which a harmonious *Guidance of the Christian Church*, that is a Christian Church-Government, is not possible.

This, namely, is the *relation* laid down in § 1; for the Christian Faith, in and for itself, does not need such an apparatus in order to its efficacious activity, either in the *individual soul*, or in the circumstances connected with the social life of the *family*.

§ 6. The said branches of knowledge, when they are acquired and possessed *without reference* to the government of the Church, *cease* to have a *theological* character, and become assignable to those sciences to which, according to the nature of their *contents*, they respectively belong.

These sciences are, then, according to the nature of the case, Philology and History, Psychology and Morals; together with certain *disciplinæ* which are off-shoots from the latter,—the Doctrine of Art in general, and the Philosophy of Religion.

§ 7. By virtue of this relation, the *variety of knowledge* referred to is, to the *will* to be efficient in the Guidance of the Church, as the *body* to the *soul*.

Without this *will*, the *unity* of Theology is lost; and its parts become disintegrated into the different elements of which it is composed.

§ 8. But, as these heterogeneous branches of knowledge are connected into such a whole, only by the pre-

sence of an *interest in Christianity*, so also this interest in Christianity can manifest itself in an *appropriate activity*, only by *being coupled with the possession* of the said branches of knowledge.

According to § 2, a Guidance of the Church can *proceed* only from a highly developed *historical consciousness*; but it can become truly *useful*, moreover, only by means of a *clear knowledge* respecting the relations of [men's] *religious states* towards all that are of a different kind.

§ 9. If we conceive of an *interest in religion* and a *scientific spirit*, existing in a state of *union*, in the highest *degree* and in the greatest possible *equilibrium*, and with a view to both *theory* and *practice*,—we have the idea of a *Prince of the Church*.

This appellation for the theological Ideal is, it must be admitted, appropriate only when the disparity between the members of the Church is great, and when, at the same time, the exercise of influence over an extensive region of the Church is possible. But it seems more suitable than the term "*Father* of the Church," which has already received the stamp of currency for a particular circle; and, for the rest, it does not in the least involve any allusion to an official relation.

§ 10. If we conceive of this equilibrium as done away: then, he who has, in his own person, cultivated chiefly the *knowledge* that relates to Christianity, is a *Theologian* in the more restricted sense of the term; and he, on the other hand, who cultivates especially the activity which has to do with the *government* of the Church, is a *Minister* [Kleriker].*

This natural *sundering* of the two characters shows itself outwardly with different degrees of prominence at different

* *Etymologically*, this word should of course have been rendered *Clergyman*. But, to say nothing of the invidious distinction which in practice confines the application of the latter term to the ministers of but one or two of the Christian Communities existing in this country, (which, however, would of itself suffice to justify our rejection of the word as an adequate representative of Schleiermacher's more catholic meaning), it

times; and the more it prevails, the more indispensable is a lively *interaction* between the two classes, in order that the Church may maintain its ground.—For the rest, the term *Theologian* will, in the remaining portion of this work, be taken for the most part in the broader sense, as comprehending *both* tendencies.

§ 11. Every dealing with any branches of *theological knowledge as such*, whatever its nature, is always to be reckoned within the department of *Church-Guidance*; and whatever process of thought,—whether it be more of a *constructive*, or more of a *regulative* character,—may be pursued concerning that activity which has to do with the *Guidance of the Church*,—the said thinking always belongs to the department of the *Theologian* in the stricter sense of the term.

Even the *scientific* activity of the Theologian must have for its object the promotion of the *Church's welfare*,—and partakes, therefore, of a *clerical* character; and all *technical prescriptions* with regard even to the properly *clerical* forms of activity, have their place within the circle of the *theological sciences*.

§ 12. If, according to what has been said, all true *Theologians* also take part in the *Guidance* of the Church, and all who are active in the *government* of the Church also have their *life* in Theology; it follows that, notwithstanding the one-sided tendency of each class, *both* these characteristics,—an interest in the *well-being* of the Church, and a *scientific* spirit,—must be *united* in every individual.

For as in the opposite case, the *scholar* would no longer be a *Theologian*, but would merely be occupied in working up *is*, if we mistake not, commonly used to designate the individual as being a member of the clerical order, rather than as a *preacher*, *pastor*, or *Church dignitary*. Applied to our own country, therefore, the term would really *include* that which is here *opposed* to it by the author; for we have no large order or class of *unordained* theologians and Church dignitaries, as they have in Germany.—TR.

certain *elements* of Theology in the spirit of that **particular** science from which they might happen to be derived; so also the activity of the *Minister* would be, not a *guidance* technically *correct*, or even directed by prudent *thoughtfulness*, but simply a *confused* exercise of influence.

§ 13. Every one who finds himself called to the exercise of the guiding activity in the Church, determines for himself the *mode* of his working, according to the measure in which one or the other of these two elements preponderates in him.

Without such an inward calling, no one is in truth either a Theologian or a Minister; but neither of these modes of working is in any way dependent upon the circumstance, that the government of the Church constitutes the basis of a *particular civil status*.

§ 14. No one can be *perfectly possessed* of the various branches of theological knowledge *in their full extent*: partly because every discipline in particular is susceptible of an *infinite developement in detail*, and partly because the diversity of *disciplinæ* requires a *variety of talents*, which can hardly be *all* possessed in an equal degree by any one individual.

This capability of developement, even to the extent of an infinity of detail, applies as well to all that is *historical*, and all that is *connected* with the historical, as to all *technical rules* in relation to the variety of cases that may possibly arise.

§ 15. If, however, every one should determine on this account to confine himself wholly to some one *part* of Theology; the *whole* would have existence neither in any one nor in *all together*.

Not in the latter,—because, with such a kind of distribution, no *co-operation* could take place between the individual occupants of different departments; nay, strictly speaking, there could not be even a *communication* amongst them.

§ 16. A mastery, therefore, of *all* the theological *disciplinæ* in their *essential features*, is the condition un-

der which alone even but *one* of them can be dealt with in the *manner* and the *spirit* which are proper to Theology.

For only thus,—when every individual, along with his own *particular* discipline, possesses also a general comprehension of the *whole*,—is it possible for *communication* to take place between all and sundry; and only thus is it possible for each, by means of the discipline to which he specially devotes himself, to exercise an efficient influence upon the whole.

§ 17. *Whether* a man labours with a view to the perfecting of a *particular discipline*, and *what* discipline he selects for this purpose, are matters which are determined chiefly by the peculiar character of the *talent* possessed by the individual, but also, in part, by his views with regard to the prevailing *need* of the Church at the time.

The prosperous advancement of Theology in general, depends in a great measure upon the satisfaction of this condition,—that there shall be found, at any and every given period, *distinguished talents* for *that*, the onward cultivation of which is most *needed*. Those persons, however, can always be efficient in the greatest *variety* of ways, who have mastered the *largest number* of *discipline* in a certain degree of *proportionateness*, without aiming at special proficiency in any one of them; whereas, on the contrary, those who devote themselves exclusively to a *single department*, are capable of accomplishing most as *scholars*.

§ 18. The following, therefore, are matters which are indispensable to every Theologian. In the first place, a correct view of the *mutual connexion* existing between the different parts of Theology, and of the *particular value* of each in relation to the common object. In the next place, a knowledge of the *internal organization* of every discipline in particular, and of those *leading topics* included in it, which are the most essential with regard to the entire connexion. Further, an acquaintance with those *helps* by means of which he may at any time pro-

cure immediately whatever information he may require. Finally, *practice* and *certainly* in the application of those precautions which are necessary, in order to his making the best and most correct use of the results presented by the labours of others.

The first two particulars are frequently united, under the title *Theological Encyclopædia*; and the third, too, (namely, *Theological Bibliography*), is possibly drawn into the same connexion. The fourth is a section of the art of Criticism which has not been worked out as a separate discipline, and concerning which but few rules can be given in the way of teaching; so that its attainment depends almost exclusively upon the possession of a certain *natural capacity*, and upon *practice*.

§ 19. Every one who wishes to make himself master of a particular discipline in its whole extent, must make it his object to *sift* and to *supplement* what others have already accomplished therein.

Without an effort of this kind he would, whatever the completeness of his knowledge, be but a mere depository of *tradition*; a mental activity which is, of all, the most subordinate and the least important.

§ 20. The encyclopædian outline which is intended to be given here, relates merely to the *first* of the general requisites above mentioned (§ 18); only that it deals, at the same time, with the *individual disciplinæ* in the same manner as with the *whole*.

Such an outline is usually called a *Formal Encyclopædia*; in contradistinction to which, those which are denominated *Material* are intended rather to present a brief sketch of the leading *contents* of the individual *disciplinæ*, but are less exact in setting forth their *organization*. Inasmuch as Encyclopædia is, in its very nature, the first Introduction to the study of Theology, it certainly has connected with it, also, the *Technology* of the order according to which one ought to proceed in the said study,—or what is usually called *Methodology*. But this, in so far as it does not present itself spon-

taneously, upon an exhibition of the *inward* connexion [of the various theological *disciplinæ*], depends, in the present condition of our academical institutions, as well as of our literature, too much upon accidental circumstances, to make it worth while that we should constitute this a particular section, even, of the discipline with which we are occupied.

§ 21. There is no such thing as a *knowledge* with regard to Christianity, so long as men,—instead of endeavouring, on the one hand, to understand the *essential nature* of Christianity in its contrast to *other modes of faith and other churches*,—and on the other, to understand the *essential nature* of Religion and of Religious Communities in connexion with *the other activities of the human mind*,—content themselves with a merely *empirical* mode of apprehension.

The fact that the essential nature of Christianity is connected with a certain *history*, merely determines more particularly the *mode* of the understanding insisted upon; it is a circumstance which cannot prejudice the *problem itself*.

§ 22. Unless Religious Communities are to be looked upon as practical *mistakes*, it must be possible to show that the existence of such associations is a *necessary* element in order to the developement of the human mind.

The first part of the alternative has recently been exemplified, in the “Reflections on the Essential Nature of Protestantism.”* What constitutes Atheism, properly so called, is just a looking at religion itself in the very same way.

* *Betrachtungen über das Wesen des Protestantismus*. Thus the title of the work referred to is given by Schleiermacher. Under this title, however, I have sought for it in vain. Probably he meant to refer to “*Betrachtungen über den Protestantismus*,” (8vo, Heidelberg, '1826) The first chapter of the latter book is entitled “*Das Wesen des Priestertums*,” and this may have led to the apparent mistake. The work was published anonymously; it is attributed to a certain K. I. Jochmann, of whom I know nothing further. What I have to say of the book is derived from a merely cursory examination of it, and is so far open to

§ 23. The farther developement of the *notion* of Religious Communities must also yield an indication, in what *manner* and in what *degree* one may be *different* from another; and likewise, how that which is *individually characteristic* in the fellowships of faith which are *historically given*, is related to *these* differences [which are conceived of as *possible*]. And the place for this is in the Philosophy of Religion.

The latter name, employed in this (certainly not yet altogether usual) sense, designates a discipline which, in relation to the idea of the *Church*, stands in the same position with regard to *Ethics*, as a certain other discipline which has to do with the idea of the *State*, and a third, which has to do with the idea of *Art*.

§ 24. All that is necessary in order to a proper exhibition. The fundamental principle appears to be a thoroughly Kantian *identification* of religion and morality. The author starts with sundry quotations from Hume, setting forth the evil consequences which have resulted from the separation of the two; and, pursuing his principle to its furthest consequences, exhibits Christianity as *absolutely* opposed to what (expressing the parallel meaning, as he has done, in parallel terminology) we may call *Priestianity* and *Churchianity*. The Church, in so far as it can be said to have any existence at all, becomes merely a *moral association*, and the Christian minister a *moral teacher* (in the Kantian sense). In short, while the book is not without some good things in detail, its general tendency is decidedly negative and destructive. I subjoin a brief synopsis of the contents, and must refer the reader who is desirous of farther information to the work itself. Book I. is introductory, being devoted to the statement and discussion of principles. Chap. i. The Essence of Priestianity. Chap. ii. Christianity and its Disfigurement. Chap. iii. The Purer Transmissions of Christianity (these the author finds amongst the sects of the Middle Ages). Chap. iv. Protestantism. Chap. v. The Aberrations of Protestantism. Book II. (Historical, containing the application and verification of the author's principles), The Protestant Churches. Chap. i. The Presbyterians (especially those of Scotland. Neal's "History of the Puritans," and, if my memory serves me, McCre's "Life of Knox," have stood the author in good stead). Chap. ii. The Episcopal Church (of England, of course). Chap. iii. The Political Church (as organized under the German Princes).—Tr.

bition, (upon the basis just pointed out), of the *essential nature of Christianity*, by virtue of which it is a peculiar mode of faith,—as also of the *form of the Christian Community*,—and, at the same time, of the manner in which each of these, again, is *subdivided and differentiated*,—all this, taken together, forms the division of Christian Theology which we call *Philosophical Theology*.

The appellation is justified, on the one hand, by the *connexion* of the problem involved with the science of *Ethics*, and on the other, by the nature of the *contents* of that problem; which has to do for the most part with *notional definitions*. Such a discipline, however, has not hitherto been exhibited or recognised as a *unity*, because the necessity for it, in the form in which it is here conceived of, does not arise until we come to deal with the problem of *organizing* the theological sciences. Still, the *matter* of the discipline in question has already been worked up with a tolerable degree of completeness, in consequence of certain practical necessities which have grown out of various circumstances of the age.

§ 25. The *purpose* of Christian Church-Guidance is both *extensively and intensively conservative and progressive*; and the *knowledge* relating to this activity forms a Technology which we, grouping together all its different branches, designate by the name, *Practical Theology*.

In the cultivation of this discipline, too, up to the present time, there has been a very *unequal distribution* of the labour applied. The *details*, namely, of official duty, have been discussed with great copiousness; but, on the other hand, that which relates to the work of guidance and arrangement *upon the whole*, has received but scanty attention,—indeed, the connexion proper to a *disciplinary treatment* of the subject has been observed only with regard to individual *portions* of it.

§ 26. But Church-Guidance requires also that there shall be a knowledge of the *Whole* that is to be guided, as viewed in its *existing condition*; which condition. (since the whole referred to is of a *historical* character).

is capable of being understood only when it is viewed as a *product of the Past*; and this apprehension [of the Past and the Present as antecedent and consequent, and of the latter as explained by the former], in its entire extent, constitutes *Historical Theology*, in the wider sense of the term.

The Present cannot be rightly dealt with as the germ of a Future which is to correspond more nearly to the [true] Notion [of the thing referred to,—i. e. Christianity organized in the form of a Christian Community], unless it is perceived how this Present has itself been developed out of the Past.

§ 27. If Historical Theology exhibits every point of time [in the history of Christianity] in its *true relation* to the *idea* of Christianity; it is at once not merely the *foundation* of *Practical*, but also the *verification* of *Philosophical Theology*.

It will be both, of course, in so much the greater degree, the more manifold the developements which are already presented to our view. For this reason, Church-Guidance was, at *first*, a matter rather of *correct instinct* [than of careful study], and Philosophical Theology manifested itself in attempts of but little power.

§ 28. Historical Theology, accordingly, forms the proper *Body* of theological study; and is connected with *Science*, strictly so called, by means of Philosophical, and with the active Christian *Life* by means of *Practical Theology*.

Historical Theology also *includes* within itself, *historically*, the Practical division of the science; since the correct understanding of any particular period must needs show also what were the leading views in accordance with which the Church was governed during that period. And by reason of the connexion which was pointed out in § 27, Philosophical Theology must also, in like manner, be *mirrored* in Historical Theology.

§ 29. If Philosophical Theology, as a discipline, were brought to a proper degree of *perfection*, it might form

the *commencement* of the entire course of theological study. As it is, on the contrary, the individual portions of it are to be acquired only in a *fragmentary* manner, in connexion with the study of Historical Theology; but even *this* can take place only when the study of *Ethics*,—which we have to regard as being at the same time the science of the *principles of History*,—has *gone before*.

Without a constant reference to ethical principles, even the study of Historical Theology can be nothing but an unconnected preliminary exercise, and must needs degenerate into unintelligent tradition. This enables us, to a great extent, to explain the state of *confusion* in which the theological *disciplinæ* are so often presented, and the total *want of certainty* which is manifested in their application to the guidance of the Church.

§ 30. Not only is it impossible for the *Technology* which is yet wanting for the purposes of Church-Guidance, to present itself, except as a *result* of the perfecting of Historical by means of Philosophical Theology; but even the customary imparting of *rules* respecting the *details* of official duty, can work only in the manner of a *mechanical prescription*, unless it is *preceded* by the study of Historical Theology.

The consequences of occupying one's self *prematurely* with this Technology, are a *practical superficiality*, and an *indifference to scientific progress*.

§ 31. Within this trilogy,—Philosophical, Historical, and Practical Theology,—the entire course of theological study is included: and the most natural order for the present Outline is, indisputably, to begin with Philosophical Theology, and conclude with Practical.

Whatever division we might choose to begin with, there would always be a good deal which we should find it necessary to *assume* from the other two, on account of the mutual relation which exists between them all.

PART THE FIRST.

OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 32. SINCE the peculiar, essential character of Christianity is as little susceptible of a *purely scientific construction* as of a *merely empirical apprehension*, it admits only of being defined *critically* (compare § 23) by comparing that which, in Christianity, is *historically given*, with those antitheses by virtue of which it is *possible* for Religious Communities to be different from one another.

Although certain general *rubrics* may be laid down with respect to characteristic differences, still, we cannot *construct* the *individuality* of individual men [*ideally, a priori*]; and the same process is equally impossible with regard to the *individuality* of such *collective or moral personalities* as are here referred to.

§ 33. The *point of departure*, therefore, of Philosophical Theology can be taken only *above* [or *beyond*] Christianity in the logical sense of the word; that is, in the *general notion* of a Religious Community, or Fellowship of Faith.

In accordance, namely, with what has been said before, it may be laid down as a general principle, that every determinate form of faith, and every individual Church is capable of being rightly understood only by means of the relations of *co-existence* and of *subsequence* which it sustains towards others;

and so far, the point of departure referred to is the *same* for all the analogous *discipline* of *other* Theologies [than the Christian], inasmuch as, in order to exhibit the relations just mentioned, they must all revert to the same *higher notion*, and to the possibility of its being *subdivided*.

§ 34. The *relation* of any *historically-given condition* of Christianity to the *Idea* of Christianity, is determined not alone by the *contents* of the said condition, but also by the *manner* in which it has been *produced*.

These two things, it is true, are matter of reciprocal implication; inasmuch as it is not possible for states of *different character* to have been produced from the *same* earlier condition otherwise than by some difference in the *process*; and so of the converse. This, however, renders it so much the safer to employ, by way of preference, *sometimes the one and sometimes the other*, for the purpose of *finding out* the above relation. And that, in the case of a living and historical whole, its various conditions do not all stand in the *same* relation to the *Idea* of the whole, is self-evident.

§ 35. Since Ethics, as the science of the *principles* of History, can also exhibit the *mode-of-becoming* of a historical whole only in a *general* way; so, in like manner, it is only in the way of *Criticism*, by a comparison of the general differences there exhibited [*i. e.* in the science of Ethics] with that which is historically given, that we are able to find out what, in the development of Christianity, is the *pure expression* of its *Idea*, and what, on the contrary, must be regarded as a *deviation* from that *Idea*, and consequently as a *morbid condition*.

Morbid conditions do occur in *historical*, not less than in *organic* individuals; to subordinate differences in development there can be no reference here.

§ 36. As often as Christianity, [thus historically organized], divides itself into a *plurality* of *Church-Communities*, all of which, notwithstanding, lay claim to the same appellation, Christian,—the *same* problems arise

with regard to *these* also ; and there is then further, in addition to the *general*, for every one of these a *special*, Philosophical Theology.

Manifestly, this is the position in which we find ourselves : for even if every one of these particular communities were to declare all the rest to be portions which had fallen into a *morbid* condition, still, from the point of departure which we have adopted (see § 33), the claims of *all* must, for the purpose of the first problem, be subjected to the *critical* process referred to. Our special Philosophical Theology, therefore, is *Protestant* in its character.

§ 37. Since the two problems here stated,—in §§ 32 and 35,—*exhaust* the *purpose* of Philosophical Theology: it is, if viewed as to its *scientific contents*, [a species of] *Criticism*; and, from the nature of its *object* [subject-matter,] it appertains to *Historical Criticism*.

In the solution of these problems, namely, is contained all that is required to form the *basis* of Historical as well as of Practical Theology, in their relation to Church-Guidance.

§ 38. Philosophical Theology, as a theological discipline, must have its *form* determined by the relation which it bears to *Church-Guidance*.

This, of course, applies also to every *special* Philosophical Theology.

§ 39. As every individual is *in* the Church-Community to which he belongs, only by virtue of his *conviction* of the *verity* of that mode of faith which is successively propagated therein; so also must Church-Guidance, in its conservative aspect or application, be designed to procure recognition for this conviction by *imparting* it. But the *foundation* for such a proceeding is furnished by those investigations which relate to the *peculiar, essential character* of *Christianity*, and, in like manner, to that of *Protestantism*; which constitute, therefore, the *Apologetical* portion of Philosophical Theology,—the for-

mer class of inquiries sustaining this relation to *general, Christian* Philosophical Theology, and the latter, to the *special* Philosophical Theology of *Protestantism*.

No other kind of *defence* is to be thought of in connexion with this appellation, than that which seeks to prevent any manifestation of *hostility* towards the Community. The endeavour to bring others, also, *into* the Community, is a matter of clerical practice which certainly involves a resort to the storehouse of Apologetics; and a Technology with regard to it,—which, however, has scarcely begun to be formed,—would constitute the portion of Practical Theology resting immediately upon Apologetics.

§ 40. Since every individual, in proportion to the strength and clearness of his conviction, must necessarily also experience dissatisfaction with regard to such *morbid deviations* as may have arisen in the Community to which he belongs; Church-Guidance, by virtue of its intensively conservative aim. (§ 25), must be designed in the first instance to make this deviation, as such, a matter of *consciousness*. This can be effected only by means of a correct exhibition of the *essential character* of Christianity,—and, in like manner also, of Protestantism; which exhibitions, therefore, in *this* application, form the *Polemical* division of Philosophical Theology,—the first, in relation to its general,—the second, in relation to its special, Protestant form.

The principles of the clerical praxis which is directed towards the removal of morbid conditions, find their place *here*; and the Technology of this praxis would constitute the division of Practical Theology which bases itself immediately upon Polemics.

§ 41. As the direction of Apologetics is wholly *outwards*, so is that of Polemics altogether *inwards*.

That which is far more commonly designated by the name—the outwardly directed special Polemics, of Protestants, for example, against the *Catholica*, and in like manner the ge.

eral Polemics of Christians against the Jews, or against Deists and Atheists,—is likewise a clerical proceeding in the broader sense of the term; a proceeding that, on the one hand, has *nothing in common* with the discipline of which we are treating, and one that, on the other hand, could hardly be recognized as *salutary* in its character by a well wrought out [system of] Practical Theology. It might be affirmed, truly, that we need but to view this proceeding as having, not a *Protestant*, but a *general Christian* character, and then its direction, too, would be wholly *inwards*. But, in that case, it would also be directed, not, (as it is nevertheless always supposed to be), against Catholicism *upon the whole*, but only against *that* in it which does *not* belong to its *peculiar form*, but is to be regarded as a *morbid condition of Christianity*.

§ 42. Since, then, Philosophical Theology contains no *further* problems; we have to treat, in the immediate sequel, of the *organization* of Apologetics and Polemics, and this as well in their *general*, Christian, as in their *special*, Protestant form.

Either, therefore, first of general Philosophical Theology in both its divisions, and then of the special in like manner; or, first of Apologetics, general and special, and then in like manner of Polemics. The latter arrangement has been preferred.

SECTION THE FIRST.—PRINCIPLES OF APOLOGETICS.

§ 43. Since the notion of Religious Communities, or the Church, attains its sole realization in a *body of historical phenomena* existing side by side with and following upon one another, which have a certain *unity* in the said notion, but *differ* among themselves, it must also be shown with regard to Christianity,—by setting forth both that unity and this difference,—that it *properly belongs* to the body of phenomena just mentioned. This is effected by laying down and applying the correlative notions of the *Natural* and the *Positive*.

The laying down of these notions, the former of which expresses what is *common* to all, and the latter the possibility of different, peculiar *modifications* thereof, belongs, properly speaking, to the province of the Philosophy of Religion; and for that reason, the said notions are equally valid also for the Apologetics of *every* religious community. Supposing, now, that we were in a position to refer in this manner to the Philosophy of Religion [for the notions just specified], all that would be left, of this [problem], for Christian Apology to deal with, would be merely what is contained in the paragraph next following.

§ 44. It will then be necessary (reverting to the notion of the Positive), to lay down a *formula* expressive of the *peculiar, essential character* of Christianity, and, connecting it with that which is characteristic in *other* religious communities, to *take it up* under the said notion [in the way of generalization.]

This is, certainly, the fundamental problem of Apologetics: but in proportion as a formula of the kind referred to is to be *found* only by means of a *critical* process (comp. § 32), in the same proportion is it to be completely *verified* only in its *practical application*.

§ 45. It is also necessary that Christianity should establish the validity of its claim to a separate historical existence, by the nature and manner of its *origin*; and this is effected by a reference to the notions, *Revelation, Miracle, and Inspiration*.

The more it relies ultimately upon *original facts*, the greater is its title to an independent existence, and *vice versâ*; just as the same principle applies with regard to other species of association.

§ 46. But, inasmuch as the historical exhibition of the Idea of the Church is also to be viewed under the character of a *continuous series*: it is therefore necessary, notwithstanding what was said in §§ 43 and 44, that the *historical continuity*, in the sequence of Christianity

with regard to Judaism and Heathenism, should also be pointed out: which is effected by the application of the notions, *Prophecy* and *Type*.

The observance of the *proper medium* in the determination and application of these notions, is perhaps the highest problem of the discipline before us; and the more complete the solution, the firmer is the foundation presented for that practical activity which has to build upon it from without.

§ 47. Since the Christian Church, like every historical phenomenon, is a thing subject to *change*; it must also be shown how the *unity of its essence* is, nevertheless, *not endangered* by these mutations. This investigation embraces the notions, *Canon* and *Sacrament*.

Apologetics are not concerned about the dogmatical *theories* relating to these two notions; inasmuch as the said theories cannot be *anticipated* here. Both *facts*, however, are related, notionally, to the *continuity of the essential* in Christianity; the *former*, as this continuity finds expression in the *production of mental representations* [proper to Christianity,—the *Canonical Scriptures* affording the *constant source* and *means* of these]; and the *latter*, as the same certainty finds expression in the *transmission* of the [Christian] *fellowship* [from one generation to another.]

§ 48. As the notion of the *Church* yields itself, in a scientific form, only in connexion with the notions of *all other* organizations of a common life which develop themselves out of the notion of humanity (comp. § 22); it must also be shown concerning the Christian Church, that viewed in its peculiar, essential character, it is *capable of existing along with* all these organizations; a consequence which must result from a correct investigation of the notions, *Hierarchy* and *Church Power*.

The State, and *Science*, come especially into consideration here. For no one could be expected to recognize the validity of the claims of Christianity, if, by virtue of its very *essence*, its efforts were hostile towards either of these organizations.

The solution of the problem is therefore the more complete, the more definitely it can be shown that these internal institutions of the Church, in the very notion of them, aim only at the *independent developement* of the Church in connexion with the State and with Science, but do not aim at *disturbing* the *equally* independent developement of the latter. Every thing relating to this subject, that belongs to *Practical* Theology, remains excluded from the present inquiry.

§ 49. In proportion as regard is had, in all these investigations, to the two circumstances,—that Christianity is intended to exist as an *organic community*,—and that it is exhibited and communicated chiefly by means of *thought*, (comp. § 2),—in the same proportion will they, of necessity, lay a foundation for the conviction that, from the very commencement [of the process], (comp. § 44), the essential character of Christianity has been *rightly apprehended*.

If, in all that relates to *doctrine* and *polity*, we find the *same* essential character of Christianity expressing itself, and that in *agreement* with the *formula* laid down; this circumstance constitutes the best *verification* of the latter.

§ 50. If the Church is in a state of *division*, the *special* Apologetics of every ecclesiastical party respectively,—and consequently, at the present time, *Protestant* Apologetics also,—must pursue *the same course* as *general* Apologetics.

For the problem is the same; and the relation of every individual Church-party to the rest, resembles the relation sustained by Christianity towards those other fellowships of faith which are akin to it. The reference insisted upon in § 4 leads [in this connexion] to the notions *Confession* [Creed or Symbol], and *Rite*, and in connexion with that which described in § 48, the thing of chief importance is the relation to the *State*.

§ 51. In this case, also, *general*, Christian Apologetics being affected by the theory of each particular modification of Christianity, will assume a *peculiar form* in each

There will, certainly, be the *less* of this, the more strictly everything of a *dogmatical* character is excluded from the investigation. But it ought *never* to be carried so far, as that each shall seek for itself an *exclusive* recognition as *Christianity*,—representing the rest, on the contrary, as *unchristian*. This is intended to be provided against at the outset, by the division of Apologetics into general and special.

§ 52. Since it is not possible for a number of Christian Church-Communities, standing in opposition to one another, to have formed themselves otherwise than out of a condition of the whole in which *no* antagonism had found expression; it is the more necessary for each of these communities to defend itself against the charge of *anarchy* or of *corruption*, in proportion as each, again, is inclined to *vindicate* to itself a *connexion* with that original condition.

On the one hand, no antagonism had found expression in *primitive* Christianity; and on the other, it is not possible for an antagonism ever to appear *in the place of another*, unless this other has previously *ceased to exist*.

§ 53. Since, for this very reason, every antagonism of the kind referred to, within the boundaries of Christianity, seemed destined also to *disappear* again, the *perfection* of a system of special Apologetics will consist in this,—that it shall also include within itself, in a *divinatory* manner, the *forms* for this disappearing [*i. e.* an indication of the forms in which, or the conditions under which, it may be expected to occur.]

We by no means intend, by what is here observed, to attribute to special Apologetics a *prophetic* tendency. But the more correctly, in this respect, the peculiar, essential character of Protestantism is apprehended, the more *tenable reasons* will special Apologetics furnish towards *averting* the attempts at *union*; since every such attempt rests upon the assumption that the antagonism has *already*, to a certain extent, *ceased to exist*.

SECTION THE SECOND.—PRINCIPLES OF POLEMICS.

§ 54. Morbid phenomena of a historical organism, (comp. § 35) may have their origin, on the one hand, in a *recession of vital energy*, or, on the other, in the fact that something *heterogeneous*, mixed up with the organism, *becomes organized for itself* therein.

It is not necessary to revert, in connexion with this subject, to the analogy of the *animal* organism; the same type may be distinctly observed, without going any further, in the morbid affections of *States*.

§ 55. Since the *impulse* to make Christian piety the object of a *community* does not necessarily stand in a relation of *equality* to the *strength* of this piety *itself*; it is possible that sometimes the one and sometimes the other of these may, *relatively*, be *weakened and recede*.

The union of both in their highest perfection certainly constitutes the *normal* condition of the Church's health; a condition, however, which cannot be *taken for granted* at any one point in her historical career. On the other hand, from the very circumstance that this state of health is capable of being described only as consisting in the perfect *unity* of the two things mentioned, it follows that *one-sided deviations* are possible in *both* directions.

§ 56. Those conditions by which it is especially made manifest that *Christian piety itself* has become morbidly weakened, are comprehended under the name *Indifferentism*; and the problem is, therefore, to determine *where* that which appears to be a debility of the kind in question, *actually begins* to have a *morbid* character, and *in how many different forms* this condition presents itself.

The expression here employed is commonly understood to signify indifference with regard to the *characteristic stamp* of Christian piety; in which case, assuredly, *piety* may yet *exist*, without having any precise *stamp* at all.—We may remark

farther that, frequently, certain conditions are placed to the account of a debility of the kind referred to, which are susceptible of a totally different explanation.—That in the case of actual Indifferentism, the impulse to Christian fellowship must also be weakened, is a thing of course; but this is then merely a *consequence* of the malady, not the *cause* of it.

§ 57. Those conditions which indicate especially a weakening of the *impulse to fellowship*, are designated by the name *Separatism*; which, therefore, is likewise to be more strictly defined as to its *limits* and its *subdivisions*.

A distinction, stricter than that which we commonly meet with, is to be made between *Separatism*, properly so called, and an inclination towards *Schism*; especially since the former, notwithstanding its entirely negative character, often assumes the appearance of the latter. It is manifest that when the impulse to fellowship is present in its full strength, it must also pervade *all* the members [of the community]. It is therefore weakened, in proportion to the number of those who consciously and designedly *exclude* themselves [from the community], notwithstanding that they affirm themselves to be in the possession of the same Christian piety.

§ 58. Since the peculiar, essential character of Christianity expresses itself, chiefly, in *doctrine* on the one hand and in *polity* on the other: it is possible also for a *heterogeneous* element to become organized within the Church, on the one hand in doctrine, as *Heresy* (Hæresis), on the other hand in polity, as *Division*,* *Schism*; and each of these, therefore, requires to be defined as to its limits and its forms.

In most cases (though not as a matter of necessity), if a deviation from received doctrine becomes diffused, there will also arise out of it a distinct *Community*; but this, being merely a consequence of the former, does not constitute a *division* in the strict sense. In like manner, within the sphere of a *division*, it will generally (though not necessarily),

* *Spaltung* is, strictly, a division which has not yet led (and possibly may not even lead hereafter), to a formal separation (*Trennung*).—TR.

be the case, that a deviation in point of *doctrine* will also find developement; but the doctrine thus arising needs not on that account to be *heretical*.

§ 59. None of the notions here laid down are capable of being either discovered by a merely *empirical*, or deduced by a purely *scientific* process; on the contrary, they can be determined only by that *critical* method of proceeding which is everywhere predominant in these investigations; for which reason they must be *increasingly verified* by actual *use*, in order to become *wholly trustworthy*.

So far as Division and Heresy are concerned, it is necessary, on account of the great multiplicity of the phenomena involved, that the process should be based upon a certain *classification*, which becomes authenticated by the fact, that the phenomena presented to view can with facility be *taken up* under it. With regard to Indifferentism and Separatism, the critical process becomes authenticated in proportion as it *prevents* that which is yet *sound* from being, through excessive strictness, declared to be *morbid*,—and the contrary.

§ 60. It must be shown, concerning that which is asserted to be morbid, that as to its *contents* on the one hand, it *contradicts* or *tends to destroy* the *essential character* of Christianity, as the latter has found expression in doctrine and in polity; and that as to its *origin* on the other hand, it *does not cohere* with that mode of developement which proceeds from the *fundamental facts* of Christianity.

The more the results of these two processes *coincide with* and *elucidate each other*, the greater is the *certainty* which appears to attach to the decision.

§ 61. In periods in which the Christian Church is divided, it is for the *special* Polemics of every particular Christian Church-Community to pursue the same path as the *general* discipline.

The circumstances of the case are the same. Only that in such periods, on the one hand, as a matter of course, Indifferentism and Separatism find a home, originally, in the *partial* Church-Communities, and become *general* evils only in so far as they are present in a like degree in *several* Christian Communities existing *side by side*; and, on the other hand, that which is opposed to the peculiar and essential character of one of these *partial* communities merely, ought never to be designated by the expressions *heretical* or *schismatic*.

§ 62. Since the first beginnings of a *heresy* always make their appearance as *opinions* held by *individuals*, and those of a *division* as *fraternizations* on the part of *individuals*; and since, on the other hand, a *new partial Church-Community* cannot well make its first appearance in any other than precisely the same way: it is necessary that the principles of Polemics, when perfectly developed, should furnish to our hands the means of *distinguishing*, with regard to primal elements of this sort, whether they are such as will pass over into *morbid conditions*, or whether they include within themselves the *germ* from which a *new antagonism* is likely to be developed.

As this proposition is, generally, of the same tenor with that contained in § 53, so, too, we have to remark here to the same effect as in that place; with reference, namely, on the one hand, to *false tolerance* as it respects that which is of a morbid character, and, on the other, to the advocacy of a *reasonable liberty* for that which is about to develope within itself a new diversity.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY.

§ 63. As each of these two *disciplinæ*, Apologetics and Polemics, *excludes* the other, so is each of them, at the same time, *conditionally dependent* on the other.

They *exclude* each other, by the opposite character of their *contents*, (comp. §§ 39 and 40), and by the oppositeness of their *direction*, (comp. § 41). They are *conditionally de-*

pendent on each other, because that which is morbid in the Church is capable of being discovered only by a reference to some *definite representation* of the peculiar, essential character of Christianity, and because, at the same time, in the investigations by which this representation is established, it is necessary that the *morbid phenomena* should also be taken up, preliminarily, as a portion of that *given matter* which the critical process requires for its basis.

§ 64. These two *disciplines*, therefore, can attain to perfect developement only *by means of* each other, and *along with* each other.

And, for this very reason, only by a process of *approximation*, and only after a variety of *transformations*. Compare § 51; what is said there being true also with regard to Polemics.

§ 65. Philosophical Theology, it is true, *supposes* the *material* of Historical Theology as already known; but it is itself the first to lay a foundation for such a view* of Christianity as may properly be called *historical*.

This *material* is *identical with* the *given matter* (comp. § 32) which lies at the basis of the investigations respecting the peculiar and essential character of Christianity, as well as of those which have to do with the antithesis of the healthy and the morbid, (comp. § 35). But it is the *result* of these investigations which first determines the *value* of the individual *momenta* in connexion with the *whole developement*, and, by consequence, the *historical view* of the entire career of Christianity.

§ 66. Philosophical and Practical Theology occupy, on the one hand, a *common* position of contrast with regard to Historical Theology; but, on the other hand, they have also a relation of contrast *between themselves*.

The former assertion is true, because the two first-mentioned *disciplinæ* have an immediately *practical*, Historical Theology, on the contrary, a purely *contemplative* direction. For although, certainly, Apologetics and Polemics are in their na-

* That is, a contemplation accompanied by *insight*. Comp. § 188.—Tr.

ture *theories*, from which we ought perhaps to distinguish actual *services* of an apologetical or polemical character, still the *purpose* of the former first receives its *accomplishment* in the latter, and the former are laid down only *for the sake* of the latter. On the other hand, the two are in contrast, partly, *as first and last*, Philosophical Theology determining in the first instance the objects with which Practical Theology has to deal,—and partly, because Philosophical Theology attaches itself to certain *constructions of pure science* [as its points of connexion and departure], while Practical Theology, on the contrary, lays hold, in the manner of a *Technology*, on the department of the *particular and individual*.

§ 67. Since every man's Philosophical Theology includes within itself, essentially, the *principles* of his *entire mode of thinking* in reference to Theology, it is also necessary that every Theologian should *produce for himself*, entirely, this part of his system.

There is no sort of intention here to deprive any Theologian of the liberty of professing his *adherence* to a system of Philosophical Theology which may have emanated from *another*; only it must be appropriated *thoroughly*, as a matter of clear and firm *conviction*. But especially is it requisite that every theologian should be in possession of Philosophical Theology in its *entirety and completeness*, without regard, so far as *this* division of Theology is concerned, to the distinction laid down in §§ 14–17; because here, namely, *all* with which we have to do is in the nature of *first principles*, and every particular is connected in the most intimate manner with the whole. That all theological *principles*, moreover, have their place in this portion of the whole, follows immediately from §§ 65 and 66.

§ 68. Both the *disciplinæ* of Philosophical Theology still await their *farther development*.

This fact is explained, in part, by a reference to the *relations* [i. e., of the great divisions of Theology amongst themselves] which have here been exhibited. Further, also, Apologetics, on the one hand, have been made to relate too strictly and exclusively to properly apologetical *services*, the occasions for

which presented themselves only at intervals, while, on the contrary, the *propositions* belonging to this discipline found their place, not without serious prejudice to the clear survey of the whole field of study,—in the “Introductions” to Dogmatics. It is only within the most recent period, that they have begun to receive again a special elaboration, in their more general design and their true comprehensiveness. Polemics, on the other hand,—chiefly because their proper direction was misapprehended,—had, for a considerable time past, ceased to be wrought out and discoursed upon as a theological discipline.

PART THE SECOND.

OF HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 69. Historical Theology, (comp. § 26), viewed as to its contents, forms a *part of the science of Modern History*; and when it is *thus* regarded, all the natural divisions of the latter science are *co-ordinate* with it.

It belongs especially to the *inner* side of the science of History, the History of Modern *Civilization* and *Morals*; in which Christianity has manifestly introduced a developement of its *own*. For, to represent Christianity as having been merely and purely a source of *perversions* and *retrograde* movements, is to take a view of the subject which has grown quite out of date.

§ 70. Regarded as a *theological discipline*, the historical *knowledge* of Christianity is, in its more immediate character, the *indispensable condition of all intelligent inoperation upon the further developement of Christianity*; and in *this* connexion, the other parts of the science of History are merely *subordinated* to its service.

From this it is seen at once, what a different turn the study and mode of treatment of the same mass of facts will respectively take, when these facts have their place in the theological discipline of which we are treating, and when they come before us in the general science of History; while, nevertheless, the *principles* of historical investigation do not cease to be the *same* for both departments.

§ 71. Whatever makes its appearance in any department of History as an individual *Momentum*, is capable

of being viewed either as a sudden *origination*, or as a gradual *developement* and further *progress*.

In the department of *individual* life, every *beginning* is a sudden *origination*; but, from that point forward, all the rest is mere *developement*. In the proper department of History, however,—the department of *social* life,—the two are not strictly opposed to each other; and only on account of a *preponderance* of either is one *momentum* viewed in the one way, another in the opposite.

§ 72. The *total career* of every historical Whole, consists of a manifold *alternation* of *momenta* of both kinds.

Not as though it were in and of itself *impossible* that an entire career of this kind should be viewed as a *continuous developement* from a single point of commencement. But nothing more is requisite than that it shall be possible for us to look at the *energy* itself [which is the *subject* of developement], as being also a something *manifold*, the elements of which do not all become apparent at the same time,—or to trace, in the developement itself, the differences of a *quicker* and a *slower progress*,—(and it will hardly be the case that both these conditions will fail),—and we are then at once constrained to assume the existence of *intervals* of an *opposite* character.

§ 73. A series of *Momenta* in which *quiet progress* uninterruptedly predominates, exhibits a state of *order*, and constitutes a historical *Period*; a series of those in which *sudden origination* predominates, exhibits a *destructive revolution* in the relations of things, and forms a historical *Epoch*.

The longer the continuance of the latter state of things, the less possible would it be for the *identity* of the *object* to be maintained; because, in such a case, all contrast between the enduring and the changing comes to an end. The longer, therefore, the object maintains its position as one and the same, the greater preponderance is there of such states as belong to the former class.

§ 74. Every historical Whole is capable of being viewed,

not only as a *unity*, but also as a something *composite*, the different *elements* of which, (although only in a subordinate sense, and with a constant relation to one another), *have each of them a career of its own*.

Such distinctions present themselves, in some form or other, on every hand; and there is the greater reason for directing a special attention to them, in proportion as the one part seems to be *at rest* while the other is *in motion*, and the two, consequently, appear relatively *independent* of each other.

§ 75. There are, therefore, two modes of proceeding, in order to combine the infinity of material presented by a historical career, in such a manner that it shall be possible to take a proper survey of the whole. Either, the *whole career* is divided *into several periods*, according to the *revolutionary interstices* which present themselves, and each of these periods is made to comprehend all that has happened within its own limits, in relation to the object treated of; or, the *object itself* is divided *vertically*, so that several *parallel series* are made to present themselves, and the course of each series in particular is followed throughout the whole length of time [to which the history extends].

Of course, the two modes of division may also be *combined*, the one being rendered subordinate to the other: in such a manner that either every period is divided into parallel series, or else every principal series, by itself, is cut up again into periods. The attempted delineation is the more *imperfect*, in proportion as these processes of division are conducted *arbitrarily*, or, at least, in proportion as mere *externalities* are made to constitute the basis of them.

§ 76. A historical object demands, preferentially, the *former* mode of division, in the same degree in which its various members are *less independent of one another* in their progress, and *revolutionary nodes of development* are strongly prominent therein; and when the case is

the *reverse* of this, the *second* method is to be preferred.

For, in the latter case, an *original organic* division predominates; in the former, a marked difference in the character of different *periods*.

§ 77. The more strongly the *contrast* between *periods* and *epochs* makes its appearance in a historical career, so much the more *difficult* is it in the case of the *latter*, — but so much the more *easy* in that of the *former*, — to separate the different *elements* (§ 74) from one another.

For, in *periods* of transformation, every kind of *interaction* is more *free*, and every thing of an *individual* character is more dependent upon a *common impulse*; whereas, on the contrary, a *quiet course* of things favours the prominent appearance of the *organic division*.

§ 78. Since not merely the collective course of all human things is *general* — but also, *within* this, the entire succession of manifestations of *one and the same force*, — constitutes a *Whole*: every coming forth to view of a *minor historical Whole* may be looked at in two ways, — on the one hand, as the *origination* of something new, which did *not exist before* — but also, on the other hand, as the *forth-formation* of something which *had* existence somewhere.

This is evident at once from § 71. That which, at any given point in the course of time under observation, is certainly to be regarded as something *new* in relation to all that is running on *side by side with it*, may yet have a more intimate connexion with *some one earlier momentum* of the course than with all the rest.

§ 79. Thus, too, the career of Christianity admits of being treated, on the one hand, as a *single Period* [in the history] of *one branch of the religious developement*; but also, on the other hand, as a *particular historical Whole*, which takes its rise as a *new thing*, and pursues its own

secluded course in a series of periods separated by epochs.

That here, expressly, *only one branch* of the religious development is under discussion, may be shown by a reference to § 74. In whatever manner we group the great multiplicity of forms which religion has assumed, there will always be *some* more nearly related to Christianity than the rest, so as to admit of being *combined* with it in one and the same group.

§ 80. Historical Theology, viewed as a theological discipline, connecting itself wholly with Christianity, can adopt, for its own purposes, only the *latter* mode of treatment.

Compare §§ 69 and 70. But, moreover, the Christian Faith *could* not be what it is, if the *fundamental fact* thereof were not *posited*, in an exclusive manner, as something *original*.

§ 81. Viewing the historical material of Christianity from the stand-point of the constitutive principle of Theology, we find that that which occupies the most *immediate* relation to Church-Guidance is *the historical knowledge of the existing momentum*, as being that out of which the Future is to be developed. This, consequently, forms *one of the special divisions* of Historical Theology.

Its purpose is, that we may be able rightly and appropriately to work upon what is healthy and upon what is morbid, as well as to help forward any members of the organization that have remained behind; and also to employ what is applicable, out of other departments, in connexion with our own.

§ 82. But since the Present can be understood only when it is viewed as a *result* of the Past: it follows, that *the knowledge of the entire previous career of Christianity* forms a *second* division of Historical Theology.

The remark is not to be understood as if this second division were a sort of *auxiliary* science in relation to the first; on the contrary, they are both related to Church-Guidance in the

same way, and are not *subordinate*, but *co-ordinate*, to each other.

§ 83. The more a historical career is occupied in [the process or experience of] *diffusion*,—so that the inward life-unity, in proportion to the degree of the extension, appears more and more exclusively *in contact with other forces*,—in the same proportion do these forces, also, *participate* in [bringing about] the individual *states* which present themselves; so that the *peculiar and essential character of the object* is presented to view in the *purest* manner, only in those states which are of the *earliest* occurrence.

This, also, is equally true with regard to all historical phenomena of a kindred nature, and is properly the reason why so many nations mistakenly regard the earliest period of the life of humanity as the age of its highest perfection.

§ 84. Since, now, the Christian Life, also, has become continually more and more compounded and complicated, while, on the other hand, the final end of its theology consists in this,—to give a purer representation of its peculiar, essential character in each successive moment yet to come: *the knowledge of Primitive Christianity* naturally presents itself to our attention as a *third* special division of Historical Theology.

Primitive Christianity, it is true, is also *included* in the *total career* of Christianity; but it is one thing to treat of it as a series of *momenta*, and another to bring under observation *that only*,—derived even from *different momenta*,—which shall furnish materials for setting forth the *pure notion* of Christianity.

§ 85. Historical Theology is *completely included* within these three divisions,—the knowledge of *Primitive Christianity*, the knowledge of the *entire career* of Christianity, and the knowledge of the state of Christianity *at the present moment*.

Only, the order in which we have *deduced* them is not also the proper order in which to *study* them. On the contrary, the knowledge of *Primitive Christianity*, as connecting itself immediately with *Philosophical Theology*, forms the *first* stage, and the knowledge which relates to the *Present*, as constituting the transition to *Practical Theology*, the *last*.

~ § 86. As, in dealing with any division of History, all that facilitates an acquaintance with the *cause of action* and with the *outward relations of the object*, or that is necessary towards the understanding of *monuments* of all kinds, is to be regarded in the light of *auxiliary science*: so also does Historical Theology call to its aid, as auxiliary sciences, first of all the *other divisions of the same department of History* (comp. § 40), and then, further, all that is necessary in order to the understanding of *documents*.

Accordingly, these auxiliary branches of knowledge are partly *historical* in the *strict sense*, partly *geographical*, partly *philological*.

§ 87. For the purpose of that *normal treatment* of the subject which has already been pointed out, we cannot suitably define the *boundary of Primitive Christianity*, in relation to the *further historical career* of Christianity, otherwise than by taking the former expression to signify that period in which *Doctrine* and *Community*, in their mutual connexion, first went through the process of *becoming*, and did not as yet exist in their *definitive constitution*.

Even this definition, however, might easily be stretched out *too far*, because *doctrine and fellowship*, in their mutual connexion, continue *always* in the state of *becoming*; and a fixed boundary arises immediately, only when we exclude every age in which there already existed a *difference of fellowship on account of a difference of doctrine*. But too narrow limits, also, might be given to our definition, if one were to start from the assumption that a *definitively constituted*

community existed as early as from the day of Pentecost downwards; and it receives a *due* degree of extension, only when we maintain, that the Christian Community, properly so called, was first definitively constituted when, with consciousness and universal recognition, *Jews and Heathen had become united therein*; and the same principle holds good also with regard to doctrine. Thus, both definitions agree tolerably well with that *external* one which assigns Primitive Christianity to the age of Christ's *immediate disciples*.

§ 88. Since that knowledge of Primitive Christianity which has to be elicited for the purpose specified, is to be obtained only from the *written documents* which originated within the said period of the Christian Church, and rests entirely upon the *correct understanding* of these writings; the division of Historical Theology now before us, bears also, specifically, the name of *Exegetical Theology*.

Since the largest portion of that which is included in the other two divisions [of Historical Theology] *also* depends upon exposition, the appellation is certainly *arbitrary*; but still it may easily be justified, on account of the *peculiar* value of the writings with which we are here concerned.

§ 89. Since it is necessary that every Theologian should form his own exposition *for himself*, on account of the intimate connexion which it has with Philosophical Theology, the proper place of all [theological] principles: here, too, we find but little that one can allow himself to derive from the contributions of *special proficients* (comp. §§ 17 and 19) [in this department of study].

For the most part, merely that which we are obliged to borrow, for the purposes of exposition, from the *auxiliary sciences*.

§ 90. The knowledge of the *further career* of Christianity may either be exhibited as a *whole*, or be *divided*

into the History of the System of Doctrine and the History of the [Christian] Community.

Because, namely, the History of the System of Doctrine is nothing else than the developement of the religious conceptions of the Community. The combination of the two, as well as the History of the Community in its separate delineation, bears the name *Church History*; as that of the System of Doctrine, exhibited apart, bears the name *Dogma-History*.

§ 91. Both branches in conjunction, as well as each by itself, present, when viewed in the direction of their *length*, an uninterrupted *stream*, in which, nevertheless, it is possible, by means of the notions of Periods and Epochs (comp. § 73), to find certain *nodes of development*, which may serve the purpose of *giving fixity to the distinctions* existing between such points as are *separated by an epoch*, and belong, therefore, to *different periods*; as also between such as lie *within* the boundaries formed by the *same* two epochs, but in such a manner that the one contains rather the *result* of the first, and the other appears rather as a *preparation* for the second.

If we yet further conceive of *intervening points*, containing, in any given period, the maximum of the developement of its *commencing epoch*, but still continuing to represent the *zero* of its *closing epoch*; this process, carried out through both branches and through all their periods, will furnish a *plexus* of the most valuable *momenta*.

§ 92. Since the total career of Christianity presents an *infinity of details*, there is room here, in the highest degree, for the distinction between that which is *common property*, and that which is the property of the *special proficient*.

The *plexus* just mentioned, wrought up in outline into an analogue of *continuity*, constitutes the *minimum*, the possession of which is necessary for every one; the investigation and completion of matters of *detail*, even when parcelled out

amongst a large number of persons, forms an inexhaustible department of labour.

§ 93. *It is not every momentum* that is equally well adapted for delineation as a *whole*, having an inward connexion of its own; but this adaptation belongs in the *highest degree to the point of culmination of a period*, and *least of all to a point occurring in the midst of an epoch*, or in *immediate proximity* to the latter.

It is always the case that, during a *revolution*, nothing but that which is matter of *detail* can come under discussion; in its *isolation*, too, and hardly otherwise than in the form of *controversy*. In the *immediate proximity* of an epoch, it is true, the *want* of a connected delineation may already become perceptible, but the attempts which may be made to meet this want cannot have any other than an imperfect result. This is apparent even in the first beginnings which were made by the Church after the apostolic period; as well as amongst ourselves in the earliest times of the Reformation.

§ 94. In the case of those periods which admit of a *satisfactory solution* of the problem, a spontaneous separation ensues between the exhibition of the *doctrine* of the period in question, and the delineation of its *social condition*.

For although the *same* peculiar, essential character, either of the Church, or of some partial Church-Community, finds expression in *both*, yet the two depend upon *co-efficients* so different, that they must be, to a considerable extent, *independent* of each other in the *changes* they undergo, and therefore also in their *condition at any given moment*.

§ 95. The delineation of the *social condition* of the Church in any given *momentum*, constitutes the problem of *Ecclesiastical Statistics*.

It is only within a short period that this topic has begun to be treated of in its proper order, as the object of a distinct discipline; and therefore much yet remains to be done, as it respects both matter and form.

§ 96. Even when a *separation* exists, the problem

nevertheless continues to be, for *every individual Church-Community*, essentially the same.

In this case, each Community will certainly have an *especial* interest in being most exactly acquainted with its *own* condition; and, in so far, an *inequality* will occur; which, however, occurs also when the Church is *not* divided. On the other hand, it cannot but be a circumstance productive of great mischief, when the persons entrusted with the guidance of any one of these individual Church-Communities are not acquainted with the true condition of the rest.

§ 97. The connected exhibition of the System of Doctrine as *currently received* at any given time,—whether by *the Church in general*, (that is, when no separation is found to exist),—or, otherwise, by any distinct *Ecclesiastical Party*,—we designate by the term *Dogmatics* or *Dogmatic Theology*.

The term *doctrine* is taken here in its fullest comprehensiveness of meaning. The appellation *Systematic Theology*, which is still frequently employed to designate this branch of our science,—and which, with reason, suggests especially that the System of Doctrine is not to be delivered as a mere *aggregate of single propositions*, but that the *connexion* ought to be clearly made manifest,—nevertheless *conceals*, on the other hand, to the detriment of the subject, not only the *historical* character of the discipline before us, but also its relation to *Church-Guidance* as constituting its purpose and aim; from which concealment manifold misapprehensions must needs arise.

§ 98. In periods in which the Church is divided, it is possible only for each party *itself* to effect a dogmatic treatment of its *own* System of Doctrine.

Impartiality and equality would not be attainable,—either upon the supposition that a theologian of one party should attempt a connected treatment of the doctrinal systems of other parties in a *parallel* order, (since, for him, only *one* of these connexions has the character of *truth*, the other not),—or again, if he should confine himself to a connected treatment

of *that* system to which he *adheres*, merely *adducing* the *deviations* of other systems in their appropriate place, (because then, the latter would be torn out of their *natural connexion*). The former process takes place, nevertheless, so far as the *leading* points of doctrine are concerned, under the title of *Symbolics*; and the other, under the title of *Comparative Dogmatics*.

§ 99. Both *disciplinæ*, Statistics and Dogmatics, are likewise of an infinite extent; and occupy, therefore, the same position with the second division of Historical Theology, as it respects the difference between that which is *common property*, and that which constitutes the department of the *special proficient*.

This is immediately evident with regard to Ecclesiastical Statistics. But in the department of Dogmatics, too, not only is every individual doctrine susceptible of *determination* to an extent which is almost infinite, but the *exhibition* of it, moreover, in connexion with the deviating modes of conception peculiar to other times and places, affords an endless task.

§ 100. It is necessary that every one should *form for himself* his own *historical view*, as it respects both the knowledge of the *entire career* of Christianity, and that of the *momentum* which lies immediately before him.

Otherwise, that activity in the Guidance of the Church, which has each of these branches of knowledge, in an equal degree, for its basis, would not possess the character of an *independent personal* activity.

§ 101. If, for this purpose, it is necessary to make use of *historical delineations*,—which can never be wholly free from peculiar views and judgments of the delineator,—it is necessary that every one should possess the art of *separating* therefrom, in as pure a state as possible, the *material* which he is to elaborate for himself.

This, again, applies to Dogmatics and Statistics, not less than it does to Church History.

§ 102. As for the entire department of Historical Science, so also for Historical Theology, *Historical Criticism* is the universal and indispensable *Organon*.

It is contrasted with the *material* auxiliary sciences before adverted to, in that it is *a form of scientific skill, which effectuates a certain purpose*.

SECTION THE FIRST.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

§ 103. The Christian Writings which are derived from the period of Primitive Christianity are not *all*, on this account, objects of Exegetical Theology; but only in so far as they are held capable of contributing to the *original*, and therefore (comp. § 83), for all periods, *normal representation* of Christianity.

It is involved in the nature of the case, and is, besides, completely established as a matter of fact, that there *also* existed, in the very first instance, an *imperfect*, and consequently to some extent *false apprehension*,—and therefore also a like *representation*,—of the Christian Faith in its distinctive individuality.

§ 104. The *collective body* of the documents just referred to as containing that which is of a normal character, forms the *New Testament Canon* of the Christian Church.

Consequently, the correct *understanding* of this Canon is the sole essential *problem* of Exegetical Theology, and the collection itself is the sole original *object* with which the latter has to deal.

§ 105. To this New Testament Canon *belong essentially* both those normal documents which relate to the effectual working of Christ *upon*, and *in conjunction with*, his disciples, and likewise those which relate to the *joint labours* of his disciples, as directed towards the establishment of Christianity.

This, moreover, is what we are to understand by the ancient division of the Canon into *εὐαγγέλιον* and *ἀπόστολος*. There exists no reason in the nature of the case, for laying down any *distinction* between these two constituent portions in respect of *canonical dignity*. Which, however, would in a manner be done, if it were to be maintained that the two were related to each other as *origin* and *progress*; and still more so, if one were at liberty to *deny* to the activity of the *disciples*, when left to itself,* the attribute of *normal dignity*.

§ 106. Since neither the *temporal limit* of Primitive Christianity, nor the *personale* thereof, can be determined with precision; it follows also that the *external boundary-line* of the Canon cannot be established with perfect fixity.

In regard to both in common,—period and persons,—it would, indeed, be possible to lay down a settled *formula* which should designate the Canonical; but this formula would, nevertheless, fail to lead to any certain distinction with regard to what is *actually before us*, on account of the uncertainty which prevails with regard to the personality of several individual authors.

§ 107. The unsettledness just referred to, consists in a *wavering of the boundary-line* which separates the department formed by the *Writings of the Apostolic Fathers* from that of the *Canonical Writings*.

For, the period of the Apostolic Fathers lies *between* that in which the Canon first began to be formed, and that in which it already possessed a separate existence. And the term *Apostolic Fathers* is to be understood here as having such a compass of meaning, that the uncertainty spoken of applies to the *first* part of the Canon in the same manner as to the *second*.

§ 108. Since the notion of *normal dignity*, too, is one

* Left to itself—that is, in so far as Christ's *outward presence* was concerned. Schleiermacher never intended to deny the presence of the *Spirit* of Christ in and amongst the disciples; which, in truth, is just what gives to their activity its *normal character*.—TR.

which cannot be reduced to fixed, immutable formulæ; neither is it possible, with perfect certainty, to lay down the limits of the Canon by the help of *internal* reasons for determination.

If we reckon the *normal* character, as applied to individual propositions, to include on the one hand perfect *purity** [in the propositions themselves], and on the other hand, a certain *copiousness* in the *inferences* and *applications* which admit of being developed from them; we have no reason to assume the existence of the first characteristic, absolutely, anywhere but in Christ alone; and with regard to the second, also, we must concede that in all other [teachers], natural imperfection might possibly exert an obstructive influence.

§ 109. Christian Writings of the Canonical Period to which we deny the attribute of normal dignity, we designate by the term *Apocrypha*; and as against these also, therefore, the limit of the Canon is not completely fixed.

Most of the New Testament Apocrypha, it is true, bear this name merely because they were *supposed*, or because they *professed*, to belong to the canonical period. The term itself, used in this sense, is arbitrary, and it would be better to exchange it for some other.

§ 110. It is necessary that the Protestant Church should vindicate its claim to be *still occupied continually in the more precise determination of the Canon*; and it is this which constitutes the highest exegetico-theological problem for the *higher* Criticism.

The New Testament has received its present form by means of the Church's decision; although this decision may not be capable of being precisely *quoted*, or of being pointed out in any single act. It is a decision to which we do not concede an *authority exalted above all inquiry*, and we have a right, therefore, to make the wavering which *has* existed a point of connexion for new investigations. The problem referred to is the *highest*, because it is a matter of more importance to

* Freedom from every admixture of error.—Tr.

determine whether a work is *canonical* or not, than to decide whether it is to be assigned to a certain *author*, or to some other; the result of the latter inquiry having, *possibly, no effect at all* upon its *canonical* character.

§ 111. It is within the province of this Criticism to institute investigations under both the following heads: namely, whether certain matter to be found *in* the Canon is not, strictly speaking, *uncanonical*; and whether there does not exist, *out of* the Canon, matter which is *canonical*, but which has not been *recognized* as possessing that character.

Quite recently, there was an investigation of the latter kind in progress; those of the former class have, properly speaking, never been discontinued.

§ 112. Both problems apply not merely to entire *books*, but also to single *sections* and *passages* thereof.

An *uncanonical book* may contain new *canonical passages*; even as, in a *canonical book*, the greatest part of that which has been interpolated by a later hand will be *uncanonical*.

§ 113. As the higher Criticism solves its problem, for the most part, only by *approximation*; and as there exists no other *measure* with regard to the fitness of a particular decision, than that which is afforded by the *congruence of internal* and of *external indications*: so here, too, the main questions are simply these,—with what degree of determinateness it is indicated by *external* signs, that an article under investigation belongs either to the *subsequent* period of the *Apostolic Fathers*, or to the region—*remote* from the Church's *centre*—of the *Apocryphal* mode of treatment,—and how far *internal* indications suggest, that the *mode of apprehension and of thought* by which the article is characterized are *not* such as to connect themselves strictly with what is *essential* in the *Canonical representation*.

So long as these two classes of indications are in *opposition*

to each other,—or so long as, in each class, some are ranged on the one side and some on the other, the controversy will arrive at a critical decision.—That under the term *centre of the Church*, neither any *given space*, nor any *official dignity*, is here to be understood, but only the *perfection of the [Christian] spirit** and [*of Christian*] *insight*, is a point which probably needs no discussion.

§ 114. It would be necessary for the ship to have *detected* both these diseases at once, and to have arrived, with perfect accuracy, at the right determination of the question, *whether* or *not* to go on, and what is not, with any real degree of accuracy, on that account, that *the disease had been cured, or sufficiently ordered.*

It would not be necessary: because, surely, the uncanonical may be *acknowledged* to be so, although it retains its old position; and a like recognition may be extended to that which is *proved* to be canonical, although it remains excluded from the Canon. In that case, however, it must be *permissible* to have the Canon in *two* forms; that which has been handed down *historically*, and that which has resulted from the application of the detective processes of *Criticism*.

§ 115. The same may be well and argued in the position occupied by the Father of the Deaf-mute in our Bible.

That the Jewish Codex does not contain any *normal* exhibition of *peculiarly Christian* dogmas, is a principle which will, probably, be almost universally acknowledged. It is not, however, on this account *necessary*,—although it must also continue to be *permissible*,—to *deviate* from that usage of the ancient *Codex* which has been followed by the *Editors* of the New so as to form a whole, the Bible.

§ 116. The multiplicity of the laws of the New Testament is another of signs that the canon is

* *Gesinnung*—disposition, habitual temper of mind, inward character.
—T.B.

document is subject to the same *defects* which attended the *copy* process of the *rest* of all other ancient works.

These *defects* being the *same*, all the *pre-*
ferred *text* to which is *referred* with *respect* to this *matter*.

§ 112. From the *copiousness* and *variety* of
copies which are *preserved* of these *books*, affords
the *strongest* *proof* of the *possibility* that, in the case of
some *single* *passages*, the *original* *reading* has neverthe-
less been *lost*.

For, this *loss* may have occurred at a *very* *early* *period*,—
which *the* *first* *transmission* *is* *possibly* *also*, it may be *re-*
peated *in* *such* *a* *manner* *and* *the* *damage* *could* *not* *be* *made*
good *again*.

§ 113. The *method* of *reading* of the *lower* *Criticism*,
which *is* *directed* *to* *the* *original* *reading*, throughout,
is *essentially* *the* *same*, and in the *way* *best* *adapted*
to *the* *purpose* *which* *it* *serves*—is *altogether* *the* *same*
as *the* *method* *of* *reading* of the *higher* *Theology* as it is *else-*
where.

The *same* *method* *of* *reading* are employed here
without *any* *intention* *either*
of *limiting* *the* *scope* *of* *the* *method* *or* *of* *limiting* *more* *closely*
their *limits* *with* *respect* *to* *each* *other*.

§ 114. The *method* of the *New* *Testament* *Critic*, also, is
the *same* *as* *the* *method* *of* *the* *higher* *Criticism*, and *is* *adapted* *to* *make*
use *of* *the* *same* *method* *of* *reading* *as* *is* *applied* *elsewhere*.

§ 115. The *method* of *reading* of the *higher* *Criticism* (comp. §
112) *is* *the* *same* *as* *the* *method* *of* *the* *lower* *Criticism*, and *is* *adapted* *to* *make*
use *of* *the* *same* *method* *of* *reading* *as* *is* *applied* *elsewhere*.

§ 116. The *method* of *reading* of the *higher* *Criticism* *solves*
the *problem* *of* *the* *higher* *Criticism*, and *is* *adapted* *to* *make*
use *of* *the* *same* *method* *of* *reading* *as* *is* *applied* *elsewhere*.
as *proof* *and* *warranty* *in* *relation* *to* *the* *other*.

Even such true services as may be rendered in the way of *conjecture*, must be able to *appeal* to some *momenta* or other in the history of the text; and on the other hand, again, any *striking emendations* which may be made must necessarily serve also to *illustrate* the history of the text.

§ 121. In connexion with the *theological purpose* of an occupation with the Canon, the restoration of the original is of *immediate* value only where the *normal contents* are in some way or other concerned.

This principle, however, is by no means to be limited in its application to *Dogmatic Passages*, as they are called,—but is to be extended to all that admits of being employed in any way, in connexion with such passages, as *parallel* or *illustration*.

§ 122. This forms the *basis of the distinction* which,—since the critical problem is a thing of infinite extent,—it is necessary to lay down here, between that which is to be required of *every* Theologian, and that which constitutes the department of *special proficiency*.

The requirement here mentioned is properly of force, only in reference to the *Protestant* theologian; for strictly speaking, the Roman Catholic theologian has the right to demand* that the *Vulgata* shall be delivered to him in such form and manner that there shall not be *any* critical problem left remaining.

§ 123. Since it is possible for *every* theologian (taking the word even in its broader sense) to find himself in such a case (comp. § 121) as also to need, for purposes of exposition (comp. § 89), the possession of a *critical conviction*: it is necessary, in order that he may be able, by an independent effort, to avail himself of the labours of the specially proficient, and to choose between the results at which they have respectively arrived,—that he should be in possession, as well of the critical *principles* and *rules* which are applicable to the case supposed, as

* That is, on the principles of his Church, which he accepts as true.—Tr.

also of a general acquaintance with the most important critical *sources*, and with their *value*.

A meagre guide to these acquisitions is to be found, on the one hand, in the *Prolegomena* to the critical editions; and the like is also furnished, on the other hand, along with and amongst the divers matters which it is usual to call *Introduction to the New Testament*.

§ 124. It is to be required of every *special proficient* in the department of New Testament Criticism, that he shall have mastered all that pertains to a *constituting of the Text, completely and consistently, according to the same principles throughout*; and also to the proper and suitable getting up of a *Critical Apparatus*.

These are problems of a purely *philological* character. It is, however, not easy to conceive, that a philologer should, apart from any interest in Christianity, apply his skill to the solution of these problems in relation to the New Testament, since there are other writings to which this book is far inferior in point of linguistic importance. If, however, Theology should at any time be *destitute* of special proficient in this department, it would also follow that we should no longer have any security with respect to that which is requisite to be accomplished for the *theological* purpose of the study before us.

§ 125. In all that has been said hitherto (§§ 116—124), we have been proceeding upon the assumption, that none but he who has to do with the Canon *in its original language* is in a position to construct an interpretation for himself.

Otherwise, the critical problem would be of no moment except for the *translator*; and this, too, only within the limits described in § 121.

§ 126. Since it is not possible for even the most masterly translation to do away with the *irrationality* [non-equivalence] of languages; it follows that no discourse or writing is to be *perfectly* understood, except in its *original language*.

By *irrationality* is meant simply this well-known characteristic of our language, that it is not a direct medium of thought. Thus, we cannot understand a proposition simply as the medium of a translation—and consequently also the translation itself—without the aid of a person who is capable of tracing it back to the original language.

§ 127. The more limited the diffusion and the productivity of a language, the more it is liable to be influenced by other languages. Thus, the language of the New Testament, which is a direct medium of thought, is to be distinguished from the language of the Old Testament, which is a medium of thought, by the fact that it has been *mediately influenced* by that language.

The assertions formerly put forth, that certain individual books of the New Testament were originally *written* in Aramaic, hardly require to be any longer taken notice of. Much, however, of that which has been preserved in the shape of *discourse* or *dialogue*, was originally *spoken* in Aramaic. The *mediate* influence referred to is to be found in that modification of the language which is known under the name of *Hebraism*.

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The more so, since these references relate, in part, to passages of great importance, in regard to which it is necessary to form an interpretation for one's self; and where, consequently, a correct judgment as to the relation which the common Greek translation of the Old Testament bears to the original language is indispensable.

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directions,—on the one hand from *partiality*, on the other from *prejudice*.

§ 132. The perfect understanding of a discourse or writing is a work of *art*, and involves the need of an Art-Doctrine, or Technology, which we designate by the term *Hermeneutics*.

We apply the term *Art*, even in a more restricted sense, to every compound production in connexion with which we have a consciousness of certain *general rules*, the *application* of which in detail cannot be reduced, again, to *other rules*. It is a common, but unjustifiable practice, to restrict the use of Hermeneutics to *larger works*, or *difficult matters* of detail, exclusively. The *rules* which may be adopted, can form a Technology only when they are drawn from the *nature* of the *entire process*, and when, therefore, they also *comprehend* the entire process.

§ 133. Such a Technology has existence, only in so far as the precepts admitted form a *system* resting upon *principles* which are immediately *evident* from the nature of *thought* and of *language*.

So long as Hermeneutics continue to be dealt with merely as an *aggregate of isolated observations*, general and particular, —no matter how acute or how worthy of recommendation the latter may be,—they do not as yet deserve to be called a *Technology*.

§ 134. Protestant Theology cannot accept any representation with regard to the Canon, which should *exclude* from the pursuits that have reference to the latter, the application of the Technology in question.

For this would be possible only upon the supposition that, in some way or other, the existence of a *miraculously inspired*, *perfect understanding* of the Canon was taken for granted.

§ 135. The New Testament Scriptures, on account of their *inward contents*, as well as of the *outward circumstances* with which they stand connected, are *especially difficult* of interpretation.

For the former reason,—because we have here the communication of *peculiar religious notions*, in their *first development*, by writers who, for the most part, belonged to the *less cultivated* circles of society, who employed a *language* which was *not vernacular* to them, and employed it in an *irregular* manner,—and such a communication is *very* liable to be *misunderstood*. For the latter,—because we are *ignorant*, to a great extent, of the *circumstances* and *relations* which *modify* the course of thought, and our first discovery of them has to be made from the documents themselves.

§ 136. Inasmuch as, by reason of the peculiar purpose which Exegetical Theology has in view, the New Testament Canon ought to be dealt with *as a whole*, while on the other hand every individual document which it contains, considered in and for itself, constitutes a *separate whole*, we have further to entertain this special problem. —the effecting of a *mutual adjustment and combination* between the two modes of treatment here specified.

The entire exclusion of the one or the other of these stand-points, resulting as it does from *opposite* forms of theological one-sidedness, has, in all ages, served to introduce error and confusion into the business of exposition.

§ 137. The *Special Hermeneutics* of the New Testament can consist only of *more precise determinations* of the *general* rules [of Hermeneutics], made with a reference to the peculiar circumstances of the Canon.

It is all the more a matter of necessity that the progress of New Testament Hermeneutics towards the stricter form of a Technology should be but *gradual*, from the circumstance that their first foundations were laid at a time when even *general* Hermeneutics existed, as yet, only in the form of a *collection of observations*.

§ 138. There are *two forms* which the Technology of interpretation may *be made* to assume; but in whatever way we choose to take it, it constitutes the proper *centre* of Exegetical Theology.

Either, General Hermeneutics may be made wholly prominent, so that the special portion shall assume the shape of *corollaries*; or, *vice versâ*, Special Hermeneutics may be organized in a connected manner, and the general principles may then be introduced merely in the way of reference.—It is true, certainly, that [Hermeneutical] *practice* is subject to conditions derived from Philology and Criticism; but the *principles* [of Hermeneutics] exert, themselves, a most decided influence, both upon the operations of Criticism, and upon the more subtle class of observations in Philology.

§ 139. Here again, therefore, no reason presents itself for a man's venturing to rely upon others; on the contrary, it is necessary that every one should strive to attain as high a degree of *mastery* as possible.

The further the subject-matter with which we have to deal has been *elaborated already*, the less proper is it that this mastery should seek to show itself in the particular path of *new interpretations*.

§ 140. No document can be perfectly understood, except in connexion with the *entire circle of mental representations* out of which it has proceeded, and by the help of an acquaintance with the *life-relations* both of the writers and of those for whom they wrote.

For, every document bears the same relation to the *collective life* of which it is a part, that a single *sentence* does to the whole *discourse* or writing in which it occurs.

§ 141. The historical apparatus for the exposition of the New Testament embraces, accordingly, an acquaintance with the earlier and later *Judaism*, as also with the *intellectual and civil condition* of those localities in which and for which the New Testament Scriptures were composed.

The *books of the Old Testament*, therefore, constitute at the same time the most general auxiliary to the understanding of the New: after them come the Old and New Testament *Apocrypha*, and the *later Jewish writers* in general, as also the *historians and geographers* of the period and locality in ques-

tion. All these aids require, in like manner, to be used in their *original language*,—*critically*,—and according to the *rules of Hermeneutics*.

§ 142. Up to the present time, many of these sources of aid have *not been used*, either in their greatest possible *completeness*, or with a due degree of *caution*.

Both parts of the assertion are true especially with regard to the contemporary and the more recent *Jewish* writings.

§ 143. This collective apparatus, therefore, claims the activity of a number of theologians for a long time to come, in order that the previous labours of such as have been masters in this department may be *corrected* and *supplemented*.

Viewed in another direction, these labours go back into the department of Apologetics, inasmuch as the opponents of Christianity are in the habit of endeavouring, again and again, to explain Christianity wholly by means of that which was previously *given*, and moreover do not always represent it, [even on this basis], as having been a *progress* and *improvement*. That which belongs to the department before us, however, is simply the preparation, in due purity and completeness, of the historical *material*.

§ 144. As much of this as is adapted to be *common property*, is usually delivered, partly under the title *Jewish and Christian Antiquities*, and partly in combination with divers other matters, in the so-called *Introduction to the New Testament*.

In the latter, which, perhaps, in general, stands in need of a transformation, one still misses a great deal which, nevertheless, belongs especially (according to § 141) to this head, because we need to *bring it with us* to the reading of the New Testament. That which a man may allow himself to derive from the labours of *special proficient*s in this department, consists, on the one hand, in *collectanea* from individual sources, and, on the other, in *commentaries* upon the *separate books* of the New Testament.

§ 145. As yet, the *chief problem* of Exegetical Theo-

logy is not by any means to be looked upon as completely *solved*.

Not even when we leave out of sight the circumstance that there are individual passages, some of which will never be *corrected* with perfect certainty, while others of them will never be *explained* to the satisfaction of all.

§ 146. With regard, also, to the *auxiliary* branches of knowledge which belong to this department, a two-fold problem continues to present itself,—the problem of a constant advance towards the *completion* of their *material*, and towards the *conversion* of that which has already been elaborated, into *common property*.

Even the *first* study, under the guidance of such as are masters in the art, must not merely lay the *foundation* for the *last*, and furnish the *commencement of practice* in accordance with the precepts of Technology; but must also at least *unlock* the various individual departments of study, in reference to that *mastery* which is yet to be attained in them.

§ 147. A continued occupation about the New Testament Canon, which should not be prompted by a personal feeling of *interest* in Christianity, could only be directed *against* the Canon.

For, the purely *philological* and *historical* gain which the Canon promises to afford, is not sufficiently extensive to entice a man to the kind of occupation referred to. But even the investigations of *opponents* (comp. § 143.) have been of great *service*; and will become so again on future occasions.

§ 148. It is necessary that every occupation about the Canon which is not connected with a *philological spirit* and *philological skill*, should keep within the limits of the department of *edification*; for in that of *theology*, it could only serve to create confusion by its pseudo-dogmatic tendency.

For the sort of proceeding referred to cannot be founded in a pure and strict desire to *understand* [what is taken up in this manner.]

SECTION THE SECOND.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY IN THE MORE RESTRICTED SENSE; OR, CHURCH HISTORY

§ 149. Church History,—taking the word in its more extended signification (comp. § 90).—is that knowledge which relates to the *total development* of Christianity, from the time of its having obtained a settled footing as a historical phenomenon.

What Christianity has wrought in so *concrete* direction, abstractedly from the development here referred to, does not belong to the department before us.

§ 150. Every historical *idea* is capable of being viewed, on the one hand, as a single indivisible *Being* and *Doing* which is in the state or process of *Becoming*,—and, on the other hand, as a *compound* which is made up of an infinite number of individual elements. The properly *historical* manner of contemplation is that in which the two aspects are intimately combined.

The one is merely the *elemental-spirit* of the whole, viewed in its aspect of *mobility*,—particulars each not being allowed to separate themselves; the other is merely the *annexation* of its *notes* in their *diversity*, without their being combined into a *unity* is the *identity* of their *common essence*. The historical manner of contemplation includes both elements; the *combination* of a *body of facts* into a single image of the inward [*principle or spirit*], and the *exhibition* of this inward [*principle*] in the *evolution* of the *facts*.

§ 151. In like manner also, every *fact* constitutes a *historic individuality* only in so far as those two elements are *posited identically*; the *external*, a *change* in what is co-existent,—and the *internal*, a *function* of the [characteristic] *energy*, [conceived of as] *in motion*.

In this mode of expression the *internal* is posited as *soul*, the *external* as *body*, the *whole*, consequently, as a *life*.

§ 152. The observation and retention in the memory

of *local changes*, is an operation all but *mechanical*; whereas, on the other hand, the [ideal] *construction of a fact*, the combination of the external and the internal into a *historical view*,* is to be regarded as a *free intellectual activity*.

It is on this account, too, that where the *observation* of a thing by several persons has been wholly the same, they nevertheless differ in their *apprehension* of it as a *fact*.

§ 153. The description of *local changes*, as such, in their contemporaneousness and succession, is not *History*, but *Chronicle*; and a thing of this kind, having reference to the Christian Church, would not be able to make good its claims to be regarded as a *theological discipline*.

For, of the entire career of Christianity, it would not present *that* [portion or aspect] which sustains any [immediate] relation to *Church Guidance*.

§ 154. It is only for the sake of *continuity*, that such events as are not properly to be regarded in the character of historical *elements*, require to be also taken up into the historical apprehension.

To this class belong *changes* amongst the *persons* who were influentially active in distinguished positions, where, at the same time, the peculiarity of their personal character did *not* exercise any perceptible influence upon their public proceedings.

§ 155. *Historical apprehension* is a *talent*, the development of which in each individual is effected, though in a different degree, by means of his own *historical life*,—but which can never wholly dispense with the *mechanical expertness* before referred to [§ 152].

As in ordinary life, so also within the domain of Science,—an excited *selfish* interest, and consequently also every thing of a *party* character, contributes more than any thing else to *falsify* the historical view.

* Compare the note on this word at § 65.—Tr.

§ 156. Historical knowledge with regard to that which is not a matter of personal experience may be *obtained* in two ways: *immediately*, but with much *labour* in the formation of a connected view,—by using the *sources*; *easily*, though only *mediately*,—by the use of *historical descriptions*.

Hardly will it be possible to *do without* the latter in *any* department of History; certainly not in that of Church History.

§ 157. What we call *sources*, in the more restricted sense of the word, are *monuments* and *documents* which *testify* to a fact by the circumstance that they themselves constitute a *part* of it.

In this stricter sense of the word, even *historical descriptions by eye-witnesses* are no longer sources. Still, they are the more deserving of the name, in proportion as they approximate to the nature of a *chronicle*, and merely give again, quite in an unpretending way, what the writers themselves observed.

§ 158. It is possible to attain to a historical apprehension of one's own in the use of historical *descriptions*, only by effecting an *exclusion* of that which has been *introduced* by the author.

This process is facilitated when we are able to compare *several* accounts of the same series of facts; especially if they are taken from *different points of view*.

§ 159. The knowledge of any given *condition of the whole*, as presenting an *image of the inward* [principle or spirit] (comp. § 150), is attained only by *combining*, in their proper relations, a mass of *individual facts* which have a mutual *connexion*.

This, therefore, is the greatest service which the talent of historical apprehension is capable of rendering; it is that which implies and includes within itself every thing besides.

§ 160. As a theological discipline, Church History, in

the more extended signification of the term (comp. § 90), ought especially to distinguish between that which has proceeded from the *characteristic energy* of Christianity, and that which has its foundation partly in the nature of the *organised* set in motion, and partly in the influence of *heterogeneous principles*; and to endeavour to *measure* each in its *advance* and its *recession*.

Only, it was a very *indefinite* method, to divide the *description itself*, on this account, into that of *favourable* and *unfavourable occurrences*.

§ 101. From the *first appearance* of Christianity, and therefore as early as the age of Primitive Christianity, we are able to *distinguish*;—and also to separate from one another in the historical delineation,—*various functions* of this new, efficacious principle; which, again, are themselves susceptible of manifold subdivision.

This, also, is true universally, in relation to *all* important historical phenomena, in relation not merely to *all religious communities*, but also to those which have a *civil* character.

§ 102. No one of these functions, however, admits of being *perfectly understood* in its development, apart from its relation to the *others*; and every division of time which is capable of being treated apart as a relative whole, becomes what it is through the *reciprocity* of the influences which these functions exert upon one another.

For the *living energy* is *posited entire* in every momentum, and can be *equated*, therefore, only by having regard to the *reciprocal dependence* of all the different functions.

§ 103. The entire essence of Christianity, therefore, is to be completely apprehended only by adopting a very manifold [*many-sided*] *combination* of *both* methods of proceeding; it being necessary that each should *supplement* at one point what has been defective in the other at another.

While we are engaged in tracing the course of *one function* only, the prospect of the *total life* continues removed from our immediate observation, and we must reserve it to ourselves as a subsequent object to make good this defect. While we are occupied in bringing together into a *single picture* such traits as exhibit themselves contemporaneously, it is not possible for us to form an accurate estimate of the *individual elements*, and we must reserve it as a subsequent object to measure the latter by a comparison with what is homogeneous to them, but of earlier and of later occurrence.

§ 164. In the process of historical contemplation, the more we split up these different functions into the *individual* and *minute*, the more frequent must be the interposition of points which *unite* again what has been disjoined. The *larger* the dimensions assigned to the parallel masses, the *longer* may the observation of these individual portions be continued without interruption.

The *periods*, therefore, *may* be so much the *greater*, and *must* be so much the *smaller*, in proportion as the *functions* which are treated of are of greater or of smaller dimensions, respectively.

§ 165. The *most important* epoch-points, however, are always those which not only have a *like* value as it respects *all* the functions of Christianity, but are also of importance in relation to the historical developement *out of* the Church.

Since the *appearance* of Christianity, itself, constitutes at the same time a *turning-point* in the history of the *world*,—other epochs approximate in importance to this, only in the degree in which they *resemble* it in this respect.

§ 166. The formation of *Doctrine*, or the progress of the religious self-consciousness to distinctness,—and the fashioning of the *Common Life*,—or, of the impulse to fellowship, gratifying itself in each by means of all and in all by means of each,—are the two functions which are *most easily separable*, in the developement of Christianity.

This may be perceived from the fact, that great *changes* sometimes occur on the one side, while on the other every thing remains in the old position,—and that a certain point of time may be of importance in relation to the one side, as constituting a *node of developement*, while it appears to be of no consequence with respect to the other.

§ 167. The formation of the *Ecclesiastical Life* is especially co-determined (comp. § 160) by *political circumstances*, and by the *condition of society* upon the whole; the developement of *Doctrine*, on the other hand, by the *state of science* upon the whole, and especially by the *dominant philosophemes*.

This co-determination is *natural* and *unavoidable*, and is not, therefore, a condition which, in and of itself, marks the *existence* of *morbid* states; but it certainly contains the ground of their *possibility*. Epoch-points of a more general character which proceed from a new developement of *knowledge*, will also manifest themselves in the Christian Church most of all in the history of *doctrine*; such, on the contrary, as proceed from developements in the *civil condition* [of society] will also manifest themselves chiefly in the *ecclesiastical life*.

§ 168. On the side of the Ecclesiastical Life, again, the particulars most easily separable are, the developement of the *System of Worship* [Cultus], that is, of the mode in which *religious life-moments* are made a matter of *public communication*; and the developement of *Morals*, that is, of the *common stamp* which the influence of the Christian principle impresses upon the different departments of *action*.

The System of Worship bears the same relation to Morals as the more limited department of *Art* (in the stricter sense of the word) does to the more indefinite one of *Social Life in general*.

§ 169. The developement of the System of Worship is especially co-determined by the *nature* of those *means of delineation*, suited to its purpose, which are to be

found in [any given] society, and by the *manner* in which these are *distributed* among its members. The progress of Christian Morals, on the other hand, by the state of developement and distribution of the *spiritual* * *faculties in general*.

With regard, namely, to the former particular: that *communication* or *circulation* of religious excitements† which is to be effected in accordance with the excitements themselves, is dependent solely upon *delineation*. With regard to the other: all those motives of which the *religious* sentiment has to possess itself, are at *rest* in the condition here referred to.

§ 170. Both, however,—Morals and Worship,—are also, in their progress, so intimately *connected* with each other, that whenever they differ too greatly as to the degree of movement or repose [prevailing in each respectively], it follows that either the System of *Worship* gets the appearance of having degenerated into *empty usages* or into *superstition*, while the *Christian Life* gives proof of its existence in the department of *Morals*,—or else, on the contrary, it seems as if, while *Christian piety* maintained itself by means of the System of *Worship*, the prevailing *morals* presented merely the result of motives *foreign* to Christianity.

These different modes of judgment serve as the *manifestation* of an internal antagonism existing amongst the *members* of the community, and having a connexion with the disproportion referred to in the text.

§ 171. The more *sudden* the occurrence of any important *changes* in either of these two departments, the more numerous are the *re-actions* to which they are exposed. Those only, on the other hand, which take

* The reader will scarcely need to be told that the term is here employed in its *general*, and not in its *Dogmatical* acceptance.—TR.

† The word is used in its *good* sense. Every religious *emotion*, every *quickening* of the spiritual life, must *image* itself, visibly or audibly, or both, if others are to be made *partakers* of it.—TR.

place more *slowly*, approve themselves as having a character of *thoroughness*.

The former assertion, however, is *self-evident*, only with regard to such changes as do not extend to *several departments at the same time*. It is easy, therefore, *prematurely* to regard changes of this kind as *epoch-points*, where, nevertheless, they often leave but few effects behind.

§ 172. *Slow changes cannot be apprehended under the form of continuous series*; on the contrary, they admit of being brought to view only at *certain points*, which are to be made individually prominent, and which exhibit the *advances* effected from one season to another.

These points, moreover, must not be selected *arbitrarily*, but must have a *resemblance*, although only in a subordinate sense, to those which constitute *epochs*.

§ 173. The historical apprehension, in this department, is the more perfect, the more definitely the relation of the *Christian impulse* to the *moral and the artistic constitution of society* presents itself to view, and the more convincingly that which belongs to the *healthy developement* of the religious principle is separated from what is *weakly and morbid*.

For in this way the claims of Church-Guidance upon a scientific knowledge of Christian History are *satisfied*.

§ 174. The *Ecclesiastical Constitution*,—especially in the Evangelical Church, where it is destitute of all outward sanction,—can only be considered as appertaining to the department of *Morals*.

This proposition, rightly understood, lies *beyond the range* of all those controversies which yet prevail with regard to the [Ecclesiastical] *Law* of the Evangelical Church, and merely expresses the *essential difference* between a *civil* and an *ecclesiastical* constitution.

§ 175. Those greater nodes of developement which also exert an influence *out of* the Church, upon the *civil*

life, will manifest themselves *within* the Church most immediately and most strongly in its *Constitution*.

Just because no other section of Christian Morals is so intimately connected (comp. § 167) with political circumstances.

§ 176. The *highest* degree of suitability belongs to *that* arrangement, in which the *historical delineation* of the collective Christian life is made to follow the *order of developement* of the Church's *Constitution*.

For, this constitution exerts the most direct influence upon the System of *Worship*,—is indebted for its stability to the *state of morals upon the whole*,—and constitutes, at the same time, the expression of the *relation* between the *religious* and the *civil* communities.

§ 177. The *System of Doctrine* is developed, on the one hand, by means of that *reflection* which is continually directed towards the *Christian self-consciousness in its different momenta*, and on the other hand, by means of that *effort* which has for its object to establish, with more and more of general agreement and of precision, the *expression* by which this consciousness shall be represented.

Each of these tendencies is a *check* upon the other, the one having an *outward*, the other an *inward* direction. For this reason, different periods are characterized by the *preponderance* of the one or the other.

§ 178. The *order* in which, according to what has just been said, the different points of doctrine come forth to view, and the principal masses of the didactic dialect shape themselves, must be *capable of being understood*, at least in a general way, by a reference to the *peculiar, essential character* of Christianity.

For it would be contrary to the order of nature, if such conceptions as are *most closely allied* to this essence, were to be developed *last of all*.

§ 179. It is only in a *morbid* condition of the Church

that *individual* and *personal* (or it may be even *extra-ecclesiastical*) *circumstances*, can exert any considerable influence upon the course and the results of that occupation which has to do with the System of Doctrine.

If this has, nevertheless, not unfrequently been the case, still, writers of history, especially those of a more recent date, have placed far *more* to the account of such circumstances than the truth warrants us in doing.

§ 180. In proportion as it is impossible for the developement of the System of Doctrine to keep clear of *fluctuation* and *dissension*, in the same proportion is prominence also given to the effort, to prove, on the one hand, the *agreement* of a given statement with the utterances of *Primitive Christianity*, and on the other hand, to establish it by a reference to certain propositions conceded elsewhere, and *not* deriving their *origin* from the Christian Faith, and which, accordingly, will be *philosophemes*.

Both these efforts would be made,—though probably at a later period, and in a different degree,—even if *no* controversy existed; for an impulse to the former is supplied by the *characteristic social spirit* of Christianity, and to the latter by the necessity of convincing ourselves of the existence of an *agreement* between the *religious self-consciousness*, when it has attained to distinctness, and the action of the *speculative productivity*.

§ 181. Only during the prevalence of a morbid condition can these two efforts become *opposed* to each other in such a manner, that the one party shall resolve not to proceed, in the determination of doctrine, beyond the declarations of *Primitive Christianity*, while the other introduces *propositions of philosophy* into the Christian System of Doctrine, without even caring to prove, by a reference to the Canon, that they also appertain to the Christian consciousness.

The former class present obstacles to the *developement* of

the System of Doctrine,—the latter, in an equal degree, interfere with and falsify its *principle*.

§ 182. A knowledge of the *changes* which take place in the *mutual relation* of the two tendencies referred to, is essential to an understanding of the doctrinal development.

Through the neglecting of such *momenta*, we but too often get a mere *chronicle* instead of *history*, and the theological purpose of the discipline is lost altogether.

§ 183. Equally important is it to take knowledge of the *relations* subsisting between the movements of *theoretical doctrines* and those of *practical dogmas*; and where these movements become *broadly distinct* from each other, it is natural to *separate* Dogma-History, properly so called, from the History of Christian Morals.

On the whole, certainly, there have been more *manifest* and more *violent* agitations in connexion with the formation of the System of Faith [Glaubenslehre], properly so called; this, however, renders it the less allowable for the opposite tendency to be overlooked.

§ 184. If we take into consideration how many *auxiliary* branches of knowledge are required in order to follow out these different branches of Church History; it is manifest that this department of labour is of infinite extent, and that it postulates a broad distinction between *that* of which *every one* must be possessed, and *that* which is furnished only by the united labours of all who attain to *special proficiency* in the department before us (comp. § 92).

To these auxiliary branches of knowledge belong,—if every thing is to be understood in its *connexion*,—the entire science of *History*, so far as it has any relation to the periods in question, and,—if every thing is to be derived from the *sources*,—the entire study of *Philology*, so far as it concerns the matter in hand, and especially *Diplomatic Criticism* [the Criticism of *Documents*].

§ 185. It can only be observed, in general, that out of this infinite circuit of acquisitions, every theologian must be in possession of *that* which he *requires* in order to an *independent participation* in the Guidance of the Church.

This formula,—to all appearance a very narrow one,—supposes, however, that in addition to his particular, *local* activity, every theologian strives to exercise a *general* influence also; although it may not be possible distinctly to *point out* the latter in its effects.

- § 186. Since, now, at any given time, the existing state of things out of which a new *momentum* is to be developed, is capable of being understood only by a reference to *the Past in its totality*, while nevertheless its *immediate* connexion is with the *most recent* occurrence that has formed an *epoch*: it follows, that a correct view of the *latter*, rendered intelligible by means of all the principal revolutions which have *preceded* it, according to the degree of its connexion with them, is the *first* and *principal* thing required.

It is manifest that, in such a case, no particular regard can be had to the question, whether the prevailing character of the existing *momentum* is not already that of a *preparation* for the epoch which is to *come*; for this question must itself receive its immediate solution from a view of the relation [actually] sustained by the former towards the latter [for which, of course, we must *wait* until the coming epoch presents itself as a *fact*.]

§ 187. In order, however, that these observations may not retain the character of a mere series of single, unconnected pictures, it is necessary that they should be *combined* by means of the *plexus* (comp. § 91)—not meagrely filled up—of the chief *momenta* belonging to *every branch of Church History in every period*.

And this, as it is designed to be the foundation of an indepen-

dent activity, must also be, as far as possible, a survey constructed from accounts of *various* character.

§ 188. But this, too, grows into a living historical *view*,* such as also to possess an *impulsive* energy, only when the entire career of Christianity is apprehended at the same time (comp. 150) as the exhibition of the *Christian spirit in its* [state or aspect of] *movement*, and when, consequently, every thing is referred to one *inward* [principle].

Not until it has assumed *this* form, is it possible for the knowledge of the entire career referred to to exert an influence upon the Guidance of the Church.

§ 189. Every *local* exercise of influence calls for a more precise acquaintance with the particular *department* in which it takes place; and this knowledge must approximate to *completeness* in the same degree in which it bears more directly upon the *Present*.

The rule becomes modified, of course, according to the *extent* of the locality; it being often the case that the smallest locality, that which is occupied by a single congregation, has no separate history of its own, but can only claim attention as forming part of a larger whole.

§ 190. It is necessary, however, that every one should also exercise himself in *personal research*, and the *use of the sources*, at least in connection with *some one small portion* of History.

Whether it be that in the pursuit of this study, he merely makes a careful and constant *reference* to the sources, or that he attempts an independent *construction* from them. Otherwise, a man could hardly have at his command even so much of Historical Criticism as is requisite in order to a right use of accounts which are at variance with one another.

§ 191. A pursuit of the Study of Church History,

* See the marginal note to § 65, and the text of § 152. *Etymologically* (though not according to prevailing *usage*) one might perhaps say *intuition*.

proceeding *beyond* the measure just laid down, must be directed towards the accomplishing of something *new*.

Nothing is more unprofitable than a heaping up of historical knowledge which neither serves to any practical purposes, nor is communicated to others in the way of delineation.

§ 192. These new services may tend towards a *correction* or *completion* of the *material*, as well as towards an increase of *truthfulness* and *liveliness* in the *delineation*.

The deficiencies which still exist in all these respects are unmistakable, and are easily to be explained.

§ 193. In the pursuit of the study of Church History, it is not possible for the interest of the Church and the interest of Science [that is, as *apprehended* and *sympathized with* by the individual] to become *contradictory* the one to the other.

Since we are content to abstain from laying down rules for others, we limit the application of this proposition to our own Church; to which, as an *inquiring* and *self-forth-forming* community, even the most perfect impartiality *cannot* be productive of *injury*, but only conducive to *progress*. The *liveliest* degree of interest, therefore, which the Evangelical Theologian may feel in his Church, must not be allowed to *prejudice* either his investigation or his delineation. And just as little is it to be feared that the *results* of his investigation will *weaken* his interest in the Church; in the worst case, they can but impart to it the impulse to co-operate in the removal of the *imperfections* which are discerned.

§ 194. The labours of any individual in the department of Church History must, on the one hand, *take their rise* from his own *inclination*, and, on the other, be *determined* by the *opportunities* which present themselves to him.

A lively interest on behalf of Theology will always know how to bring the former into connexion with the latter, or even to provide the latter for the use of the former.

SECTION THE THIRD.—THE HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
PRESENT CONDITION OF CHRISTIANITY.

§ 195. Under this head we have to do (comp. §§ 94—97) with *Dogmatic Theology*,—or the knowledge of the *doctrine* now current in the Evangelical Church; and with *Ecclesiastical Statistics*, or the knowledge of the existing *social condition* in all the different sections of the Christian Church.

We must leave it to the further carrying out of our plan, to justify us in assigning this place to Dogmatic Theology; which, in other systems, (also under the name of Systematic Theology), has been made to occupy quite a different position. Here we have only to show that the two *disciplinæ* mentioned in the text, *exhaust* the heading prefixed, in its whole extent. This is clear from the consideration that as the Church is *altogether* a Community, there is, strictly speaking, *nothing* in it to be known which would not form a *part* of its *social condition*. The System of Doctrine is taken up *apart* from the latter topic, merely because its delineation admits of and requires a peculiar mode of treatment. It is true that there are other parts of the social condition, with regard to which the same thing might also take place; but these have not, hitherto, been specially elaborated as theological *disciplinæ*. But if, in periods when the Church is divided, (according to § 98), it is possible only for each Church-Community in particular to elaborate its own system of doctrine in a dogmatic form: the question arises, how is the Evangelical Theologian to arrive at a knowledge of the doctrine which is current in *other* Christian Church-Communities, and what is the place which our outline is to appropriate to this purpose? The most direct method is, to have recourse to the dogmatic representations which they themselves give of it; which become for him, however, mere *historical reports*. On the other hand, the place to be assigned to this knowledge in our Outline, is to be found in the *History of Christian Doctrine*, followed down as far as the existing momentum; for

which history the said representations constitute the genuine *sources*. But *Statistics*, too, in treating of each individual Community, may have a place specially devoted to the statement of its *doctrine*.

I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

§ 196. A *dogmatic* treatment of the System of Doctrine, apart from *personal conviction*, is *not possible*; on the other hand, it is *not necessary* that all those elaborations of it which have reference to *the same period of the same Church-Community* should agree amongst themselves.

One might be disposed to deduce both the propositions which are here contradicted, from this fact, that the dogmatic treatment has to do merely (comp. §§ 97 and 98) with the doctrine *current at the given time*. But the man to whom this doctrine is not a matter of *conviction*,—though he may, indeed, furnish a *report* concerning it, and concerning the manner, too, in which its *inward connexion* is *conceived of*,—cannot *establish* this connexion by means of the exhibition which he gives of it. Yet it is the latter circumstance alone which gives to the mode of treatment a *dogmatic* character; the former is merely a *historical* exhibition, such as may be given in like manner of *all systems* by *one and the same man*, if possessed of the requisite knowledge.—On the other hand, there is, in the Evangelical Church, no necessity for entire agreement, for this reason, that even at one and the same time, *different views* have currency side by side. Every thing namely, is to be looked upon as having *currency*, which is *officially asserted and officially heard*, without calling forth an *official contradiction*. The *limits* of this difference, therefore, certainly, are sometimes broader and sometimes narrower, according to time and circumstances.

§ 197. We should not give the name of a system of *Dogmatics*, either to the laying down and supporting by proof of a body of propositions which were *prevailingly*

characterized by a *deviation* from the views generally current, and which expressed merely the conviction of the *individual*; or, on the other hand, to such a system as, in a period marked by the prevalence of diverse theories, would only consent to admit *that*, in regard to which *no* controversy existed.

No one will deny the former part of this assertion. But the controversial question, too, proceeding thence,—as to whether text-books can be admitted to have a *dogmatic* character, when they merely give a *historical report* concerning the *current* system of doctrine, and, on the other hand, lay down in connexion with *proof* such propositions, exclusively, as might have an *official prohibition* adduced against them,—serves as a further confirmation of our notion.—A purely *irenical* composition of this kind will, for the most part, prove so meagre and indefinite, that there will be everywhere a want, not only of the *middle terms* which are necessary to effect a *proof*, but also of that *precision* in the definition of notions, which is necessary to procure for the delineation the *confidence* of the reader.

§ 198. The immediate use of Dogmatic Theology in connexion with Church-Guidance is, to show in how many ways, and up to what point, the *principle* of the current period has *developed* itself on every side; and how the *germs* of *improved configurations* which belong to the Future are related thereto. At the same time it furnishes the department of *practice* with the *norm* for the *popular* mode of expression; by way of guarding against the recurrence of *old* forms of confusion, and of preventing by anticipation the occurrence of *new* ones.

This practical interest is to be referred exclusively to the *conservative* function of Church-Guidance; and it was from this that the gradual formation of the system of Dogmatics originally proceeded. The division enunciated in the former sentence of the paragraph is explained by what was said in

general with regard to the *contents* of every individual *momentum* (comp. § 91).

§ 199. In every *momentum* which admits of a separate delineation, (comp. § 93), that which, in the System of Doctrine, is derived from the *last preceding epoch*, bears in the most marked degree the character of having been *ecclesiastically determined*; and that, on the contrary, which serves rather to prepare the way for the *succeeding epoch*, presents itself as originating with *individuals*.

The *former* seems ecclesiastically defined, not only in a higher degree than the *latter*, but also in a higher degree than that which has been derived by transmission from *earlier* periods.—There is the more reason for tracing back the *latter* to individuals merely, in proportion as we may be unable, for the present, distinctly to anticipate a new configuration.

§ 200. All points of doctrine which are developed by the *dominant principle* of the period, must *agree* amongst themselves; whereas, on the contrary, all *others*, so long as we can but say of them that they have not this for their point of departure, appear as forming an *unconnected plurality*.

The dominant principle itself, however, may be *variously apprehended*, and this may give rise to a number of dogmatic delineations, connected in themselves, respectively, but differing from one another, and all laying claim, perhaps not without reason, to a *like* degree of *ecclesiasticity*.—When the heterogeneous, isolated elements become connected, they either present themselves to view as constituting a *new apprehension* of the principle already dominant, or else they announce the developement of a *new principle*.

§ 201. As a complete acquaintance with the state of doctrine embraces not merely that which is *essentially interwoven* with the *further developement*, but also that which, although as a *personal theory* it was not unimportant, yet, as such, again *disappears*; so also must a

comprehensive dogmatic method of treatment give a proper degree of attention to *everything that has a contemporaneous existence* in the Church Community with which it is connected.

A place will always, of necessity, be found for this, if, in the attempt to establish the *connexion* laid down, [that is, as being the *true inward connexion* of the System of Doctrine] *comparisons* and *parallels* are not neglected.

§ 202. A dogmatic delineation is *perfect* in proportion to the degree in which it possesses, along with the *assertory* character, a *divinatory* character also.

In the former is manifested the author's *confidence* in his own theory; in the latter, the *clearness* with which he apprehends the existing state of things upon the whole.

§ 203. Every element of doctrine that is constructed in the spirit of a desire to *hold fast* that which is already *matter of general acknowledgment*, along with the *natural inferences* therefrom,—is of an *orthodox* character; every element constructed with a tendency to keep the System of Doctrine in a state of *mobility*, and to make room for *other* modes of apprehension, is *heterodox*.

It seems to be too great a limitation of these terms, when they are applied exclusively to the relation which doctrinal opinions bear to a certain *norm* that has been set up; the same antagonism may also be found where there is no such norm in existence. Rather may we say that, according to the explanation given above, it is possible for the *Symbol* to have its own *origin* from the *orthodox tendency*; and so it has happened, often enough. What, on the other hand, may appear strange in our explanation, is, that it does not refer at all to the *contents* of the propositions, in and for themselves; and yet this, also, is easily justified upon a closer reflection.

§ 204. *Both* classes of elements are *alike important*, as in relation to the historical progress of Christianity in *general*, so also in relation to every important *momentum* as such.

As, notwithstanding any degree of *uniformity* which might exist, there would still be no true *unity* without the former class of elements; so, notwithstanding any measure of *diversity*, there would still be no conscious, free *mobility* without the *latter*.

§ 205. It is *false orthodoxy*, to wish for a continued retention, in the system of dogmatic treatment, of *that* also, which, in so far as the *public communications of the Church* are concerned, is already completely *antiquated*; and which, moreover, does not, by its *scientific expression*, exert any determinate influence upon *other* particulars of doctrine. .

It is evidently necessary that a doctrinal definition to which these remarks become applicable, should be rendered *moveable* again, and that the inquiry should be conducted back to the point at which it stood previously.

§ 206. It is *false heterodoxy*, to manifest hostility, in the system of dogmatic treatment, to such formulæ as have their well-grounded point of *support* in the communications of the Church; and the scientific expression of which, too, does not create any *confusion* as it respects their relation to other particulars of Christian Doctrine.

This principle, therefore, does not by any means extend to justify that servile spirit of accommodation, which would allow the retention of *all* that happens to be used by a number of persons for the purpose of *edification*, even though it may not be in accordance with the fundamental doctrines of our faith.

§ 207. A dogmatic delineation [of the System of Doctrine] intended for the Evangelical Church, will avoid both these forms of irregularity: and notwithstanding that *mobility* of the *letter* which we sought to vindicate, will still find it possible to be *orthodox* in regard to all the chief particulars of doctrine; but it will also be compelled,—notwithstanding that it confines

itself exclusively to that which has *currency*,—to *give a start*, in particular places, to some things which are *heterodox*, also.

The natural relation of the two elements will,—if this discipline is symmetrically developed from its proper *notion*,—always be that which is here laid down; and a change in this respect will become necessary, only when one of the two extremes has been for a long time predominant.

§ 208. Every dogmatic theologian who either innovates, or cries up what is old, in a *one-sided* manner, is but an *imperfect organ* of the Church: and if occupying a falsely heterodox stand-point, he will declare even the most strictly proper orthodoxy to be false; and if a falsely orthodox stand-point, he will combat even the mildest and most inevitable heterodoxy as a destructive innovation.

These fluctuations have been the principal cause which has hitherto almost continually prevented the Dogmatic Theology of the Evangelical Church from developing itself in a peaceful progress.

§ 209. Every doctrine which is taken up into the dogmatic combination, must support by *proof* the manner in which it is *specifically determined*; on the one hand, by an immediate or mediate tracing back of its *contents* to the New Testament Canon, and on the other, by the agreement of its *scientific expression* with the construction which is put upon certain kindred propositions.

All the propositions, however, upon which, in this sense, it is possible to *fall back*, are subject to the *same* rule; so that here there is no other subordination than this,—that those propositions are *least* in need of either of the operations specified, which have their *popular*, their *Scriptural*, and their *scientific* forms of expression most nearly *identical* with one another, so that every fellow-believer verifies them at once by a reference to the certainty of his own immediate

religious self-consciousness.—This distinction will probably survive as a relic of another, which, as it was commonly understood, is already to be considered antiquated; the distinction between *Fundamental* Articles, and others [which were regarded as *not* fundamental.]

§ 210. If any important *change* takes place in the *treatment of the Canon*, there must also be a change in the *mode of proof* of individual doctrines, notwithstanding that their *contents* remain the same without alteration.

The orthodox dogmatic interest should never be allowed to form an obstacle to exegetical inquiries, or to dominate over them; but the falling away of individual *proof-passages*, as they are called, does not, in and of itself, constitute a testimony against the correctness of a current *doctrine*. On the other hand, canonical proof which continues to maintain its validity, must needs impart security to a doctrine against the heterodox tendency.

— § 211. In regard to the propositions which definitively express the peculiar character of the *existing period*, a tracing of them back to the *Symbol* may stand in the place of canonical proof, provided we are still able to appropriate the interpretation which was then current [that is, at the time when the *Symbol* was composed].

In these cases it will also be advisable to make this agreement with the *Symbol* conspicuous, in order the more definitely to distinguish these propositions from others [of a different character] (comp. §§ 199, 200, 203.) The principle, however, does not by any means apply to propositions which have been transferred from *earlier* periods into the *Symbol* of the current one, by a process of mere *repetition*.

§ 212. Since the peculiar character of the doctrine of the Evangelical Church is inseparable from that *antagonism* between the Evangelical and the Romish Churches to which the issue of the Reformation first gave fixity; it follows, too, that every proposition which

is to be traced back to our Symbols, is *completely worked out* only in so far as it bears within itself the *antithesis* to the *corresponding propositions* maintained by the Romish Church.

For it would not be possible, either for a proposition in regard to which the antithesis had already, on our part, been *abrogated*, or for one with which this antithesis had *nothing to do*, to find sufficient verification in a reference to the Symbol.

§ 213. The strictly *didactic form of expression*, which, by means of the *connectedness* subsisting amongst the individual formulæ, gives to the dogmatic procedure its scientific *stability*, is dependent, at any given time, upon the existing condition of the *philosophical discipline*.

Partly on account of the *logical relation* of the formulæ to one another, and partly because many of their notional definitions are based upon elements which belong to *Psychology* and to *Ethics*.

§ 214. The dialectic element of the System of Doctrine is capable of entering into conjunction with *every* system of philosophy that does not, by the principles it maintains, *exclude* or *deny* the *religious element*,—either in general, or in that particular form of it to which Christianity professes immediately to belong.

Therefore, all decidedly *materialistic* and *sensualistic* systems,—which, however, perhaps, will hardly be allowed to pass for *truly* philosophical at all (and all properly *atheistic* systems will also have the same character)—all such systems are to be excluded from being employed in connexion with the discussion of Dogmatics. It is a difficult thing to lay down, in general, limits which shall be stricter than those now specified.

§ 215. Individual doctrines may therefore be *differently apprehended* in *contemporary* dogmatic systems, and may also be *expressed differently* at *different* periods, while

in both cases no diversity presents itself in their *religious contents*.

By reason of the diversity which characterises the co-existing or successive *Schools* and their *terminologies*. It is only in consequence of *misapprehension*, however, that such differences come to be also matter for a dogmatic *controversy*.

§ 216. In like manner, an appearance of *similarity* may arise between propositions, the *religious contents* of which have, notwithstanding, more or less of *diversity*.

Not only is it possible, in *detail*, for the difference of different theological schools belonging to the *same* Church to conceal itself behind the identity of the scientific terminology; but it is also possible for *Protestant* and *Catholic* propositions, especially where they have a certain degree of remoteness from the *leading-points* of the Symbols, to appear of like import.

§ 217. The Protestant treatment of Dogmatics must strive to bring into distinct consciousness the *relation* sustained by every separate article of doctrine to the *antagonism* that governs the period in which we live.

This is a want in the department of Church-Guidance, which can be satisfied only in the way pointed out; a department in which incorrect views with regard to the state of this antagonism—(as to *whether*, and *where*, by the approximation of the opposing parties, it is already in process of *disappearing*,—or, on the contrary, as to *whether*, and *where*, it is first beginning to *develope* itself more definitely)—must needs be productive of the most awkward confusions.

§ 218. Dogmatic Theology in its entire compass is a thing of infinite extent, and requires that a *separation* shall be made between the department of *special proficiency* and that of *common property*.

This distinction, however, of course, relates merely to the extent of the *material* to be elaborated; not to the *certainty* and *strength* of the *conviction*, nor to the *manner* in which it is *obtained*.

§ 219. It is to be demanded of *every* Evangelical

Theologian, that he be occupied in the formation of a *personal conviction* with regard to all *passages*, properly so called, of the System of Doctrine: not merely as these have been developed from the *principles of the Reformation* considered in themselves, and in opposition to the Romish doctrines; but also in so far as there is anything *new* which has taken shape, and which possesses a historical significance, at least in relation to the current *momentum*, that is not to be overlooked.

By a *passage*, I understand such a proposition or body of propositions, as, on the one hand, has a *determinate place* in the Canon and the Symbol, and, on the other, cannot be *passed by* without its resulting that *other* propositions or bodies of propositions, of the same compass and value, become *obscure and unintelligible*.—The expression, *be occupied in the formation of a conviction*, does not by any means involve the existence of a *sceptical state*, but merely that maintenance of an *inward receptivity* with regard to new investigations, which is essential to the spirit of our Church; a receptivity, in so far as it is possible, on the one hand, that there may be a change in the treatment of the *Canon*, and, on the other, that a new source may be opened up in relation to the dogmatic *phraseology*. This requirement, too, relates, immediately, not to *faith* in that aspect in which it is the *common possession* of all Christians; but to the strictly *didactic construction* of the enunciations which have reference to it.

§ 220. The study of Dogmatics must therefore *commence* with the *understanding* and *testing* of one or more strictly-connected exhibitions of that which has been *ecclesiastically determined*; by way of a *further development of the Symbols*, which, from their very nature, are but *fragmentary*.

A knowledge of *Dogma-History*, (although only in the same manner in which it is possible for the laic, also, to be in possession of its essential features), must necessarily be taken for granted at the outset of this proceeding.—For the rest, we should distinguish between, and group together, respectively,

such delineations as develope their propositions, for the most part, from the *letter* of the Symbols, and such as profess to continue faithful to the *spirit* of the Symbols, although they subject the *letter* of them, likewise, to the operations of Criticism.

§ 221. In relation to the *new* matter, which is *not* to be understood by means of the Symbol,—and in so far as it belongs to this department,—it must be left to *reflective observation* to decide, in the first instance, whether or not this new matter contains *several* particulars which point backwards to a *common origin*, and give indication of a *common design*.

For, in proportion as this is the case, may we the more safely suppose that the views in question have obtained a *historical footing*.

§ 222. An accurate knowledge of all contemporary methods of treatment and all controversial questions in agitation, as well as of all venturesome opinions, and a settled judgment as to the foundation and value of these various forms and elements, constitute the department of *special proficiency* in connexion with Dogmatics.

This *settled judgment* is to be understood with a *reservation* of that fresh receptivity (comp. § 218), which is not less necessary to the Master than to the beginner.—By *venturesome opinions* are to be understood not merely the ephemeral phenomena of a capricious and ill-regulated *personality*, but also every thing which, as being, properly speaking, *morbid*, is to be traced back to *anti-Christian*, or at least to *anti-Evangelical* impulses, and becomes an object for the practical application of Polemics.

§ 223. In the preceding delineation, little regard has been had to the now prevailing customary *division* of Dogmatic Theology, into the discussion of the *theoretical* side of the System of Doctrine, or Dogmatics in the stricter sense,—and the discussion of its *practical* side, or the Christian Doctrine of Morals; the less so, because

this separation cannot be looked upon as *essential*; even as it does not possess, either in *general*, or in relation to the *Evangelical Church*, the character of *originality*.*

Neither the designations *theoretical* and *practical*, nor the terms *Doctrine of Faith* [System of Faith, Glaubenslehre] and *Doctrine of Morals*, are perfectly accurate. For the Christian rules of life are also *theoretical* propositions, when viewed as developements of the Christian *notion* of the *Good*; and they are propositions of *faith*, not less than those which are *dogmatical* in the proper sense, since they have to do with *the same Christianly-religious self-consciousness*,—only that they have to do with it in its manifestation as *impulse*, [and not as taking the form of *conception* or of *feeling*.]—Now, although it cannot be denied that the treatment of the two in *combination* belongs to a period in the history of the theological sciences which must be regarded as in many respects *imperfect*, still, a *progressive improvement*, even in this department, may very well be conceived of, *apart from* a separation of the kind referred to.

§ 224. If this separation affords to *both* kinds of propositions, respectively, the advantage of being *more easily apprehended in their connexion*, it has been accompanied by an *additional, special* advantage as it regards the Christian Doctrine of Morals, in that the latter is now subjected to a *more extended treatment in detail*.

This last-mentioned advantage, however, is not essentially a *consequence* of the separation. For it is possible to conceive of a treatment of the two in combination, in which the *proportion* [of attention given to each respectively] should be the *reverse* of that which actually existed before the separation; and then the separation would have led to the same advantage in favour of Dogmatics. It may be urged as a *set-off* against the advantage first named, that a well-ordered, lively *combination* of the two appears to furnish an *especial security* against the facility with which it is possible for the dogmatic propositions, properly so called, to degenerate into

* That is, it does not originate *spontaneously* and *independently*; it is in its nature *purely consequential*.—Tr.

lifeless formulæ, and the ethical into merely outward prescriptions.

§ 225. The division of this department may very easily give rise to the supposition of its being possible that, in conjunction with altogether *diverse* apprehensions of the System of *Faith*, there might nevertheless be but *one and the same* apprehension with regard to the System of *Morals*,—and *vice versâ*.

This error has already obtained a very profound hold upon our ecclesiastical commonwealth; and it can be effectually counteracted only by our taking up the position which the *scientific* treatment of the matter affords.

§ 226. This division finds a considerable amount of *justification*, as well in the fact that the *verification* by means of the Canon and the Symbol assumes, in the case of the ethical propositions, a form *differing* a good deal from that which it has in the case of the dogmatical,—as also in the circumstance that the respective *terminologies* derive their origin from different departments of science.

In this respect we have, it is true, connected the theological sciences, in *general*, with Ethics, and the *disciplinæ* dependent upon the latter; but if we look at Dogmatic Theology in *particular*, we must admit that the terminology of the System of *Faith*, properly so called, has its origin, to a great extent, in that philosophical science which, under the name of Rational Theology, had its place in the System of Metaphysics,—whereas, on the other hand, the Christian Doctrine of *Morals* is able to draw, for the most part, only from the Duty-Doctrine of the philosophical system of Ethics.

§ 227. The separation of the two *disciplinæ* has also generated a perverted *eclectic* mode of proceeding, it having been supposed that one might, without any injurious results, proceed upon the basis of a *different philosophical school*, when dealing with the Christian Doc-

trine of *Morals*, from that to which reference is made when dealing with the System of *Faith*.

It is only necessary to have realized, in one's own mind, the possibility of an *undivided* treatment of Dogmatic Theology, in order to discover that the proceeding referred to is absolutely inadmissible.

§ 228. The separate mode of treatment is *the more appropriate*, in proportion as the *progress* of the period, in relation to the developement of the dominant principle and the tension of the prevailing antagonism,* has been marked by *less of actual uniformity* in these two departments [Doctrine, or Faith, and Morals],—or at any rate, in proportion as there has been less of uniformity in the *sequence* of the *scientific observation* upon the *actual course* of events.

In regard to *morality itself*, we should, perhaps, have no sufficient reason for asserting that the antithesis between Protestantism and Catholicism is less developed than it is in regard to Faith; but that in our *systems of Christian Morals*, this antithesis has not, by a great deal, been so fully worked out as in our Dogmatics, seems to be undeniable.

§ 229. It cannot be denied that there are *many elaborations* of the Christian Doctrine of Morals, in which there appears but a faint glimmering of the proper type of a *theological discipline*, and which are but little distinguishable from *philosophical systems* of morals.

That this must exert a most mischievous influence upon Church-Guidance, is perfectly clear. In the case of an *undivided* treatment of the whole subject, it would be *impossible* for such a result to take place, with respect to the propositions belonging to the Doctrine of *Morals*, except the System of *Faith* were also to renounce its proper character.

§ 230. The separate treatment of these two branches

* Or *antithesis*, if we think of the antagonism as expressed in doctrine. In German, both notions are expressed by the same word, (*Gegensatz*).

of Dogmatic Theology will be *the less liable to objection*, in proportion to the completeness with which all that was said in §§ 196—216 [respecting the System of Doctrine in *general*,] is also made to apply to the Christian Doctrine of *Morals*, and in proportion to the care which is taken, in treating each of the two *disciplinæ*, to *re-establish its connexion* with the other by means of particular allusions.

The former part of this observation cannot be carried out into detail here. The possibility of the latter particular is evident from what was said at § 224.

§ 231. It always remains *desirable* that the *undivided* method of treatment should also, from time to time, obtain currency again.

That this should be hardly possible without occasioning the resulting mass to lose all regular *form*, is a thing which could happen only where one went very much into *detail*.

II. ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS.

§ 232. In the *collective condition* of an ecclesiastical society, we distinguish between its *internal state** and its *external relations*; and in the former of these, again, between the *contents* which may be pointed out therein, and the *form* in which the society exists.

Many particulars, certainly, seem to admit of being included in the one leading division just as readily as in the other; but yet, always in a different *connexion*; so that the circumstance does not detract from the correctness of our classification.

§ 233. In periods when the Christian Church is not outwardly one, the problem now before us embraces *all* the several Church-Communities which may happen to exist.

* Beschaffenheit—*quality, state as made up of qualities*; in short, the *mode of being* of a thing at a given time.—Tr.

Every one of these is then to be individually taken into consideration; and the relations of each to the rest find their place, as a matter of course, in the second half of the discipline upon which we are engaged.—But even if there were no definitive *separation* of individual Church-Communities from one another, still, individual *portions* of the Church would be found to *differ* so much from other portions, in regard as well to their inward character, as to their relations, that classifying divisions must be made, notwithstanding.

§ 234. The *contents* of any Ecclesiastical Community at a given point of time, depend upon the degree of *strength* and of *uniformity* with which the *characteristic general spirit* of the said Community *pervades* the entire mass appertaining to it.

Immediately, therefore, and in general, [they are equivalent to] the *condition of its health* in relation to *Indifferentism* and *Separatism* (comp. §§ 56, 57.) This, again, is discovered by looking, on the one hand, at the exponents of the development of the *System of Doctrine*, regard being had to the *unanimity* or *multifariousness* of the results, and to the manner in which the Congregation is interested in this function; and on the other, at the *influence* of the ecclesiastical *common-spirit* upon the other departments of life, and especially upon the life of Divine Worship [that department of life which has to do with Divine Worship.]

§ 235. The greater the *differences* which exist in these respects in Church-Communities of considerable extent, the more *contrary* is it to the design of the discipline before us, that we should content ourselves with mere *average statements*.

That which is most instructive for the purposes of Church Guidance would be lost, if no *comparison* were instituted, with reference to the most important points which come into consideration, between those masses which are characterized by the *largest* amount of dissimilarity.

§ 236. The essential nature of the *form* under which a Church-Community exists, or, of its *Constitution*, depends upon the manner in which the *Guidance* of the

Church is organized, and upon the relation of the entire body to those who take part in the Guidance of the Church, or, to the Clerus in the broader sense of the word.

The great *variety* of these constitutions renders it necessary to distribute them into certain principal *groups*; in doing which, however, care should be taken that we do not lay too much stress upon their *analogy with political forms*, and also that we do not, while attending to their *general character*, lose sight of their *specific differences*.

§ 237. The delineation of the *internal state* is perfect in proportion to the extent of the means which it presents of estimating correctly the influence of the *Constitution* upon the *inward condition*, and of the latter upon the former.

For this stands connected with the *greatest* problem of Church-Guidance; and where such a reference is not made, all accounts belonging to this department remain mere *dead notices*, as do all statistical *figures* apart from intelligent *combination*.

- - § 238. The *external relations* of a Church Community, —which can only be relations to *other* communities,—are, on the one hand, relations to communities of a *like* nature, (namely, those of Christianity and of individual Christian communities, towards such as are *extra-Christian*, as also those of Christian communities to *one another*), and, on the other hand, relations to communities of a *different* kind,—and amongst these especially, to *civil society*, and to *science*, in the entire compass of the term.

We regard the latter as a *community*, for this reason, if for no other,—that all scientific communication is subject to conditions imposed by *language*,—and every language, surely, forms a *distinct region of fellowship*; so that the relations of the *same* Church-Community may be altogether *different* in different regions of language.

§ 239. Every Church-Community stands towards those with which it is in contact in a relation of *communication* as well as of *re-action*, which is capable of being *dier-sified by gradation* to the most manifold extent, from a junction of the *maximum* of the one with the *minimum* of the other, to the opposite proportion.

By *contact* is to be understood, not merely *local contiguity*, but *intercourse of any kind*. *Reaction*, moreover—even apart from all *Polemics* that may happen to have an outward direction—is involved, on the one hand, in the *common reference* [made by all parties] to the *Canon*, and on the other hand, in the activity which aims to promote a progressive improvement *from without*,—which can never be regarded as wholly wanting.

§ 240. The relation of Ecclesiastical Communities to *particular wholes of knowledge* fluctuates between two forms of *one-sidedness*: the one of those occurring, when the Church will not allow validity to any knowledge except that which she can herself *appropriate* for her own special purpose, and which, therefore, she can also herself *bring forth*; and the other, when the *objective* consciousness claims to have attributed to it that verity which belongs to the *self-consciousness*.

For, at both these points, the two communities in question *exclude* each other. In the middle, between the two, there lies, as a common point of approximation, a mutual *active recognition*. The problem is, to show clearly *what position* an *existing* relation [between two such communities] occupies, with reference to these principal points.

§ 241. The same may be said of the relation between *Church* and *State*. Only that in this case—in which formulæ of a more determinate character are developed,—we more readily perceive, on the one hand, that it is not easy for a mutual *recognition* to take place, without some small *preponderance* being given to the one side or

to the other,—and, on the other hand, that *Evangelical* Christianity, especially, assigns *definite limits* to its claims.

That this is not the place for a *theory* with regard to the relation just mentioned, may be understood as a matter of course. Many of the topics, [Orter, loci] however, which are here pointed out, are also treated of in what is called *Church Law* [Kirchenrecht]; only, as the name itself indicates, the *municipal* stand-point predominates in the view which is there taken of them.

§ 242. According to these its essential outlines, the department of Ecclesiastical Statistics is capable of being *carried out* to an *unlimited* extent.

Moreover, it requires, as a matter of course, perpetual *renovation*; inasmuch as, after the occurrence of any *change*, the existing elements of Church History receive *accessions*.

§ 243. That, amongst ourselves, theologians but too frequently *restrict* themselves to an acquaintance with the condition of the *Evangelical* Church, and indeed, merely of that *part* of it in which their own circle of activity is situated, is a circumstance which has a most *injurious* influence upon the ecclesiastical *praxis*.

There is nothing which contributes so much to favour a persistence in the *customary* and *traditional*, as a want of acquaintance with *other*, but yet *kindred*, states of things. And nothing gives rise to a more rugged one-sidedness, than the *fear* lest one should be obliged to recognise good *elsewhere*, which is wanting within his own circle.

§ 244. A general acquaintance with the condition of the *whole of Christendom*, in the leading relations here specified, and in proportion to the degree in which each part of it is connected with the circle of his own activity, is what we have to require as *indispensable* on the part of every Evangelical Theologian.

The obligation to become more *intimately* acquainted with that which is *nearer* and *more allied*,—which certainly follows from the above,—is, however, only of a *subordinate* cha-

racter. For it is possible for the individual rightly to exercise an efficient influence upon the Church-Community to which he himself belongs, *only* when he works upon it as upon *an organic part of the whole*,—a part which has to maintain and to develope itself in its relative opposition to the other portions.

§ 245. Much yet remains to be accomplished by *special* labour in this department, as it respects both *matter and form*.

During the most recent period, it is true, a large amount of *material* has been provided; but it has seldom been apprehended from the right point of view. And of the more comprehensive class of works, the number is still so small as to render it impossible that the *best* form can yet have been discovered.

§ 246. The merely outward *description* of things as they are, is in relation to this discipline what *Chronicle* is in relation to History.

In the present state of the discipline, however, it is a merit to bring to general knowledge, even in this way, such things as are but *little known*, or of an *irregular* character. Mere *topographical* and *onomastic*, or *bibliographical* notices, are, of course, the *least* profitable thing of the kind.

§ 247. A detailed inquiry into the present condition of Christianity, *not* proceeding from an *interest in favour* of the Church, nor assuming any relation to *Church Guidance*,—in the event of its being also carried on *without* a scientific spirit, could only result in an *uncritical gathering*; and on the other hand, the *more scientific* its character, the more would it lean towards a *sceptical* or *polemical* tendency.

From the nature of the objects investigated, it is *impossible* that the impulse should originate from a *purely scientific* interest. If, therefore, the interest *in favour* of the cause is wanting, an interest *opposed* to it must be operative. A similar remark may be made with regard to Church History.

§ 248. Supposing that the *religious interest* is *unaccom-*

panied by a *scientific spirit*, the labour, instead of yielding a *true result*, will merely be subservient to the *subjectivity* of the person or his party.

For where there is the prevalence of a powerful interest, which has its origin from the self-consciousness, nothing but the scientific spirit is capable of affording security against *uncritical partiality*.

§ 249. The discipline which is usually called *Symbolics*, is merely *put together* out of certain elements derived from Ecclesiastical Statistics, and is capable of *retiring again within the latter*.

It is a collocation of that which is *characteristic* in the respective systems of doctrine of the Christian parties still extant; and since this cannot be presented to view after the manner of Dogmatics (comp. §§ 196, 233), with the adduction of proof in support of the [systematic] connexion, the delineation must be purely *descriptive*. The *name*,—which does not exactly answer to the *thing*, because, namely, *all parties* are not in possession of *Symbols* in the proper sense of the word,—can only be intended to affirm, that the account given follows as its authority the *most classical* and the *most generally recognized* representation of each particular mode of faith. It is necessary, however, in the discipline with which we are occupied (comp. § 234), that an account of this kind should form the *basis* for an exhibition of the *relations* of the System of Doctrine *within* the community; and the difference is merely this, that the system of doctrine of a community is described, in the latter case, in connexion with the *other circumstances* of the community, but, in Symbolics, in connexion with the system of doctrine of *other communities*,—(although we have already (comp. § 233*) recommended that the *comparative method* should be adopted for the purposes of Statistics, also).

§ 250. Biblical Dogmatics, too, approximate more closely to the method of Statistics, in the treatment of

* This seems to be the reference intended. In the original, by an evident mistake it is printed § 335.—Tr.

the System of Doctrine, than to Dogmatics, properly so called.

For, the method of *combination* we adopt is so very different; and, on the one hand, the reference [which we are able to make] to the Old Testament Canon, is, in relation to the *Biblical* propositions of the *New Testament*, but a very insufficient substitute for our reference to the New Testament Canon [in relation to *Dogmatic* propositions *now* current in the Church], and on the other hand, in the former process, [the immediate derivation of a system of Biblical Dogmatics from the New Testament], there is *wanting* throughout the *further developement* of later times, which developement has so become a part of our conviction, that we cannot *appropriate* the system of Biblical Dogmatics in that manner which is essential to a *strictly* dogmatic treatment. The exhibition of the [systematic] connexion of the Biblical propositions in their characteristic dress is therefore, prevallyingly, of a *historical* character. And inasmuch as every *comprehensive picture* (comp. 150) of a period which is posited as a *unity*, constitutes, strictly speaking, the *Statistics* of that period and that portion, Biblical Dogmatics merely form *part* of such a picture of the *Apôstolic* period.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS RESPECTING HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

§ 251. Although, in the Christian Church, the pre-eminent influence of individuals upon the mass diminishes, upon the whole, still it is appropriate, in relation to Historical Theology more than to other departments of History, that those periods which, (as constituting, even though but in a subordinate sense, *epochs*, are to be apprehended each as a *unity*,) should be delineated in connexion with the *lives* of certain eminently influential *individuals*.

This influence *diminishes*, because, in Christ, it was *absolute*, and there is no individual of *later* times whom we place on a footing of equality with the *apostles*, of whom, nevertheless, there were but few that exercised any distinct *personal* in-

fluence. The *farther* we advance, the *more numerous* do we always find the contemporary individuals by whom any new revolution was effected. This, however, is by no means to be limited to the period of the so-called Fathers of the Church. But we may perhaps say, that each individual is the *better fitted* to exercise such an influence, in proportion as he answers to the notion of a Prince of the Church [§ 9], but that the farther we advance, the less reason have we for *expecting to meet* with persons of this kind. It is often the case, too, that particular variations in the System of Doctrine, which are worthy of note as an indication and foreboding [of something yet to come], are best rendered intelligible by viewing them in connexion with the lives of their authors.

§ 252. That knowledge of the historical career which it is necessary for the purposes of Philosophical Theology (comp. § 65) to *take for granted*, must be merely such a knowledge as belongs to the department of *Chronicle* (which is *independent* of the system of theological study); whereas, on the other hand, the *scientific treatment* of the historical career in the several branches of Historical Theology, supposes at the *outset* a possession of the *results* of Philosophical Theology.

This, as may be seen from previous observations, is true not less of Exegetical and Dogmatic Theology, than of Historical Theology in the more restricted sense of the term. For all the *leading notions* of the science are *definitively determined* in those investigations which constitute Philosophical Theology.

§ 253. This circumstance, taken in connexion with the present state of Philosophical Theology (comp. § 68) furnishes an *explanation*, if not of the great *diversity* which appears in the various elaborations of the several branches of Historical Theology, yet at least of the want of a common understanding as to the *original seat* of this diversity.

For the diversity itself would continue, [even if Philosophical Theology were less imperfectly developed], because what

was said in § 51 of Apologetics, and extended in § 64 to Polemics also, must be true in regard not merely to the different configurations which Christianity receives in different Church-Communities, but also to the not unimportant diversities which further obtain *within* each of these communities in particular. But if every several party has properly elaborated its Philosophical Theology, it will also necessarily become evident, which of these diversities are connected with an *original difference* in the *mode of apprehending* Christianity itself, and which are not so.

§ 254. It is necessary that Philosophical and Historical Theology should become still more decidedly *separate and distinct* from each other; and yet, on the other hand, they can attain to their proper perfection *only in company, and by means of each other.*

All branches of Historical Theology suffer from the circumstance that Philosophical Theology has not yet been properly elaborated in its distinctive character (comp. § 33.) But Philosophical Theology would become altogether an *arbitrary* thing, if it were to break away from the obligation of *supporting* all its propositions by the clearest apprehension of History. And just in the same way would Historical Theology lose all *stability*, if it refused to connect itself with the clearest development of the elements of Philosophical Theology.

§ 255. In the present state of things, it is just as possible that the accusation which may be brought against an individual, of proceeding, in the department of Historical Theology, according to *arbitrary hypotheses*, may be *unreasonable*, as it is also that there may be *foundation for such a charge.*

It *has* foundation, when any one seeks to *constitute* the elements of Philosophical Theology by a process of mere *construction*, and then interprets events accordingly. It is *unreasonable*, when all that the man does is merely to make no secret of the fact that his Philosophical Theology, as it grows up for him *along with* the Historical, also furnishes its own *confirmation*, in its *aptness* with regard to the latter.

§ 256. The same remark applies to the case in which an individual is accused of transforming Historical Theology into an unintelligent *Empiricism*.

The charge has *foundation*, when any one *lays down*, as something *empirically given*, those notions which ought to be *made out* in the department of Philosophical Theology, in order that he may use them in that of Historical Theology. It is *unreasonable*, when a man does nothing more than *protest* against the *construction* of these notions *a priori*, and insist upon the necessity of the *critical* method (comp. § 32).

PART THE THIRD.

OF PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 257. As *Philosophical Theology* brings to intelligent consciousness the feelings of pleasure and dissatisfaction which arise in contemplating the condition of the Church at any given period : so is it the problem of *Practical Theology*, to regulate, with intelligent consciousness, and to conduct to the attainment of its object, that *deliberate activity* which is developed from the mental emotions connected with the said feelings.

As *Philosophical Theology* is here apprehended in the influence of its results upon an immediate *life-momentum*, so, too, is *Practical Theology* viewed as to the manner in which its results take hold of a similar *life-momentum*.

§ 258. *Practical Theology*, therefore, is for those only in whom an interest in the welfare of the Church, and a scientific spirit, exist in combination.

For, without the former, there is no origin for either the feelings or the mental emotions just referred to. And without a scientific spirit, there will be none for that deliberate activity which allows itself to be guided by precepts; on the contrary, that impulse to activity which is disaffected towards knowledge looks with contempt upon rules.

§ 259. The problems which have to be dealt with by every theologian, respectively, who seeks to put forth this deliberate-influence, arise out of the manner in

which he judges concerning the *state of the Church* at the time being; according to the notion which he entertains with regard to the *essential character of Christianity*, and of *his own particular Church-Community*.

For since the problem, stated generally, is merely the *Guidance of the Church*, his purpose, in every individual case, can be but this,—to make all that seems to him *good productive*, and on the other hand, to make that which is of the *opposite character inoperative*, and to effect a *change* with regard to it.

§ 260. Practical Theology does not aim at teaching us rightly to *apprehend* these problems; but, supposing this to have been already accomplished, it has to do merely with the *proper mode of proceeding* to be adopted in *disposing of all problems* which are capable of being brought under the notion of Church-Guidance.

If Philosophical and Historical Theology have been mastered, distinctly and in proper measure, nothing further remains to be done, theoretically, towards the right *apprehension* of the problems referred to. For, in that case, it is also possible for the given *condition* to be rightly *appreciated* in its relation to the aim of Church-Guidance; and consequently also, for the *problem* to be *stated* accordingly. We may admit, however, that for the purpose of laying down precepts as to the mode of proceeding to be adopted, it is necessary that the problems should be *classified*, and arranged in certain groups, the notion of Church-Guidance being taken as the starting-point of this classification.

§ 261. If we choose to consider these rules as *means*, by which the end is to be obtained, it follows, surely, (on account of the *subordination* of the means to the *end*,) that everything must remain *excluded* from these precepts, which, while it tended, perhaps, to advance the solution of an *individual* problem, might yet, at the same time, *in general*, *loosen* the ecclesiastical bond of union, or *weaken* the energy of the Christian principle.

The case is one of so frequent occurrence, that this canon

becomes necessary. Manifestly the individual good working of such a means can be but *accidental*; even supposing that it does not rest upon a mere *illusion*,—in which case the solution, after all, would not be the right one.

§ 262. In like manner, because the agent can *apply* he *means* only with the same spirit [temper, disposition] by virtue of which he *wills* the *end*,—it follows that no problem is to be solved by *means* which are *at variance* with either of the two elements of the theological spirit.

We may observe, again, that the two things which we here specify,—modes of proceeding that run counter to the *scientific* spirit,—and such as, while appearing to promote the *ecclesiastical* interest in some *particular* connexion, expose it in danger *upon the whole*,—have both been of sufficiently frequent occurrence in the ecclesiastical praxis.

§ 263. Since, however, all deliberate inoperation upon the Church with a view to the purer exhibition of Christianity thereon, is nothing else than *Soul-Guidance*; and since, on the other hand, no other *means* whatever are applicable to this purpose than certain definite operations upon the minds of men,—that is, therefore, again, *Soul-Guidance*: it cannot be productive of advance,—since means and end are entirely *coincident* with each other.—to regard the *rules* referred to as *means*, they should, on the contrary, be regarded simply as *methods*.

For *means* must be something situate *without* the end, and consequently, not *willed in and along with* the end itself, which can be said here only with regard to what is in the very highest degree *external*, while all that occupies a *nearer* position is itself *contained in* the end, and constitutes a *part of* it. Which relation, of the part to the whole, is what appears most prominently in the expression *Method*.

§ 264. The *classification* of the problems which present themselves in the department of Church-Guidance, and the *specification* of the *modes of proceeding* to be

adopted, are processes which admit of being *traced back into each other*.

For every particular *problem*, viewed both *notionally*, and in its *actual occurrence*, is a *portion of the collective end* in view, namely, Church-guidance, precisely as every *method* to be applied in the case of the several problems is but a part of the *same thing*. These matters, therefore, do not admit of being *kept apart* from each other, as if they were two principal divisions of the discipline now before us; inasmuch as the classification, too, merely specifies the method with a view to the solution of the *collective problem*.

§ 265. All the precepts of Practical Theology can be but *general expressions*, in which the nature and manner of their application to individual cases is not co-determined beforehand (comp. § 132); that is, they are *rules of art* in the more restricted sense of the term.

In all the rules of a *mechanical art*, this application is co-included beforehand; whereas, on the contrary, the precepts of the *higher arts* are all of the kind referred to in the text, so that the proper treatment of any matter in hand, in conformity with their rules, always requires, in addition, a special *talent*, which must be applied to discover the right course of procedure.

§ 266. These rules, therefore, cannot suffice to make a theologian of *any* and *every* one, even supposing him to be in possession of the theological spirit; on the contrary, they can but serve for the guidance of him who has *the will to be* a Practical Theologian, and who, as to his inward constitution and the preparation enjoyed by him, is *capable of becoming one*.

By this it is not intended to be affirmed, either that gifts of nature altogether *peculiar*, and granted only to a *few*, are necessary to the exercise of this office, or that the *entire course of preparation* must *precede* the resolve to seek it.

§ 267. As Christian Theology in general, and consequently the Practical department of it also, first became able to develope itself when Christianity had ob-

tained a *historical significance* (comp. § 2-5), and this was possible only by means of the *organization* of the *Christian Community*; so is all Church-Guidance, properly so called, based upon a determinate configuration of the *original contrast*, between those who occupy a position of *prominence*, and the *mass* [of Church Members.]

Without a contrast of this kind, capable of the most manifold *gradations*, but founded conformably to the order of nature in the relation of the *mature* to the *immature*, all progress towards the better could take place only in a *uniform developement*, not by means of any deliberate *guidance*. On the other hand, apart from a *determinate configuration* of this contrast, the guidance referred to could be nothing more than a relation existing between *individuals*; and the community, therefore, would consist merely of unconnected elements, and could never operate as a *whole*,—the condition upon which, notwithstanding, its attainment of a historical significance depends.

§ 268. This determinate configuration consists in the *method of circulation* which has been established for the purposes of *equalization* and *advancement*, and by virtue of which the religious energy of the pre-eminent stimulates the mass, and the mass, again, calls forth the activity of the former party.

That there results in this way a certain *equalization*, and a nearer approach on the part of the mass towards the position occupied by the pre-eminent, is in accordance with the nature of things; but *advancement* is attainable only upon the supposition that the religious energy, in the Community generally, and especially amongst the pre-eminent, is in a state of *increase*.

§ 269. In harmony with all that has been said hitherto, we shall, accordingly, have to take into especial consideration the form which this contrast assumes for the purpose of an efficient operation by means of *religious representations* [conceptions, ideas], and that which

it assumes for the purpose of influence upon the *life*; or, the guiding activity in the System of *Worship*, and the guiding activity in the ordering of *Morals*.

Phenomenally, it is true, these two things are very decidedly *distinct*; but, in so far as the *formula* is concerned, they certainly constitute but an *imperfect* antithesis. For the System of *Worship* itself exists only as a matter of *Morals* which has been reduced to a certain *order*; and since the *ordinances* [of the Church relative to *Morals*] are destitute of all external sanction, their validity, again, depends simply upon the before-mentioned efficient influence by means of *mental representations*. This two-fold relation [of the primary contrast], however, will still maintain its right to be recognized.

§ 270. Since those who are pre-eminent, are so only in virtue of possessing *both* elements of the theological spirit; while, on the other hand, the existence of these two elements in a precise *equilibrium* is nowhere to be taken for granted: we shall also find, that there is one species of guiding activity which is more *clerical* in its character, and another which is more *theological*, in the stricter sense of the word.

It cannot be proved that this difference is *coincident* with the preceding; still less that it *subdivides only one member* of the classification founded thereupon. Consequently, the two distinctions are to be regarded, preliminarily, as *co-ordinate* and as *crossing each other*.

§ 271. Christianity first acquired a *historical* character, when the Christian Community had come to consist of a *Union* of several locally determinate Congregations, each of which, again, had reduced the contrast before-mentioned to a *definite form*, (this being the process by which they first became Congregations). There is, therefore, a guiding activity which has for its object the *individual Congregation as such*, and which, accordingly, continues to be merely *local* in its character—and

a guiding activity directed towards the *whole*, which has for its object the organic Union of Congregations, that is, the Church.

This antithesis, too, is not a *perfect* one, inasmuch as it is possible that something may proceed, mediately, out of the guidance of the *individual* Congregation, which shall have a bearing upon the *whole*; and in like manner, it may happen that a guiding activity which is determined from the standpoint of the *whole*, affects but a *single* Congregation. In the *actual* course of history, both [forms of activity] present themselves in a manner very well defined.

§ 272. In periods in which the Church is *divided*, those Congregations only which are of one and the same *Confession* are *organically united*; and the *general* guiding activity, in its definitive character or application, is confined exclusively to the circle which is thus bounded.

There are also, certainly, influences which are put forth by one Church-Community upon others; but they cannot have the character of a *guiding* activity.—But even if no such division existed, still, with the present diffusion of Christianity, *outward* reasons would make the existence of a *universal* Church-Guidance, comprehending all Christian Congregations upon the earth, a thing *impossible*.

§ 273. Since, now, the modes of procedure to be adopted must be regulated by the manner in which the *contrast* before-mentioned has been *apprehended and reduced to form*; it follows that the *theory* of Church-Guidance must also be *different* for every differently constituted Church-Community; and what we are able to do, therefore, is merely to lay down a Practical Theology for the *Evangelical* Church.

Nay, not *completely* even for this; since within its limits also, too many differences of worship, and especially of constitution, present themselves. What we shall have immediately in view, therefore, will be merely the Evangelical Church of *Germany*.

§ 274. We regard the antithesis which was last enun-

ciated, in § 271, as presenting the highest basis for a division of our present subject; and we denominate the guiding activity which is directed towards the *whole*, Church-Government, and that which is directed towards the *individual local Congregation*, Church-Service.

Not as though it lay in the nature of the case, that these *must needs* be the leading divisions in our classification; but because this arrangement is the most *appropriate* to the *present* condition of our Church. Elsewhere, circumstances exist in which there would be little to be said concerning Church-Government, in the sense which the word bears here; because in those instances the tie by which a number of congregations are held together is but a very loose one.—For the rest, another mode of appellation for our two divisions suggests itself; namely, if we call the one Church-Government, we might denominate the other, Congregation-Government. But the appellation employed above has been preferred for the same reason for which this was adopted as our leading classification,—namely because the *Union of Congregations* which we call, by way of special distinction, the *Church*, is that which comes out most prominently to view, and it is therefore proper to connect the *other* division, also, with this totality; since, moreover, the *care* of an individual *portion* can only appear as a *service* which is rendered to the *whole*.

§ 275. The contents of Practical Theology are *included exhaustively* in the Theory of Church-Government (in the more restricted sense) and the Theory of Church-Service.

The antitheses, namely, which were specified above, in §§ 269 and 270, must be taken up and carried out within these two leading divisions.

§ 276. The *order of arrangement* is, in and of itself, a matter of *indifference*. We prefer to begin with the department of Church-Service, and to let that of Church-Government follow.

It is a matter of indifference, because, in any case, in the treatment of the antecedent division, regard must be had to

the *notion* of that which is to be dealt with subsequently, and to its possible *varieties of form*.—It is, however, the *natural order*, that those who devote themselves, in general, to the work of Church-Guidance, should *commence* their public activity in the department of Church-Service.

SECTION THE FIRST.—THE PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH-SERVICE.

§ 277. The local *Congregation*, which is a body of Christian households of the same Confession, inhabiting the same locality, and united together for the purposes of a common devotion, is the *simplest* organization, of a perfectly *ecclesiastical* character, in which it is possible for a guiding activity to have existence.

The usage of the language still presents us with the terms “National Congregation” (*Landesgemeinde*), “Congregation of a District” (*Kreisgemeinde*); but in these cases a strictly *common* exercise of devotion is not always to be found. It also affords the term “Domestic Congregation” (*Hausgemeinde*); but the guiding activity in this instance is not one which proceeds distinctively from the *religious* interest.

§ 278. If a Church-Service is to have existence at all, the antagonism between preponderant *activity* and preponderant *receptivity* must be definitely *adjusted* by agreement, at least in so far as certain determinate *momenta* are concerned.

Without *determinate momenta*, there can be no *common life*; and without *agreement* as to who shall communicate and who receive, this common life would be a mere *confusion*. If we suppose the greatest possible *parity* to exist amongst the members of the Congregation, the *distribution* of the parts referred to assumes an *arbitrary* character: but even in the case of the greatest *imparity*, receptivity [in some degree] must still be incumbent upon *all*.—The *determining* of this relation, as it respects every several Congregation, appertains, in the nature of the case, to the department of Church-Government.

§ 279. The guiding activity in Church-Service consists (comp. § 269) on the one hand of the *edifying*, which is exercised in connexion with the System of *Worship*, or assembling of the Congregation for the purpose of awakening and animating the devout consciousness; and on the other hand, of the *governing*, which acts not merely by the regulation of *Morals*, but also by an influence which is exerted upon the lives of *individuals*.

Above (§ 269), this second aspect [of the guiding activity] could be indicated only in the form in which it also has significance in connexion with Church-Government. Church-Service, however, would fail of attaining a large part of its object, if the guiding activity were not also directed towards *individuals*.

§ 280. The edifying activity in the system of Christian Worship rests preponderantly upon the imparting of the religious consciousness* when it has arrived at the condition of *thought*; and a *theory* in regard to this matter is possible only in so far as the said impartation may be regarded as possessing the character of *Art*.

This "preponderantly" applies, indeed (comp. § 49) to Christianity generally, [as compared with other religions]; but within its sphere, again, to the Evangelical form of it in particular.—*Thought* is to be taken here in that broader sense in which the elements of poetry are thoughts too. *Art*, in a certain sense, there must be, in every connected series of thoughts. The theory referred to must include at once these two questions—in what degree Art is here requisite or allowable, and by what methods the end in view is to be attained.

§ 281. The *material* of the System of Worship, in the stricter sense, can consist only of such representations [Vorstellungen] as also have their place in the body of the Church's doctrine; and our theory has therefore to determine, with respect to this material, *what* elements of the common doctrine are adapted, and *in what way*

* That is, of course, not the *faculty*, but its *contents*.—Tr.

they are adapted, to the purpose of the communication referred to.

Those representations are materials in the stricter sense, which have to be communicated *on their own account*, in opposition to those which merely serve as *illustrations* and *means of exhibition* to the former.—And since the same representations are wrought up in the most various *methods*, from the popular to the severely scientific, from the language of conversation to that of oratory and poetry, it must be determined which of these shades of difference are adapted to the purposes of the System of Worship, either generally, or in various [particular] connexions.

§ 282. Since the system of Christian Worship,—and the Evangelical form of it, again, in particular,—is compounded of elements *prosaic* and *poetic*: we have to treat, in relation to the subject of *form*, first of the *religious style*, prosaic as well as poetic, in its adaptation to Christianity; and then also, on the other hand, of those different *relations of commixture* between the two [kinds of] elements, which are of possible occurrence in the Evangelical System of Worship.

The Theory of Ecclesiastical Poesy belongs at least *thus far* to the Doctrine of Church-Service,—that even the process of *selection* [for the purposes of Christian Worship] from what exists already, must be conducted according to the *same principles* [by which every true Poet of the Christian Church is guided in the process of *composition*.]

§ 283. *Uniformity* and *variety* [*alternation* of different parts or elements in the same or in different services of Worship] have an unmistakeable influence upon the effectiveness of all delineations of the kind referred to; and hence this question also requires to be answered,—namely, how far,—treating the matter purely with reference to the interests of worship,—consideration for that which has an *established existence* must be *sacrificed to a better insight*, or the contrary.

Viewed immediately, the question seems to be in place here, only in so far as it is capable of being decided within the Congregation itself, without the intervention of the Ecclesiastical Government. But since it is also possible, notwithstanding, that the Congregation may be altogether *free* in this respect, it is best that the whole subject should be brought into the present connexion.

§ 284. Highly conformable as it is to the spirit of the Evangelical Church to regard Religious *Discourse* as the proper *centre* [kernel] of the System of Worship, yet nevertheless, that *form* of it which prevails among us at the present time, and which we designate distinctively by the term *Sermon*, is, in this precise shape, a thing of merely *accidental* character.

This is sufficiently evident, if we look merely at the *history* of our System of Worship; it becomes still clearer, when we inquire what it is, upon which the great *inequality* in the *effectiveness* of these discourses properly depends.

§ 285. Since the discipline which we call *Homiletics* usually takes for granted that this form is firmly established, and makes all its rules relate principally thereunto; it would be better to get rid of this restrictedness, and to treat the subject in a *freer and more general manner*.

The distinction between *Sermon* (in the proper sense) and *Homily*,—a distinction which, for some time past, has begun to be so far taken notice of that the latter [the Homily] is made to constitute the subject-matter of a *special theory*,—is far from satisfying the requirement of the proposition which we have laid down.

§ 286. In the Evangelical Church, we find the System of Worship consisting almost everywhere of two elements: one, which is left entirely to the *free productivity* of the individual by whom the Church-Service is conducted, and another, in which he merely occupies the position of an *organ* of the Ecclesiastical Government.

In the former aspect he is especially the *Preacher*, in the latter the *Liturgus*.

§ 287. The *liturgical* element can be a matter of discussion here, only upon the supposition that in it too, certain room is still afforded for a *free self-determination*; and only in the degree in which this is the case.

The question with regard to this self-determination can be decided only from the stand-point of Church-Government. It could be dealt with here, only in so far as it might be possible to show that a *total negation* [of the self-determination contended for] is at variance with the proper *notion* of the System of Worship in the Evangelical Church.

§ 288. Since the Service of the Church in the System of Worship is essentially connected with certain *organic activities* which produce an effect simultaneous with the proceeding itself: it is to be determined *whether*, and *to what extent*, these activities may also become a matter for the application of *rules of art*; which are to be laid down accordingly.

These rules, then, would be an application of *Mimetics*, in the broader sense of the word, to the department of religious delineation.

§ 289. Since the proceedings of Church-Service are connected with a certain *limited space* [apartment], which is capable in like manner of producing, by its character, an impression simultaneous with these proceedings; it is to be determined how far such an impression is *allowable* or *desirable*, and *rules* upon this head are to be laid down accordingly.

Since the circumscribing of the space [occupied] is merely an *outward condition*, and consequently a *collateral circumstance*, not a *part* of the System of Worship itself, the rules here spoken of would be necessarily a mere application of the Theory of Decorations to the department of religious delineation.

§ 290. If we look solely at the antagonism between

the preponderantly productive and the preponderantly receptive within the Congregation, regarding the latter as in a condition of *parity*; [we shall find that] there may be in the Congregation a guiding activity producing an effect that is *common* [to *all* the members]: but in so far as, amongst the receptive, any portion is found to *lag behind* the general body, the condition of these, as *individuals*, is a matter for the application of the guiding activity.

The latter form of this activity is already known under the name of Pastoral Care [Seelsorge, Care of Souls]; and we treat of this first, because the *removal* of an *imparity* such as is here supposed, appears ever as the *first* problem to be dealt with. The former we call the *regulative* activity; and it gives origin to *modes of life* as well as to individual *works performed in common*.

§ 291. The immediate *objects* of the Pastoral Care, in the *broader* sense of the word, are those persons of immature age who are to be *educated* in the Congregation; and the Theory of that activity which is to be directed towards them, and which forms a part of the organization of Church-Service, is denominated *Catechetics*.

The name is taken merely from an *accidental form* of the immediate practical duty [to which the theory refers], and is consequently too circumscribed, as an expression for the whole extent of the problem involved.

§ 292. The business of Catechetics can be rightly ordered only when an *agreement* is established amongst all who have part therein, as to its *points of commencement* and of *termination*.

To this extent, therefore,—supposing that the required agreement does not *occur of itself*,—the *practical business*, as well as the *theory* [of Catechetics], is dependent upon the *ordering* [regulative] activity.

§ 293. By reason of the end in view, which is, to make the *immature* like the *mature*, in so far, namely,

as the latter are the *receptive*, the business [of Catechetics] must consist of *two parts*: namely, that the former become equally receptive [with the latter] in relation to the *edifying* activity, and also equally receptive in relation to the *ordering* activity, (comp. § 279); and the object is to be attained in both its parts by one and the same process.

The former is the vivification of the religious consciousness towards the side of *thought*, the latter the awakening of the same consciousness towards the side of *impulse*.

§ 294. In so far, however, as it is necessary that the end in view should be at the same time to prepare them for a greater approximation towards [the position of those in whom there is a *preponderant self-activity*: it is to be determined how this may take place without disturbing their relation to the other [members of the community who belong to the class of the] mature.

As Catechetics, in general, fall back upon Pædagogics as [furnishing the] Technology [which they require], so this, too, is a *general pædagogical problem*, which, however, at the same time, assumes a *special form* in connexion with the department of religion.

§ 295. Since Religion is to be developed in both directions (comp. § 293), not merely in its *contrast* to the *sensible* [or *sensuous*] *self-consciousness*, but also in its *Christian* character and in the *Evangelical* form: it is necessary also that the *relation* of the *individual* and the *universal* tendencies [or aspects of this development] to each other, in regard both to *equalization* and to *progress* (comp. § 294), should here be determined.

It is the more necessary that this problem should be embraced by the theory [of Catechetics], from the circumstance that within the latest period, most notable errors in regard to this point have presented themselves.

§ 296. It is possible for those individuals who live

within the local limits, or in the vicinity, of a Congregation, in the character of *religious aliens*, to become, for a similar reason, objects for the exercise of a similar activity: and it is necessary, with a view to such cases, that we should be provided with a theory respecting the proper treatment of *convertendi*.

The more accurately the principles of Catechetics are laid down, the more easy will it of necessity be to derive from them such others as are necessary for the case here specified.

§ 297. But since this form of activity is not based upon so *natural* a foundation [as the catechetical]: it would be desirable to lay down certain *signs* by which it may be known whether there is sufficient *motive* for such a proceeding.

For it is possible, in this matter, to err in both directions; by a too ready confidence, and by a too timorous hesitation.

§ 298. *Conditionally*, the *Theory of Missions* might also find a point of connexion here; a theory which, up to the present time, is as good as altogether wanting.

In order that this connexion may be effected in the easiest manner, it is necessary, certainly, to start from the assumption that all efforts of the kind referred to are successful only where a Christian Congregation has existence.

§ 299. *Individually*, those members of the Congregation may become objects for the exercise of the Pastoral Care, who, from inward or outward causes, have *lost* their *parity* with the rest; and the occupation which has to do with these persons is denominated Pastoral Care, in the more *restricted* sense of the term.

Since, namely, in the actual state of things, *parity* is ever but the *minimum* of *disparity*,*—those who occupy the *least advanced* position amongst the *like*, are not the persons intended to be referred to here; this latter class, indeed, being

* In other words, those who are said to be, in any respect, *alike* or *equal*, are, strictly speaking, simply those who are *least unlike* or *least unequal*.—TR.

always to be found, but the others [those referred to in the text] only *accidentally*.

§ 300. Now since, in the case adduced, a *special* relation has to be formed [between the Pastor and the individual]: it is necessary that *our* theory should determine, in the first place, whether this connexion may *originate*, in *every* instance, in *either* of the two possible ways,—with the party that *needs* or the party that *communicates*,—or *which* way is the *right* one under any given circumstances.

The great *diversity* which prevails in different portions of the Evangelical Church, as it respects the treatment of this matter, has not, up to the present time, been either reduced to theory* or got rid of.

§ 301. Since such a loss of parity, proceeding from *inward* causes, can manifest itself only in an *opposition* to the *edifying* or to the *ordering* activity: it is in the next place to be determined *whether*, and *in what manner*, in conformity with the spirit of the Evangelical Church, the mode of proceeding to be adopted should be *compounded* of these two elements; and lastly, also, whether, supposing that the Pastoral Care does not attain its end, its business is to be regarded always and exclusively as *not yet finished*, or *whether*, and *when*, and *how far*, the *connexion* of those who have become unresponsive with those who sustain the office of guidance may be looked upon as *done away*.

The cessation of this connexion would also draw after it, as a natural consequence, the cessation of the connexion with the *Congregation* as such.

§ 302. With regard to that exercise of the Pastoral Care which is rendered necessary by the operation of *outward* causes, we have only, in addition to the solution

* Literally, *constructed*, (ideally or logically); exhibited in a *systematic connexion* which of itself suffices to render the diversity *intelligible*.—Th.

of the first problem (comp. § 300), to determine in what way the *official* activity of which we are speaking may be made to *harmonize* with the *social* activity [or influence] of the receptive who belong to the Congregation.*

For the questions started in § 301 can hardly be connected with any doubt in the case before us; since here we have only to supply that deficiency which is experienced in consequence of the momentary suspension of participation in the common life [of the Congregation]. The edifying activity, in this case, approaches too nearly to the character of ordinary conversation to require a special theory.

§ 303. The *regulative* activity within the Congregation (comp. § 290) appears *limited* in relation to *Morals*, partly by the more comprehensive inoperations of the *Ecclesiastical Government*, partly by the irrefragable claims of *personal liberty*.

One can only say "*appears*;" for it is necessary that those who sustain the office of guidance should be restrained by *their own personal sense of liberty* from invading the province of the latter. The very same influence, on the other hand, ought also to withhold those who sustain the guiding office in the department of Church-Government from invading, in the pursuit of a centralizing tendency, the province of the Congregation.

§ 304. Since the Evangelical System of Morals, as well as of Doctrine, in opposition to [that of] the Catholic Church, is still *in process of developement*: we have simply, in general, to lay down rules concerning the manner in which,—starting from any given condition,—the *collective life* may gradually be brought nearer to that

* I take the passage to mean, that *both* the forms of service or influence here specified,—that of the *Minister*, and that of *sympathizing fellow members* of the Congregation,—are *necessary* to compensate the temporary loss suffered by the patient, and should be secured accordingly; but that they must at the same time be *kept from clashing* with each other,—or rather, be *combined* in such a manner as to produce the *greatest possible amount of benefit*.—T₂.

form which is in accordance with the *maturer insight* of such as have gone on in advance [of the rest, and of their own former position].

It is possible, on the one hand, that the given state of things may yet contain within itself, unperceived, sundry elements derived from Catholicism; or, on the other, that it may, in consequence of mistake, have stepped beyond certain limits which Christianity itself lays down.

§ 305. Since the life of man, in the Christian Congregation, as well as elsewhere, is subject withal to certain determinations derived from *social* and *civil* relationships: it should be specified in what manner we may also procure for the influence of the Christian and Evangelical spirit a *larger validity* within the department thus indicated, —in so far as it is possible for such an effect to result from *local* determinations [as distinguished from *general* ordinances].

Here, universally, we can speak only of the *method of proceeding* to be adopted; the *material* of the ordering activity being dependent upon the current apprehension of the System of Christian Doctrine, especially the Doctrine of Morals.

§ 306. Since it is also necessary that the calls to a union of energies, for the purpose of all such *works in common* as are contained in the *notion*, and [are to be accomplished] within the *local limits* of the Congregation, should also have their origin from the ordering activity: it is of importance that the *boundary* of the latter (comp. § 303) should be defined.

The problem is, to separate that which forms a part of *official* labour, and [as such] has a *constant and continuous existence*,—for example, the entire province of the Diaconate, in the original sense of the word,—from that which can proceed only from the *personal* relation of individuals, sustaining the office of guidance, towards a portion of the entire body.

§ 307. We have here treated of Church-Service as

one *undivided* department, without seeking to impose any restrictions with regard to the different ways in which it is possible to *distribute* the *occupations* it involves.

Otherwise, we should have been obliged to anticipate here the theory of Church-Government. Here, again, therefore, we can but follow the ancient method, by grouping together, at this stage, all who take part in the occupations of Church-Service, under the term *Clerus*.

§ 308. Only in this general way, therefore, is it possible for us also to deal with the question as to *whether* any, and *what sort of influence* should be exerted by the *ecclesiastical* relation between Clerus and Laity upon the *association* of the former with the latter, as well in *civil*, as in *social* and *scientific* relations.

The problems which it has been usual to discuss under the title of *Pastoral Prudence*, appear here in an altogether subordinate character; and their solution depends upon the settlement of the question, whether any, and what specific *difference* obtains between those members of the Clerus who conduct the exercises of Worship, and the rest.

SECTION THE SECOND.—THE PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT.

§ 309. If Church-Government has its foundation in the *form* which is given to a connexion subsisting between a *complexus* of Congregations: it follows that we have, in the first place, to note down the multiplicity of relations which are of possible developement, between the Ecclesiastical Government and the [individual] Congregations, and to determine whether there are any forms which, by the peculiar character of the Evangelical Church, are definitively *excluded*, or any others which are definitively *postulated*.

It is taken for granted, namely, that the form of such a connexion neither contradicts the essential character of Christianity, nor does away with the spontaneous activity of the individual Congregations.

§ 310. Since the way and manner in which, in such an enclosed *complexus*, those in whom spontaneous activity is predominant become organized with a view to the exercise of Church-Government, and the manner in which the operation of this Government, and the free, spontaneous activity of the Congregations are mutually stimulated and restricted, form the *internal Church-Constitution* of the body: the tendency of the problem stated above is, to refer the latter [the internal Church-Constitution], so far as the Evangelical Church is concerned,—as well in its multiplicity [of ecclesiastical developements] as in its antagonism towards the Catholic Church,—to certain *principles*.

On the one hand, the solution must base itself upon certain propositions of Dogmatics, and on the other, it can be successfully accomplished only by making an appropriate use of Church History and Ecclesiastical Statistics.

§ 311. Since the Evangelical Church does not, at the present time, form but *one single complexus* of Congregations, and since, in different portions of it, there is even a *difference of internal constitution*, while on the other hand its Theology ought to be *the same for all*: it is necessary that the Theory of Church-Government should *put* its problems in that form and manner in which they are the *same for all possible* Evangelical Constitutions, and are capable of being solved from the position of any and every one of the latter respectively.

The expression “at the present time,” is merely intended to premise that the *impossibility* of any manner of outward unity for the Evangelical Church is at least not *decidedly made out*.

§ 312. Since every historical whole is capable of a continued existence only by means of the same energies through which it originated: it follows that the Government of the Evangelical Church consists of *two elements*: the *fixed*,—that is, the form which the antagonism [between the Government and the Congregations] assumes for the given *complexus*,—and the *unfixed*,—in other words, that free inoperation upon the whole body, which may be attempted by every member of the Church that believes himself called to do so.

Not merely with regard to the rectification of *doctrine*, but also with regard to its *Constitution*, or fixed Church-Government, the Evangelical Church *originated* in the first instance from this free inoperation; in the *absence* of which, moreover, (since the fixed Church-Government is identical with the Constitution), an *amendment* of the Constitution could not take place in any conceivable way.—In order that the last definition [in the text of this ¶] may be kept from appearing to have a *tumultuary* tendency, it is only necessary to bear in mind, that if a man who does *not* belong to the predominantly productive class were nevertheless to believe himself a subject of the call referred to, any experiment which *he* might make would of itself *come to nothing*.

§ 313. The *purpose* of these two elements can be but *one and the same*: (comp. § 25) to *exhibit* more and more clearly, in the Evangelical Church, the *Idea of Christianity*, according to the peculiar manner in which it is apprehended by the said Church,—and to win for it a constantly increasing mass of energies. In the *pursuit* of this object, however,—while the *organized* element, the Ecclesiastical Power or (more correctly) Authority, may be concerned in the way of *ordinance* or *restriction*, the *unorganized* element, or free, spiritual power, can be so only in the way of *stimulus* and *warning*.

It being understood, nevertheless, that the Ecclesiastical Power is *also* destitute of every *outward* sanction for that

which it enunciates; so that, essentially, the difference comes to this,—that the enunciations just adverted to operate as an *expression* of the spirit and sense of the Community, while on the other hand, the free spiritual power seeks to *introduce* into this general sense and spirit something which was *not* there previously.

§ 314. The condition of a historical whole is the more satisfactory, in proportion as these two kinds of activity have a *more lively hold* upon each other, and in proportion as the action in both departments is connected more decidedly with the consciousness of the *relative antagonism* which subsists between them.

The Ecclesiastical Authority has therefore to combine the two following objects, and the Theory [of Church-Government] must seek to discover the requisite formula (comp. § 310): [the observance of] its preponderant obligations, to *maintain* and to *strengthen* the *principle* which was constituted by means of the last preceding *epoch*,—and yet at the same time also to *favour* and to *protect* the manifestations of the *free spiritual power*, which alone is capable of initiating [new] reformatory developements. In like manner it should be shown with regard to this free spiritual power, how, without sacrificing in any degree the strength of [private] conviction, it may nevertheless content itself with what is capable of being brought into life through the agency of the Ecclesiastical Authority.

§ 315. Since an ecclesiastical connexion of the larger kind can exist only in the case of a certain degree of *parity*, or a certain *facility of equalization*, amongst the Congregations by which it is constituted: the Ecclesiastical Authority has, in every case, a share in the *fashioning* and *maintenance* of the *antagonism* [or contrast] between Clerus and Laity in the [several] Congregations.

That is to say, *only* a share: because the Congregation is *prior* in point of time to the ecclesiastical *Neus*; and because its very being [as a Congregation] depends upon the existence within it of this antagonism.

§ 316. Since this participation is capable of varying in degree from a *maximum* to a *minimum*, our Theory has first to settle [the particulars of] this diversity, and then to determine to what different circumstances and conditions every mode [of adjustment] is respectively appropriate, and whether it should be the same for all the functions of Church-Service, or should differ as they differ.

For it is self-evident, from a reference to all similar cases, that in this seemingly *continuous* transition from *minimum* to *maximum*, certain points admit, nevertheless, of being *fixed* so as to furnish us with *leading distinctions*.

§ 317. Since, further, this parity cannot be regarded either as *unchangeable*, or as always *self-renewing*, and must consequently be at the same time a work of the Ecclesiastical Authority: it is necessary to determine the *form and manner* in which the influence thus implied should be *exerted*,—that is, to define the notion of Ecclesiastical Legislation.

“*At the same time*”: because, namely, it must, in a certain sense, be *already in existence*, before the Ecclesiastical Authority.—The term *legislation*, [in this connexion], always continues to have a character of *inexactness*, because the Ecclesiastical Authority is likewise destitute of every outward sanction.

§ 318. Since, now, this parity can become immediately apparent only in Worship and in Morals, and these two things, on the other hand, ought to be in themselves the *adequate expression* of the prevailing piety of any [given] locality: the problem thus arises, of making the ecclesiastical legislation a means of *uniting* the two, and of *keeping* them united.

It is involved in the nature of the case, that this object can be attained only by a process of *approximation*; and that the theory, therefore, must aim chiefly at confining the *fluctuation* which takes place between the preponderance of the

one element and that of the other, *within as narrow limits as possible.*

§ 319. Since these two things can continue to exist as the expression of the ecclesiastical Unity, only in so far as they respectively *retain their identity*; and since, on the other hand, every thing which is an expression and means of delineation [of some other thing], in so far as it has this character, gradually *changes* its significant value: the problem thus arises, in connexion with the work of legislation, of recognising the *freedom* and *mobility* of each, as well as consolidating its *uniformity*.*

This will also, at the same time, have the effect of at least confining within certain definite *limits* the relation of the Ecclesiastical Authority to the department of Church-Service, in the constitution of the Systems of Worship and of Morals.

§ 320. In case of an *opposition* arising within the Congregation,—whether it proceeds from individuals (comp. § 299) who have fallen out of a state of unity with the whole body, or from a recession of [the principle or sentiment of] unity in general,—it must, further, be competent to the Ecclesiastical Authority, as being itself the highest expression of the Spirit of the Community, to bring the matter to a *decision*, provided no agreement can be arrived at within the Congregation.

This decision obtains *effect*, always, only in so far as the opponents are also minded *not to cease* from seeking the satisfaction of that impulse which leads them to wish for Christian fellowship, in *this particular* ecclesiastical Union.

§ 321. In so far as the Ecclesiastical Authority operates towards this end, either *by means of* general regulations, or at least (where it interposes specially) *in accordance with* such regulations: it is necessary that

* That is, its *constant identity* and *self-consistency*; *Gleichförmigkeit*, not *Einförmigkeit*.—Tr.

the question be here determined, *whether, and under what circumstances*, in an Evangelical Church-Union, *Church Discipline*,—or, it may be, *Excommunication*,—is to be permitted.

The question with regard to the *latter* applies, namely, in so far as it is possible [under each particular Ecclesiastical Constitution] for the Ecclesiastical Authority to declare that the relation of an individual member towards the Congregation or the Church-Union has come to an end. That with regard to the *former*, arises in so far as it is supposed that where an *opposition* [comp. § 301] has occurred, it cannot be properly brought to an end, except by a public acknowledgement of its impropriety [on the part of its author or authors].

§ 322. With regard to the relation of the Ecclesiastical Authority towards the System of Doctrine, views of such opposite character still obtain currency, that it seems impossible to find *a common starting-point*; so that a *theory* [of this relation] can be laid down only *conditionally*.

Nay, it would not be easy even to bring the different parties to a mutual understanding with regard to the *place* where the controversy ought to be decided, and consequently, as it were, to the choice of an *umpire*.

§ 323. Setting out on the one hand from the fact, that the Evangelical Church-Union has *arisen in connexion with*, and it may almost be said *out of*, the assertion of the principle, that it is not competent to any *authority* to *fix* or to *alter* the System of Doctrine; and on the other hand, from the fact that notwithstanding the existence of a *plurality* of Evangelical Church-Unions, following different maxims, we nevertheless recognise the existence of *one* Evangelical Church, and of a *community of doctrine* attesting this unity: we believe ourselves at liberty to state the problem only in the manner following. It is to be determined in what way the Ecclesias-

tical Authority of every Union respectively,—recognizing the principle that *changes* in the doctrinal propositions and formulæ commonly received may be permitted to arise out of the researches of individuals, *only* when [the results of] the latter have been taken up into the *conviction* of the Congregation,—may be able to *protect* this efficient activity of the *free spiritual power*, and yet at the same time to *hold fast the unity* of the Church [as founded or embodied] in the principles of its origin.

Of course it is by no means intended to exclude the possibility of the exercise of this efficient activity of free research, also, on the part of those who operate as constituting the Ecclesiastical Authority; on the contrary, all we have to do in such a case, is to insist the more strongly upon the principle that they must not do this *in the manner and under the official character* [Firma] of the Ecclesiastical Authority.—But the problem must be stated in a manner *totally opposite* to that which is here adopted, if we start from the hypothesis that the Church exists as *one*, only by means of a *uniformity* of doctrine so *exact*, that the *degree* of this exactness is capable of being specified.

§ 324. What was said above (comp. § 322) applies also to the rights and obligations of the Ecclesiastical Authority, as it respects *the relation of the Church to the State*, inasmuch as no method of proceeding which could possibly be prescribed would have the good fortune to meet with general recognition.

There seems to be but *thus* much observable: that in those cases in which the Evangelical Church is *wholly separate* from the State, no one cherishes a wish that it should be *otherwise*; but where a *closer connexion* exists between the two, there is a *division of opinion* within the Church.

§ 325. Setting out on the one hand from the principle, that if the Church does not *wish* to be a secular power, it must not be *willing*, either, to be *entangled in the organization* of the secular power; and on the other hand

from the principle, that what such members of the Church as stand at the head of the Civil Government, do within the department of the Church, they can do, nevertheless, *only in the form of Church-Guidance*: we are able to state the problem only in the manner following. It is to be determined in what manner the Ecclesiastical Authority has to labour, under the various circumstances which may be given, for the accomplishment of *this* object: that the Church shall be kept from falling, either into an *impotent independence* with regard to the State, or into a *servitude*, no matter how *respectable*, towards the latter.

The theory required, is one which it is in the highest degree difficult to lay down, and one which at the same time yields but little advantage; because, if the Ecclesiastical Authority finds already existing, either a fusion of the Church with the political organization, or a mode of proceeding in ecclesiastical matters in which the influence of an outward sanction is employed, it can, under its own proper form, work against such a state of things only *indirectly*, and must look for every thing further to the gradual inoperations of the free spiritual power.—And how little agreement there is even with regard to first principles, is best illustrated by the circumstance, that where the Church is in a state of servitude unaccompanied by respectability, some will always prefer to *acquire* respectability in this state of servitude, and others, on the contrary, to *remain of no repute*, provided they may but become *independent*.

§ 326. Supposing the State to have *taken up into its own organization* the entire organization of *educational institutions*, the same problem presents itself yet again, in a special connexion: inasmuch as there is then,—in reference to that *spiritual culture* by which alone the Evangelical System of Worship can be maintained, and a free spiritual power continue to have existence in the

Church,—a like danger of *impotent independence* or of *opulent servitude*.

In connexion with this department, the following dilemma, —a difficult one, and one which does not admit of a simple solution—may, under unfavourable circumstances, very easily arise: whether the Church-Union shall content itself with that apparatus—no matter how meagre—which it is able to procure and to take care of for itself, *independently*; or whether it shall venture to draw also from sources in which there is an admixture of *non-Evangelical* elements.

§ 327. Since the various isolated Unions of Congregations which, taken together, form the Evangelical Church, are each *exactly limited*,—partly by outward circumstances which are subject to change,—partly by differences in their Systems of Morals or of Doctrine, the value attached to which differences is likewise subject to change; and since, on the other hand, the largest number of them find their independence endangered by this limitation: there arises, for every one of them respectively, the problem of *keeping itself open* to a closer connexion with the rest, and of *preparing the way*, within its own interior, for the accomplishment of this connexion, so that no favourable opportunity of calling it into existence shall be lost by reason of neglect.

This problem also marks the *end* of the province of the Ecclesiastical Authority; for not only does every *previously existing* Church-Government, upon the solution of this problem, *become extinct* as to its separate being, but the *solution itself*, too, (because it *goes out beyond* the province of the isolated Authority), can only be called forth by the *free spiritual power*.

§ 328. Since the unfixed element of Church-Government (comp. § 312), which, in the Evangelical Church, we designate by the term *free spiritual power*, being an activity on the part of individuals, which is directed to-

wards the entire body, supposes the existence of a *publicity* as free from limitation as possible, in which the individual has an opportunity of giving utterance to his sentiments: it follows that this element is to be found especially, at the present time, in connexion with the profession of the *Academical Theologian* and the *Ecclesiastical Writer*.

In connexion with the *former* of these expressions, our thoughts should not be directed exactly towards that *merely accidental form* [of instruction by means of *lectures*] which still obtains [in our Universities]. Nevertheless, an *oral delivery*, exercising, in various ways, a stimulating influence upon large masses of youth destined to the work of Church-Guidance, will always continue to be in the highest degree *desirable*.—The *latter* term does not comprehend, in its present connexion, those who merely commit to writing their performances in the department of Church-Service [*e. g.* sermons, prayers, &c.]

§ 329. These two characters will accomplish the most *general* efficiency of which they are capable (comp. §§ 313, 314), only in the degree in which they respectively approximate to the notion of a *Prince of the Church* (comp. § 9.)

They have each of them *less* need of that equipoise which is referred to in § 9, in proportion as their productive power is exercised within the province of a *special scientific proficiency*. In the same degree, however, will they also *fail* to exert any *general* exciting influence upon the government of the Church.

§ 330. Since the Academical Instructor, dealing with youth who are especially animated by the *religious* interest, has to make the *scientific* spirit, in its theological application, for the first time a matter of thorough consciousness in them: it is necessary to specify the method in which this spirit may be *quickened*, without *weakening* the religious interest.

How little we are yet in possession of such a method, may be learnt from an experience the examples of which are but too numerous. For the rest, we forbear the inquiry as to whether the appropriate method is of a *universal* character, or whether its selection turns upon *different* considerations in the case of different *disciplinæ*.

§ 331. Since the *existing* [amount and form of theological knowledge] suffices the less to *satisfy* [the theologian], in proportion as the individual *disciplinæ* come to be pervaded by a truly scientific spirit: it is necessary to lay down a method of proceeding by which it may be possible to *combine* that encouragement and guidance which are directed towards the *advancement* of the theological sciences, with a *correct valuation* of their *previous results*, and a faithful *preservation* of the good which has been thereby deposited within the Church.

A like experience evinces the same want in this case as in the last; and undeniably, much of the over-strained difference that exists between the heralds of the New and the worshippers of the Old, is imputable to the prevailing method of instruction.

§ 332. In so far as the literary activity is directed towards the *combating* of that which is *false* and *pernicious*: it is necessary to specify for the Theological Writer in particular, the method by which he may, on the one hand, not merely *discover*, but also *procure recognition for*, the True and Good to which the False and Pernicious is found attached, and with which it is connected,—and on the other, may point out to the *individuality* in which these things make their appearance, its *proper relation* to the prevailing *want* of the Church.

The principle, that all *error* has being only in so far as it is attached to some *truth*, and all that is *bad* only in so far as it is attached to something that is *good*, forms the *essential condition* of all *controversy* and of all *correction*.—The latter

part of the problem rests, on the one hand, upon the assumption that the Erroneous and Prejudicial, if not supported by a marked *individuality*, is capable of exerting but little influence; and on the other hand upon this,—that in the Church, it is possible for *every* kind of talent to find *some* mode of manifestation which shall conduce to the common *benefit*.

§ 333. In so far as this activity seeks to recommend and to obtain recognition for that which is *new*: it is necessary to find a formula indicative of the manner in which the exhibition of the *antithesis*, and that of the *connexion*, between the New and the Old, may be most effectively sustained.

For if there were no *antithesis*, it would not be *new*; and if there were no *connexion*, it would be impossible to find a *point of junction* for it [in the existing system].

§ 334. Since it is an easy thing for that which is matter of public communication to become *diffused beyond* the circle in which it is properly *understood*: this circumstance gives rise to the problem, of *managing the delineation* just referred to in such a manner, that it shall have an *attraction* for those only who may also be expected to make a *legitimate use* of it.

The rule which was formerly, almost exclusively, recommended and applied for this purpose, to employ none but the *learned* [Latin] language as the *vehicle* of representations likely to be either misinterpreted or abused, is no longer adapted to existing circumstances.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

§ 335. It was not possible, in this case, to speak of a *separation* between that which is obligatory upon *every* [theologian], and that which constitutes a *special proficiency*.

For the separation can be grounded only upon limitations

which are *accidental*, or all but *personal*, and presents itself, in such cases, *spontaneously*. *Regarded in and for himself*, every one who is called to the work of Church Guidance, [as a Practical Theologian] is capable of *every kind* of efficient activity [here specified]; and there exist not so much different separable *departments*, as different *degrees*, merely, of *attainable perfection*.

§ 336. The *problems* [of Practical Theology], especially those which occur in the department of Church-Government, will be *most correctly stated* by him who has most thoroughly and completely developed his Philosophical Theology. The most correct *methods* will suggest themselves to him who lives upon the most manifold Historical basis in the Present.* The proper *carrying out* of these methods must be most effectually promoted by [appropriate] *natural endowments* and *general culture*.

If there were no requirement *here* of *all* the several departments treated of in this encyclopædian outline, the *outline itself* would be *incorrect* [inasmuch as Practical Theology deals *immediately* with that which is also the *end* or *reason* of Theology considered as a whole]; as the *requirement*, again, would be, if it embraced any thing *incapable* of being contained in *any* encyclopædian outline.

§ 337. The present condition of Practical Theology evinces that that which occupies the *last* place in the *study of every individual theologian*, presents itself also in a similar position in the *developement of Theology upon the whole*.

Because (if there were no other reason) it supposes as its antecedent the complete developement of Philosophical Theology (comp. §§ 66 and 259).

* The following paraphrase may perhaps render the last clause of this sentence more readily intelligible: "who, having a conscious, living interest in the Present, has also most largely and most accurately traced out its historical antecedents."—TR.

§ 338. Since, in the Evangelical Church, both Church-Service and Church-Government are essentially conditioned by the *antagonism* of this Church towards the Church of Rome:—it constitutes the highest perfection of Practical Theology, to fashion both, [Church-Service and Church-Government], at any given period, in such a manner as shall be best adapted to the *existing state* of this antagonism with reference to [that is, as approaching, or receding from] its point of culmination.

This involves a specific reference to the highest problem of Apologetics (comp. § 53).

THE END.

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